摘要
文章根据信息经济学的基本理论,应用数理模型探讨中小企业信用担保机构存在的理论基础和前提条件,得出的结论是:在中小企业无任何抵押担保品的前提下,虽然担保机构部分解决了信息不对称问题,但并末解决由此产生的逆向选择和道德风险,反而可能加大逆向选择和道德风险,形成信用担保悖论。只有中小企业提供了足额的担保品以后,信用担保机构的存在才有现实意义。
Based on the theory of information economics, we use mathematical model to study the theory foundation and premise of credit guarantee institutions for small and medium-sized enterprises. We find that, on the premise that small and medium-sized enterprises have no mortgage, although guarantee institutions partly solve the information asymmetry problem, it can't solve, but instead enhance adverse selection and moral hazard, thus forming credit guarantee paradox. The existence of credit guarantee institution is meaningful only when small and medium-sized enterprises can provide sufficient mortgage.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第7期105-112,共8页
Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词
中小企业
信用担保
逆向选择
道德风险
small and medium-sized enterprises
credit guarantee
adverse selection
moral hazard.
