State-owned enterprises(SOE) are essentially extensions of the government and are therefore responsible for multi-task objectives. The incentive system for SOE managers consists of both monetary compensation and promo...State-owned enterprises(SOE) are essentially extensions of the government and are therefore responsible for multi-task objectives. The incentive system for SOE managers consists of both monetary compensation and promotion within the bureaucratic system. Political promotion is key to understanding the incentives of SOE managers. In the reform and opening up era, SOEs have been reformed and exposed to political and market forces. The design of incentive systems for SOE managers has thus become complicated and challenging.Our study provides important implications for this key issue of SOE reform.展开更多
We examine the association between auditor choice and the accruals patterns of Chinese listed firms that cross-list in Hong Kong.Our evidence suggests that the clients of Big 4 auditors report lower unsigned discretio...We examine the association between auditor choice and the accruals patterns of Chinese listed firms that cross-list in Hong Kong.Our evidence suggests that the clients of Big 4 auditors report lower unsigned discretionary accruals relative to the clients of non-Big 4 auditors.Further,we find that cross-listed firms with non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to understate their earnings and experience larger reversals of accruals in the future than cross-listed firms with Big 4 auditors.These findings suggest that Big 4 auditors play a meaningful role in improving earnings quality for cross-listed firms,which helps to explain why crosslisted firms have higher earnings quality than their domestic counterparts,as documented in the previous literature.展开更多
基金financial support from a China National Social Science Foundation Key Research Project (Project No.:17ZDA086):Research on Reforms and Innovations of Monitoring System in State-Owned Enterprises
文摘State-owned enterprises(SOE) are essentially extensions of the government and are therefore responsible for multi-task objectives. The incentive system for SOE managers consists of both monetary compensation and promotion within the bureaucratic system. Political promotion is key to understanding the incentives of SOE managers. In the reform and opening up era, SOEs have been reformed and exposed to political and market forces. The design of incentive systems for SOE managers has thus become complicated and challenging.Our study provides important implications for this key issue of SOE reform.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China supported this study(ProjectNos.70802067,71002026,and 70772080)
文摘We examine the association between auditor choice and the accruals patterns of Chinese listed firms that cross-list in Hong Kong.Our evidence suggests that the clients of Big 4 auditors report lower unsigned discretionary accruals relative to the clients of non-Big 4 auditors.Further,we find that cross-listed firms with non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to understate their earnings and experience larger reversals of accruals in the future than cross-listed firms with Big 4 auditors.These findings suggest that Big 4 auditors play a meaningful role in improving earnings quality for cross-listed firms,which helps to explain why crosslisted firms have higher earnings quality than their domestic counterparts,as documented in the previous literature.
