This paper studies the impact of logistics cooperation in two competing companies,one of which is equipped with a self-run logistics system while the other is not.The latter outsources logistics services to a third-pa...This paper studies the impact of logistics cooperation in two competing companies,one of which is equipped with a self-run logistics system while the other is not.The latter outsources logistics services to a third-party logistics company before logistics cooperation,or to its competitor after logistics cooperation with the client's service quality being in proportion to and no greater than the service provider's service quality.We find that when the service provider is a price taker,logistics cooperation is beneficial to both firms only when the service quality after logistics cooperation is moderate.Interestingly,under some circumstances,the client's profit increases even when its service quality decreases after logistics cooperation because logistics cooperation eases the price competition.We also find that all-win situations in which logistics cooperation increases the firms7 profit,consumer surplus and social welfare can be achieved.Finally,when the service price can be chosen by the service provider,we propose a negotiation process in which agreement on logistics cooperation can be reached;when the firm can invest in service quality,logistics cooperation may lower the equilibrium investment level.展开更多
An online inquiry service(OIS)is an innovative service designed to make medical re-sources more accessible,especially in remote areas.An OIS provides patients with an alternative method of consulting a physician.This ...An online inquiry service(OIS)is an innovative service designed to make medical re-sources more accessible,especially in remote areas.An OIS provides patients with an alternative method of consulting a physician.This study develops a game-theoretical queueing model to examine the impact of OISs on gatekeeping systems.In such sys-tems,patients are heterogeneous in terms of their travel costs.Here,we compare the performance of gatekeeping systems with and without an OIS.As such,we show that,owing to physicians’reduced diagnostic ability when working online,an OIS reduces pa-tients’travel costs,increases the flow of patients to specialists,increases the total waiting time in the system,and decreases the total health surplus of patients.Moreover,we demonstrate that when patients are not sensitive to delays,introducing an OIS always reduces their total cost.These findings are consistent with the intuition that patients are better off when more options are available.Interestingly,when patients are sensitive to delays,introducing an OIS may increase their total cost.This paradoxical result occurs when patients’sensitivity to delays is high,because those who consult a physician online impose negative externalities on the system by increasing the waiting cost in both the online and offline channels(which is proportional to patients’delay sensitivity).Finally,we numerically illustrate that the benefit of introducing an OIS is non-monotonic in the system parameters;thus,caution is required when designing policies to regulate OISs.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC:71801096,71731006,and 71925002)the Project funded by China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under 2019M650202+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,SCUT(x2gs/D2191820)the Project supported by GDHVPS(2017).
文摘This paper studies the impact of logistics cooperation in two competing companies,one of which is equipped with a self-run logistics system while the other is not.The latter outsources logistics services to a third-party logistics company before logistics cooperation,or to its competitor after logistics cooperation with the client's service quality being in proportion to and no greater than the service provider's service quality.We find that when the service provider is a price taker,logistics cooperation is beneficial to both firms only when the service quality after logistics cooperation is moderate.Interestingly,under some circumstances,the client's profit increases even when its service quality decreases after logistics cooperation because logistics cooperation eases the price competition.We also find that all-win situations in which logistics cooperation increases the firms7 profit,consumer surplus and social welfare can be achieved.Finally,when the service price can be chosen by the service provider,we propose a negotiation process in which agreement on logistics cooperation can be reached;when the firm can invest in service quality,logistics cooperation may lower the equilibrium investment level.
基金This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC:71731006,71801096,71925002,71971080,71601077,and 71571070)the Project funded by China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under 2019M650202+1 种基金the Project supported by GDHVPS(2017)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,SCUT(x2gs/D2191820).
文摘An online inquiry service(OIS)is an innovative service designed to make medical re-sources more accessible,especially in remote areas.An OIS provides patients with an alternative method of consulting a physician.This study develops a game-theoretical queueing model to examine the impact of OISs on gatekeeping systems.In such sys-tems,patients are heterogeneous in terms of their travel costs.Here,we compare the performance of gatekeeping systems with and without an OIS.As such,we show that,owing to physicians’reduced diagnostic ability when working online,an OIS reduces pa-tients’travel costs,increases the flow of patients to specialists,increases the total waiting time in the system,and decreases the total health surplus of patients.Moreover,we demonstrate that when patients are not sensitive to delays,introducing an OIS always reduces their total cost.These findings are consistent with the intuition that patients are better off when more options are available.Interestingly,when patients are sensitive to delays,introducing an OIS may increase their total cost.This paradoxical result occurs when patients’sensitivity to delays is high,because those who consult a physician online impose negative externalities on the system by increasing the waiting cost in both the online and offline channels(which is proportional to patients’delay sensitivity).Finally,we numerically illustrate that the benefit of introducing an OIS is non-monotonic in the system parameters;thus,caution is required when designing policies to regulate OISs.
