Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to ...Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.展开更多
Although blockchain technology has received a significant amount of cutting-edge research on constructing a novel carbon trade market in theory,there is little research on using blockchain in carbon emission trading s...Although blockchain technology has received a significant amount of cutting-edge research on constructing a novel carbon trade market in theory,there is little research on using blockchain in carbon emission trading schemes(ETS).This study intends to address existing gaps in the literature by creating and simulating an ETS system based on blockchain technology.Using the ciphertext-policy attributed-based encryption algorithm and the Fabric network to build a platform may optimize the amount of data available while maintaining privacy security.Considering the augmentation of information interaction during the auction process brought about by blockchain,the learning behavior of bidding firms is introduced to investigate the impact of blockchain on ETS auction.In particular,implementing smart contracts can provide a swift and automatic settlement.The simulation results of the proposed system demonstrate the following:(1)fine-grained access is possible with a second delay;(2)the average annual compliance levels increase by 2%when bidders’learning behavior is considered;and(3)the blockchain network can process more than 350 reading operations or 7 writing operations in a second.Novel cooperative management of an ETS platform based on blockchain is proposed.The data access control policy based on CP-ABE is used to solve the contradiction between data privacy on the firm chain and government supervision.A learned auction strategy is proposed to suit the enhancement of information interaction caused by blockchain technology.This study provides a new method for climate change policymakers to consider the blockchain application of the carbon market.展开更多
With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to ...With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.展开更多
Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem ...Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem between MDs and ENs caused by the excessive concern on MD profit.In this paper,we propose an auction-based computation offloading algorithm,inspiring ENs to provide high-quality service by maximizing the profit of ENs.Firstly,a novel cooperation auction framework is designed to avoid overall profit damage of ENs,which is derived from the high computation delay at the overloaded ENs.Thereafter,the bidding willingness of each MD in every round of auction is determined to ensure MD rationality.Furthermore,we put forward a payment rule for the pre-selected winner to effectively guarantee auction truthfulness.Finally,the auction-based profit maximization offloading algorithm is proposed,and the MD is allowed to occupy the computation and spectrum resources of the EN for offloading if it wins the auction.Numerical results verify the performance of the proposed algorithm.Compared with the VA algorithm,the ENs profit is increased by 23.8%,and the task discard ratio is decreased by 7.5%.展开更多
It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incen...It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.展开更多
The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping i...The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.展开更多
The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integra...The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.展开更多
In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the...In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions. We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies. For seller or auction house, whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function, the size of the fixed commission proportion, but also related with the value of the item auctioned. So, in the practical auctions, the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.展开更多
Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framewor...Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framework has been recognized as an effective way to achieve dynamic spectrum access.From the perspective of spectrum auction,multi-band multi-user auction provides a new challenge for spectrum management.This paper proposes an auction framework based on location information for multi-band multi-user spectrum allocation.The performance of the proposed framework is compared with that of traditional auction framework based on a binary interference model as a benchmark.Simulation results show that primary users will obtain more total system revenue by selling their idle frequency bands to secondary users and the spectrum utilization of the proposed framework is more effective and fairer.展开更多
I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication （QSDC） with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen （EPR） pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state m...I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication （QSDC） with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen （EPR） pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state measurements, it is shown that the three legitimate parties can exchange their respective secret message simultaneously. Then I modify it for an experimentally feasible and secure quantum sealed-bid auction （QSBD） protocol. Furthermore, I also analyze th^ecurity of the protocol, and the scheme is proven to be secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, the disturbancb attack and the entangled-and-measure attack.展开更多
We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secu...We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secure multi-user signals. To maximize the secrecy rate of uplink communications, we propose a distributed ascending-clock auction(ACA) algorithm to allocate subcarriers and jamming power. Specifically, the impact of the self-interference of the full-duplex base station on the secrecy rate is considered. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts. Firstly, subcarriers and the jamming power are respectively priced by the base station. Secondly, users select the subcarrier and the jamming power based on the price. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed auction algorithm is mathematically proved. Simulation results show that the proposed auction algorithm is more beneficial to improve the uplink secrecy performance compared to traditional auction algorithms.展开更多
A joint resource allocation algorithm based on parallel auction(JRAPA)is proposed for mobile edge computing(MEC).In JRAPA,the joint allocation of wireless and cloud resources is modeled as an auction process,aiming at...A joint resource allocation algorithm based on parallel auction(JRAPA)is proposed for mobile edge computing(MEC).In JRAPA,the joint allocation of wireless and cloud resources is modeled as an auction process,aiming at maximizing the utilities of service providers(SPs)and satisfying the delay requirements of mobile terminals(MTs).The auction process consists of the bidding submission,winner determination and pricing stages.At the bidding submission stage,the MTs take available resources from SPs and distance factors into account to decide the bidding priority,thereby reducing the processing delay and improving the successful trades rate.A resource constrained utility ranking(RCUR)algorithm is put forward at the winner determination stage to determine the winners and losers so as to maximize the utilities of SPs.At the pricing stage,the sealed second-price rule is adopted to ensure the independence between the price paid by the buyer and its own bid.The simulation results show that the proposed JRAPA algorithm outperforms other existing algorithms in terms of the convergence rate and the number of successful trades rate.Moreover,it can not only achieve a larger average utility of SPs but also significantly reduce the average delay of MTs.展开更多
