All food systems will continue to be affected by disasters and extreme climate events. Triggered by recent food crises around the world and climate change concerns,some governments have been trying to develop more rob...All food systems will continue to be affected by disasters and extreme climate events. Triggered by recent food crises around the world and climate change concerns,some governments have been trying to develop more robust and resilient food systems. One of the oldest options for many governments is to stockpile emergency food reserves for the purpose of food security and disaster preparedness. In the aftermath of the world food price crises in2007–2008 and 2011, some governments in Asia have been maintaining emergency food reserves to ensure greater supply and price stability. Disasters and extreme climate events help governments to justify emergency food reserves. This research examined emergency food reserve policies in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia.Emergency food reserves emerged as a practice where the shared objectives of development, disaster risk reduction,and climate change adaptation have been demonstrated by governments. The findings suggest that most governments maintain the strong view that adequate emergency food reserves can buffer national food price shocks and shocks from disasters and climate change, and soften disruptions in trade due to export bans during times of disasters and climate emergencies.Under global climate change scenarios, food security is at risk and volatile(Porter et al. 2014). The expected increase in climate extremes has generated anticipatory actions from governments, including a new push for EFR policy adoption. Triggered by recent disasters and climate change concerns, some governments have been trying to develop more robust and resilient food systems(Fan and Brzeska 2014; Porter et al. 2014). For many countries in Asia, this means the renewed adoption of EFR. Unfortunately, we argue that this is not well understood in climate change adaptation studies as well as contemporary disaster studies.The Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)first initiated a Food Security Reserve Agreement in 1979,with the purpose of meeting emergency requirements(ASEAN 1979). Policymakers have been aware of the susceptibility of the region to natural hazards and the possibility of food shortages. But it took 30 years, until soon after the world food crisis in 2007–2008(Hadley and Fan 2010), for the association plus three additional East Asian nations(China, Japan, South Korea) to establish the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve(APTERR)in 2009, as a mechanism to address potential food shortages in the region in the light of climate and market uncertainties. The final formal agreement was signed in October 2011 in Jakarta(APTERR 2017).The Association of Southeast Asian Nations also established the ASEAN Food Security Information System(AFSIS) that functions as a central information repository for five commodities—rice, maize, soybeans, sugar, and cassava. AFSIS not only monitors and analyzes production,import, export, inventory stock, price, food security ratio,and self-sufficiency ratio for these commodities but also provides data on losses from both floods and droughts in every member state(Lassa et al. 2016). In theory, AFSIS serves as an early warning mechanism for ASEAN to trigger the activation of APTERR's response mechanism(Saengbangka 2014, personal interview; AFSIS 2017).This article argues that EFR can function as a means of disaster risk reduction, including climate change adaptation, and aims to understand why governments in Asia are readopting emergency food reserves as national policies,with a focus on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia.We also explore how disasters and climate change strengthen or weaken government narratives in support of emergency food reserves.展开更多
The establishment of the ASEAN Political and Security(APSC)in 2015 mimics the notion of a security community where member states are imbued with deep habits of cooperation,mutual trust,a sense of'we-feeling'an...The establishment of the ASEAN Political and Security(APSC)in 2015 mimics the notion of a security community where member states are imbued with deep habits of cooperation,mutual trust,a sense of'we-feeling'and the ability to manage security problems together with no prospects of any member going to war with another.But does a security community provide sufficient foundation for security governance in Southeast Asia?The idea of security governance,defined as a set of processes and arrangements carried out by a range of state and non-state actors across multiple levels from the local to the international that are aimed at defining and managing security challenges,requires a movement beyond state-centric approaches to one that is more participatory and inclusive.Despite the APSC's people-centred rhetoric,there are inherent tensions in security practices in ASEAN as states hold on to the principles of non-interference and state sovereignty,while having to respond effectively to address a host of non-traditional threats.These tensions have led to the emergence of multiple sites of governance that are changing the nature of security governance in the region.In analysing the cases of civilian protection in times of humanitarian crises and forced migration,the paper argues that multiple sites of governance point to the need to reassess the APSC as a mechanism for security governance and explore the idea of having fragmented but more inclusive and participatory security communities that work together towards the shared goal of more secure region.展开更多
A non-state centric approach challenged the concept of security governance in response to a changed security environment,bringing fragmentation of authority and heterarchical structures into the framework.The existing...A non-state centric approach challenged the concept of security governance in response to a changed security environment,bringing fragmentation of authority and heterarchical structures into the framework.The existing studies on this approach are largely contextualized from the European experience and developments in its security architecture.This leads to the questions as to whether and how non-state centric security governance occurs in other regions.This article contributes to the literature by studying security governance in East Asia,where the state is a dominant feature in security governance,and through the lens of non-traditional security,with China’s COVID-19 response as a case study.In this particular case,we find that security governance that opens spaces for greater involvement of actors beyond the state could happen,albeit in a more circumscribed manner and subject of certain conditions.We identify three conditions that catalyze the opening of governance spaces:when the capacity of the state is stretched to the limits,when the legitimacy of the government is under pressure,and when there is trust between the government and other actors.展开更多
