This paper investigates the minimum inventory （MI） of human system interfaces （HSIs） （i.e. alarms, controls, and displays） for plant＇s safe operation and represents the analytic procedure on the MI of HSIs deve...This paper investigates the minimum inventory （MI） of human system interfaces （HSIs） （i.e. alarms, controls, and displays） for plant＇s safe operation and represents the analytic procedure on the MI of HSIs developed for the digital instrumentation and control （I＆C） equipments in the main control room （MCR）. The MI of HSIs in the MCR indicates the HSIs that the operator always needs available to： （1） monitor the status; （2） perform and confirm a reactor trip; （3） perform and confirm a controlled shutdown of the reactor; （4） actuate safety related systems; （5） analyze failure conditions of the normal HSIs; （6） implement the plant＇s emergency operating procedures （EOPs）; （7） bring the plant to a safe condition; （8） carry out those operator actions shown to be risk important by the probabilistic risk assessment （PRA）. The proposed analytic procedure on the MI of HSIs in this study can be used to （1） identify the MI of HSIs and their design requirements; and （2） address design requirements and implementation for the MI of HSIs. The contribution of this study is to describe the MI of HSIs needed to implement the plant＇s EOPs, to bring the plant to a safe condition, and to carry out those operator actions shown to be risk important by the PKA.展开更多
文摘This paper investigates the minimum inventory （MI） of human system interfaces （HSIs） （i.e. alarms, controls, and displays） for plant＇s safe operation and represents the analytic procedure on the MI of HSIs developed for the digital instrumentation and control （I＆C） equipments in the main control room （MCR）. The MI of HSIs in the MCR indicates the HSIs that the operator always needs available to： （1） monitor the status; （2） perform and confirm a reactor trip; （3） perform and confirm a controlled shutdown of the reactor; （4） actuate safety related systems; （5） analyze failure conditions of the normal HSIs; （6） implement the plant＇s emergency operating procedures （EOPs）; （7） bring the plant to a safe condition; （8） carry out those operator actions shown to be risk important by the probabilistic risk assessment （PRA）. The proposed analytic procedure on the MI of HSIs in this study can be used to （1） identify the MI of HSIs and their design requirements; and （2） address design requirements and implementation for the MI of HSIs. The contribution of this study is to describe the MI of HSIs needed to implement the plant＇s EOPs, to bring the plant to a safe condition, and to carry out those operator actions shown to be risk important by the PKA.
