Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no...Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.展开更多
目的:系统评价连续性肾脏替代疗法(CRRT)病人体外循环寿命的非抗凝危险因素。方法:计算机检索The Cochrane Library、PubMed、Web of Science、EMbase、中国知网、万方、维普、中国生物医学文献数据库中自建库到2021年4月1日关于CRRT病...目的:系统评价连续性肾脏替代疗法(CRRT)病人体外循环寿命的非抗凝危险因素。方法:计算机检索The Cochrane Library、PubMed、Web of Science、EMbase、中国知网、万方、维普、中国生物医学文献数据库中自建库到2021年4月1日关于CRRT病人体外循环寿命相关危险因素的文献,采用RevMan 5.3软件进行Meta分析。结果:共纳入15篇文献。Meta分析结果显示,年龄(OR=3.20)、因意识障碍引起躁动(OR=4.20)、血小板计数(MD=36.56)、活化部分凝血活酶时间(MD=-11.76)、凝血酶原时间(MD=-1.95)、红细胞压积(MD=4.22)、离子钙浓度(MD=0.65)、超滤速度(MD=56.45)、跨膜压(MD=45.32)、血流速度(MD=-10.38)、稀释方式(OR=3.86)、使用间断生理盐水冲洗(OR=2.68)、中重度双腔导管出口功能不良(RR=2.07)是CRRT病人体外循环寿命的非抗凝危险因素(P<0.05)。结论:年龄≥60岁、因意识障碍引起躁动、血小板计数、红细胞压积、离子钙浓度、活化部分凝血活酶时间、凝血酶原时间、超滤速度、跨膜压、血流速度、稀释方式、间断生理盐水冲洗、双腔导管出口功能不良是CRRT病人体外循环寿命的非抗凝影响因素,临床上应针对CRRT病人存在的可控危险因素进行早期干预。展开更多
文摘Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.