基金supported and funded by the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Singapore during 2013–2015
文摘All food systems will continue to be affected by disasters and extreme climate events. Triggered by recent food crises around the world and climate change concerns,some governments have been trying to develop more robust and resilient food systems. One of the oldest options for many governments is to stockpile emergency food reserves for the purpose of food security and disaster preparedness. In the aftermath of the world food price crises in2007–2008 and 2011, some governments in Asia have been maintaining emergency food reserves to ensure greater supply and price stability. Disasters and extreme climate events help governments to justify emergency food reserves. This research examined emergency food reserve policies in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia.Emergency food reserves emerged as a practice where the shared objectives of development, disaster risk reduction,and climate change adaptation have been demonstrated by governments. The findings suggest that most governments maintain the strong view that adequate emergency food reserves can buffer national food price shocks and shocks from disasters and climate change, and soften disruptions in trade due to export bans during times of disasters and climate emergencies.Under global climate change scenarios, food security is at risk and volatile(Porter et al. 2014). The expected increase in climate extremes has generated anticipatory actions from governments, including a new push for EFR policy adoption. Triggered by recent disasters and climate change concerns, some governments have been trying to develop more robust and resilient food systems(Fan and Brzeska 2014; Porter et al. 2014). For many countries in Asia, this means the renewed adoption of EFR. Unfortunately, we argue that this is not well understood in climate change adaptation studies as well as contemporary disaster studies.The Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)first initiated a Food Security Reserve Agreement in 1979,with the purpose of meeting emergency requirements(ASEAN 1979). Policymakers have been aware of the susceptibility of the region to natural hazards and the possibility of food shortages. But it took 30 years, until soon after the world food crisis in 2007–2008(Hadley and Fan 2010), for the association plus three additional East Asian nations(China, Japan, South Korea) to establish the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve(APTERR)in 2009, as a mechanism to address potential food shortages in the region in the light of climate and market uncertainties. The final formal agreement was signed in October 2011 in Jakarta(APTERR 2017).The Association of Southeast Asian Nations also established the ASEAN Food Security Information System(AFSIS) that functions as a central information repository for five commodities—rice, maize, soybeans, sugar, and cassava. AFSIS not only monitors and analyzes production,import, export, inventory stock, price, food security ratio,and self-sufficiency ratio for these commodities but also provides data on losses from both floods and droughts in every member state(Lassa et al. 2016). In theory, AFSIS serves as an early warning mechanism for ASEAN to trigger the activation of APTERR's response mechanism(Saengbangka 2014, personal interview; AFSIS 2017).This article argues that EFR can function as a means of disaster risk reduction, including climate change adaptation, and aims to understand why governments in Asia are readopting emergency food reserves as national policies,with a focus on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia.We also explore how disasters and climate change strengthen or weaken government narratives in support of emergency food reserves.
文摘The establishment of the ASEAN Political and Security(APSC)in 2015 mimics the notion of a security community where member states are imbued with deep habits of cooperation,mutual trust,a sense of'we-feeling'and the ability to manage security problems together with no prospects of any member going to war with another.But does a security community provide sufficient foundation for security governance in Southeast Asia?The idea of security governance,defined as a set of processes and arrangements carried out by a range of state and non-state actors across multiple levels from the local to the international that are aimed at defining and managing security challenges,requires a movement beyond state-centric approaches to one that is more participatory and inclusive.Despite the APSC's people-centred rhetoric,there are inherent tensions in security practices in ASEAN as states hold on to the principles of non-interference and state sovereignty,while having to respond effectively to address a host of non-traditional threats.These tensions have led to the emergence of multiple sites of governance that are changing the nature of security governance in the region.In analysing the cases of civilian protection in times of humanitarian crises and forced migration,the paper argues that multiple sites of governance point to the need to reassess the APSC as a mechanism for security governance and explore the idea of having fragmented but more inclusive and participatory security communities that work together towards the shared goal of more secure region.
文摘A non-state centric approach challenged the concept of security governance in response to a changed security environment,bringing fragmentation of authority and heterarchical structures into the framework.The existing studies on this approach are largely contextualized from the European experience and developments in its security architecture.This leads to the questions as to whether and how non-state centric security governance occurs in other regions.This article contributes to the literature by studying security governance in East Asia,where the state is a dominant feature in security governance,and through the lens of non-traditional security,with China’s COVID-19 response as a case study.In this particular case,we find that security governance that opens spaces for greater involvement of actors beyond the state could happen,albeit in a more circumscribed manner and subject of certain conditions.We identify three conditions that catalyze the opening of governance spaces:when the capacity of the state is stretched to the limits,when the legitimacy of the government is under pressure,and when there is trust between the government and other actors.
