Using a sample of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the 1999-2009 period,we investigate the effects of overemployment on executives' pay-for-performance sensi...Using a sample of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the 1999-2009 period,we investigate the effects of overemployment on executives' pay-for-performance sensitivity(PPS) and analyze how the behavior of firms with high/low PPS affects the number of surplus employees.We find the existence of a redundant workforce significantly weakens PPS and the role of accounting measures in performance assessment.In contrast to prior literature,we find that higher PPS is associated with a stronger incentive to lay off redundant employees and to limit future employee numbers.We also find that weaker government intervention strengthens managerial control over the future size of the workforce.Finally,our findings suggest that a heavier government policy burden on SOEs leads to lower tax rates and more government gains.展开更多
This paper investigates the influence of the economic value added(EVA)performance evaluation,issued in 2010 by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council,on the value of the ...This paper investigates the influence of the economic value added(EVA)performance evaluation,issued in 2010 by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council,on the value of the cash holdings of central state-owned enterprises(CSOEs).We find that EVA performance evaluation has some influence on the overinvestment of CSOE cash holdings and significantly increases the value of CSOE cash holdings compared with the cash holdings of local state-owned enterprises.The greater value of CSOE cash holdings derives from underinvestment modification and overinvestment restraint.The value of cash holdings increases more for companies with better accounting performance.Thus,the EVA performance evaluation policy increases CSOE efficiency.This study contributes to the emerging literature related to cash holdings and the economic consequences of the EVA performance evaluation policy.It expands the literature related to investor protection in countries experiencing economic transition.展开更多
Since the opening of China's securities market,there have been a number of bull and bear cycles.This paper discusses how executives use the market timing approach to manage earnings in different cycles to maximize...Since the opening of China's securities market,there have been a number of bull and bear cycles.This paper discusses how executives use the market timing approach to manage earnings in different cycles to maximize firm value.We find that Chinese listed companies choose to release more earnings during bull markets and this phenomenon is more evident in companies that are more profitable and have higher valuations.We also find that executives who do not release more earnings during bull markets are more likely to be dismissed.展开更多
The management of future financial risk on the part of managers and changes in firm finances are two of the fundamental reasons for upward and downward rigidity of wages.The proxy variable for firm financial risk is v...The management of future financial risk on the part of managers and changes in firm finances are two of the fundamental reasons for upward and downward rigidity of wages.The proxy variable for firm financial risk is volatility,the past performance of which is among the principal indicators of wage rigidity.In firms whose current performance is on the upswing,the greater the volatility in past performance,the smaller the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward rigidity;the more stable past performance,the larger the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward elasticity.In firms in which current performance is declining,greater past performance volatility leads to a larger elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity,whereas more stable such performance leads to a smaller elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity.展开更多
Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms＇ extreme events. In this artic...Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms＇ extreme events. In this article, we investigate how tunneling behavior affects firm-level stock price crashes. The findings indicate that the probability of stock price crashes is positively associated with the extent of tunneling behavior by large shareholders. The positive relationship is more pronounced after the split of share structure reform and is moderated by the firm＇s financial conditions. This study contributes to the emerging body of literature focusing on the economic consequences of tunneling and stock price crashes. The conclusions drawn from the study also provide a frame of reference for investor protection and investment portfolios based on large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior in China.展开更多
基金supported by the National Social Science Foundation(Grant No.08CJY009)the Philosophical and Social Science Foundation of Education Department of Jiangsu Province(Grant No.07SJD630016)support from the IAPHD Project of Nanjing University
文摘Using a sample of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the 1999-2009 period,we investigate the effects of overemployment on executives' pay-for-performance sensitivity(PPS) and analyze how the behavior of firms with high/low PPS affects the number of surplus employees.We find the existence of a redundant workforce significantly weakens PPS and the role of accounting measures in performance assessment.In contrast to prior literature,we find that higher PPS is associated with a stronger incentive to lay off redundant employees and to limit future employee numbers.We also find that weaker government intervention strengthens managerial control over the future size of the workforce.Finally,our findings suggest that a heavier government policy burden on SOEs leads to lower tax rates and more government gains.
基金the support of the National Natural Science Foundation(Project No.71372032)Ministry of Education of Humanities and Social Science Youth Fund Projects(Project No.14YJC630108)+4 种基金General Financial Grant From the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(Project No.2014M560022)Jiangsu Province University Philosophy Social Science Research Project(Project No.2014SJB123)the International Accounting PhD Program(IAPHD)at Nanjing Universitythe Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions(PAPD)Collaborative Innovation Project in Jiangsu Province
文摘This paper investigates the influence of the economic value added(EVA)performance evaluation,issued in 2010 by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council,on the value of the cash holdings of central state-owned enterprises(CSOEs).We find that EVA performance evaluation has some influence on the overinvestment of CSOE cash holdings and significantly increases the value of CSOE cash holdings compared with the cash holdings of local state-owned enterprises.The greater value of CSOE cash holdings derives from underinvestment modification and overinvestment restraint.The value of cash holdings increases more for companies with better accounting performance.Thus,the EVA performance evaluation policy increases CSOE efficiency.This study contributes to the emerging literature related to cash holdings and the economic consequences of the EVA performance evaluation policy.It expands the literature related to investor protection in countries experiencing economic transition.
基金supported by the National Social Science Foundation(08CJY2009)support from the New Century Excellent Talents Project of the Education Ministry+3 种基金the Outstanding Young Academic Leaders Project of Nanjing Universitythe Young Backbone Teacher Project of Nanjing Universitythe Accounting and Finance Research Institute of the Shanghai University of Financesupport from the International Accounting PhD Programs(IAPHD)scheme of Nanjing University
文摘Since the opening of China's securities market,there have been a number of bull and bear cycles.This paper discusses how executives use the market timing approach to manage earnings in different cycles to maximize firm value.We find that Chinese listed companies choose to release more earnings during bull markets and this phenomenon is more evident in companies that are more profitable and have higher valuations.We also find that executives who do not release more earnings during bull markets are more likely to be dismissed.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation (grant no. 70602011)the National Social Science Foundation (grant no. 08CJY009)the IAPHD Project of Nanjing University
文摘The management of future financial risk on the part of managers and changes in firm finances are two of the fundamental reasons for upward and downward rigidity of wages.The proxy variable for firm financial risk is volatility,the past performance of which is among the principal indicators of wage rigidity.In firms whose current performance is on the upswing,the greater the volatility in past performance,the smaller the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward rigidity;the more stable past performance,the larger the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward elasticity.In firms in which current performance is declining,greater past performance volatility leads to a larger elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity,whereas more stable such performance leads to a smaller elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity.
基金We thank two anonymous referees and the editor who greatly improved the paper. Helpful comments were obtained from Xiangqin Qi, Fu Xin, Wei Xu, and Zhenye Yao from the seminars at Nanjing University. We acknowledge financial support from National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 71372032, 71302036 and 71272238） and the National Social Science Foundation （Grant No. 11AJL003）. Errors remain our own.
文摘Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms＇ extreme events. In this article, we investigate how tunneling behavior affects firm-level stock price crashes. The findings indicate that the probability of stock price crashes is positively associated with the extent of tunneling behavior by large shareholders. The positive relationship is more pronounced after the split of share structure reform and is moderated by the firm＇s financial conditions. This study contributes to the emerging body of literature focusing on the economic consequences of tunneling and stock price crashes. The conclusions drawn from the study also provide a frame of reference for investor protection and investment portfolios based on large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior in China.
