摘要
本文讨论当投标人之间存在不同的预算约束时两物品的序贯增价拍卖,对于物品之间不同的关系(互补、替代或者不相干的关系),物品价值大小的不同及与预算大小之间的关系,在一个简单的完全信息模型下,我们分不同情况讨论投标人的均衡出价策略,并发现对卖方来说,先拍卖价值高的物品是弱占优的策略。
In a sequential English auction,a seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to different budget constraints.With the objects that may be either complement or substitutes or unrelated in a simple complete information setting,we consider the bidders' equilibrium bidding strategies in different cases.We find it's a weakly dominant strategy to sell the more valuable object first.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2003年第6期61-65,共5页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70071012)
关键词
多物品拍卖
预算约束
序贯增价拍卖
均衡出价策略
multiple-object auction
budget constraints
sequential English auction
equilibrium bidding strategy
