The main thesis intended in this paper consists in that scientific knowledge of the physical world entails a conceptualization of it in a certain mode which is relative to,and dependent on,the theory assumed or constr...The main thesis intended in this paper consists in that scientific knowledge of the physical world entails a conceptualization of it in a certain mode which is relative to,and dependent on,the theory assumed or constructed.Physical theories embody conceptual systems that at once make possible and limit our conceptualization of how the world is and our cognitive access to what happens in it.From a conceptual holism(Brown,2007),we try to maintain that since we think of the world and understand what occurs in it by systems of concepts,they acquire major relevance to a philosophical stance about scientific knowledge.In a holistic sense,delimited,at least,by the system of concepts of a given theory,concepts have both a theoretical laden to scientific experience,according to the thesis of Hanson(1958),and an ontological laden to the world,which consists in that the statements that one can assert about the physical world,the entities,and systems that one can describe as well as the claims that one holds about the processes undergone by the physical systems are dependent on and relative to such conceptual system of such theory.Thus,the framework displayed here contrasts with the epistemological realist thesis in the sense that we cannot claim how the world is really but rather how we conceptualize it relative to our theory.In addition,we expose an epistemic concept of valid statement,relative to a theory,which becomes consistent and even complementary to the framework provided.展开更多
文摘The main thesis intended in this paper consists in that scientific knowledge of the physical world entails a conceptualization of it in a certain mode which is relative to,and dependent on,the theory assumed or constructed.Physical theories embody conceptual systems that at once make possible and limit our conceptualization of how the world is and our cognitive access to what happens in it.From a conceptual holism(Brown,2007),we try to maintain that since we think of the world and understand what occurs in it by systems of concepts,they acquire major relevance to a philosophical stance about scientific knowledge.In a holistic sense,delimited,at least,by the system of concepts of a given theory,concepts have both a theoretical laden to scientific experience,according to the thesis of Hanson(1958),and an ontological laden to the world,which consists in that the statements that one can assert about the physical world,the entities,and systems that one can describe as well as the claims that one holds about the processes undergone by the physical systems are dependent on and relative to such conceptual system of such theory.Thus,the framework displayed here contrasts with the epistemological realist thesis in the sense that we cannot claim how the world is really but rather how we conceptualize it relative to our theory.In addition,we expose an epistemic concept of valid statement,relative to a theory,which becomes consistent and even complementary to the framework provided.
