This paper examines an under-researched phenomenon of mock impoliteness in Chinese online interaction,namely,the practice of hudui(lit.reciprocal jocular abuse)as a solidarity enhancing device among acquaintances.Draw...This paper examines an under-researched phenomenon of mock impoliteness in Chinese online interaction,namely,the practice of hudui(lit.reciprocal jocular abuse)as a solidarity enhancing device among acquaintances.Drawing on data from Qzone interaction among Chinese university students,this study focuses on ritual features,sequential patterns and interpersonal functions of hudui through the lens of Kádár’s(2013,2017)interpersonal ritual theory.The results show that hudui is co-constructed by the online participants with the symmetric pattern of mutual abuse,which distinguishes it from previous studies of jocular abuse(i.e.,the asymmetric pattern of abuser–recipient).They also reveal that hudui accomplishes various kinds of relational work,including fostering intimacy,enhancing mutual affection-based face and creating amusement.展开更多
In this paper, we present one method to attack on the GMR-2 algorithm used in satellite phone under the chosen-plaintexts. First using the relationship of the rows of the two s-boxes and outputs of the F coordinate, w...In this paper, we present one method to attack on the GMR-2 algorithm used in satellite phone under the chosen-plaintexts. First using the relationship of the rows of the two s-boxes and outputs of the F coordinate, we attack on the GMR-2 algorithm. Then we deduce the happening probability of read-collision, and analyze its mathematical expectation. Finally, combining with the read-collision, we present an improved method to attack on the GMR-2 algorithm. The research results show that the complexity of the improved algorithm is about 220, and the session key Kc can be recovered in about 0.3 seconds. Compared with the available method, our method takes less time than the guess-and-decide attack method which is 700 s.展开更多
基金support the Department of Education of Guangdong Province and Center for Linguistics and Applied Linguistics at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, China, for the project (2018WZDXM006) on the frontier research and theoretical innovations in interpersonal pragmaticsthe Youth Fund Project (Project No.: 19QN34) of Guangdong University of Foreign Studiesthe support from the Chinese Ministry of Education Research Project of Humanities and Social Science (Project No.: 16JJD740006) conducted by the Center for Linguistics and Applied Linguistics, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies.
文摘This paper examines an under-researched phenomenon of mock impoliteness in Chinese online interaction,namely,the practice of hudui(lit.reciprocal jocular abuse)as a solidarity enhancing device among acquaintances.Drawing on data from Qzone interaction among Chinese university students,this study focuses on ritual features,sequential patterns and interpersonal functions of hudui through the lens of Kádár’s(2013,2017)interpersonal ritual theory.The results show that hudui is co-constructed by the online participants with the symmetric pattern of mutual abuse,which distinguishes it from previous studies of jocular abuse(i.e.,the asymmetric pattern of abuser–recipient).They also reveal that hudui accomplishes various kinds of relational work,including fostering intimacy,enhancing mutual affection-based face and creating amusement.
基金supported by China Scholarship Council under Grant No.201506965088
文摘In this paper, we present one method to attack on the GMR-2 algorithm used in satellite phone under the chosen-plaintexts. First using the relationship of the rows of the two s-boxes and outputs of the F coordinate, we attack on the GMR-2 algorithm. Then we deduce the happening probability of read-collision, and analyze its mathematical expectation. Finally, combining with the read-collision, we present an improved method to attack on the GMR-2 algorithm. The research results show that the complexity of the improved algorithm is about 220, and the session key Kc can be recovered in about 0.3 seconds. Compared with the available method, our method takes less time than the guess-and-decide attack method which is 700 s.