With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spe...With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spectrum allocation,and due to the complexity of the network environment,the security of spectrum auctions can not be ignored.Most existing secure spectrum auction schemes introduce a semi-honest agent to complete spectrum auction.However,the hypothetical semi-honest model does not guarantee the security of spectnim auction in the actual application scenario,which may lead to potential security threats:the agent may reveal the privacy of bidders,agent or auctioneer may collude with the bidder to manipulate the spectrum auction,and so on.In this paper,a secure spectrum auction scheme without a trusted party is proposed based on the smart contract technology,and the smart contract written into the blockchain replaces the traditional semi-honest agent to cooperate with the auctioneer server to complete the auction.In order to ensure the security of our scheme,a secure spectrum auction protocol is designed,in which the Software Guard Extensions(SGX)technology and Paillier cryptosystem are used to protect the privacy of bidders.Public verification is provided in our protocol by using extensive Pedersen commitment,which prevents the auctioneer server and the bidder from colluding with each other and verifies group bid sum values.Finally,the security analysis is given to propose several types of attacks that can be defended.Besides,theoretical analysis and simulation experiments of our protocol are also provided.展开更多
An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auctio...An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auction method to multi-robot task allocation. The genetic algorithm based combinatorial auction （GACA） method which combines the basic-genetic algorithm with a new concept of ringed chromosome is used to solve the winner determination problem （WDP） of combinatorial auction. The simulation experiments are conducted in OpenSim, a multi-robot simulator. The results show that GACA can get a satisfying solution in a reasonable shot time, and compared with SIA or parthenogenesis algorithm combinatorial auction （PGACA） method, it is the simplest and has higher search efficiency, also, GACA can get a global better/optimal solution and satisfy the high real-time requirement of multi-robot task allocation.展开更多
Cloud computing is a demanding business platform for services related to the field of IT.The goal of cloud customers is to access resources at a sustainable price,while the goal of cloud suppliers is to maximize their...Cloud computing is a demanding business platform for services related to the field of IT.The goal of cloud customers is to access resources at a sustainable price,while the goal of cloud suppliers is to maximize their services utilization.Previously,the customers would bid for every single resource type,which was a limitation of cloud resources allocation.To solve these issues,researchers have focused on a combinatorial auction in which the resources are offered by the providers in bundles so that the user bids for their required bundle.Still,in this allocation mechanism,some drawbacks need to be tackled,such as due to the lower average bid price the users are dropped from the auction process.To solve this problem,we proposed a“Negotiation based Combinatorial Double Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation(N-CDARA)in cloud computing”.The proposed method negotiates with dropped users.Lower average bid price users are asked by our proposed mechanism to increase their bids,as by the quoted bids they will be dropped by the auctioneer.Most of the users that are close to winning accept the proposal and increase their bid prices.The proposed mechanism is implemented in a CloudSim simulation toolkit.Results are compared with the latest model and performance study shows that in our proposed scheme more users win and get their requested services and the utilization of offered services is increased up to 18.4%than the existing schemes.展开更多
The carbon market auction mechanism is an important policy tool for carbon pricing and a key mechanism that supports carbon emission neutralization,especially for China.A few systematic studies exist on China’s carbo...The carbon market auction mechanism is an important policy tool for carbon pricing and a key mechanism that supports carbon emission neutralization,especially for China.A few systematic studies exist on China’s carbon market auction mechanism.This article focuses on the five auction mechanisms in Chinese pilot emission trading schemes(ETS),reviews the structures and bidding situation of the five-pilot auction mechanism,extracts the similarities,and analyzes their different features,such as auction mode,bidding scale,participants,pricing mode,auction frequency,and so on.This study conducts an in-depth analysis of the carbon allowance auction mechanism in the Guangdong pilot ETS of China,including its development and the evolution of the key elements,its operational effects,and related disputes.Finally,this study puts forward the trend forecast and suggestions for the Chinese allowance auction mechanism,such as the time window of launching national allowance auctions,the most likely auction mode,carbon pricing,and bidding revenue management.Carbon pricing by auction is the most powerful policy tool for addressing carbon emissions reduction and implementing the Glasgow Climate Pact.展开更多
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(62173066)Open Project of Sichuan Provincial Key Laboratory of Intelligent Terminal Co-built by Province and City(SCITLAB-1014)。
文摘Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.72104075,71850012,72274056)the National Social Science Fund of China(No.19AZD014,21&ZD125)+2 种基金the Major Special Projects of the Department of Science and Technology of Hunan province(No.2018GK1020)the Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province(No.2022JJ40106)the China Association for Science and Technology(No.20220615ZZ07110402),and Hunan University Youth Talent Program.
文摘Although blockchain technology has received a significant amount of cutting-edge research on constructing a novel carbon trade market in theory,there is little research on using blockchain in carbon emission trading schemes(ETS).This study intends to address existing gaps in the literature by creating and simulating an ETS system based on blockchain technology.Using the ciphertext-policy attributed-based encryption algorithm and the Fabric network to build a platform may optimize the amount of data available while maintaining privacy security.Considering the augmentation of information interaction during the auction process brought about by blockchain,the learning behavior of bidding firms is introduced to investigate the impact of blockchain on ETS auction.In particular,implementing smart contracts can provide a swift and automatic settlement.The simulation results of the proposed system demonstrate the following:(1)fine-grained access is possible with a second delay;(2)the average annual compliance levels increase by 2%when bidders’learning behavior is considered;and(3)the blockchain network can process more than 350 reading operations or 7 writing operations in a second.Novel cooperative management of an ETS platform based on blockchain is proposed.The data access control policy based on CP-ABE is used to solve the contradiction between data privacy on the firm chain and government supervision.A learned auction strategy is proposed to suit the enhancement of information interaction caused by blockchain technology.This study provides a new method for climate change policymakers to consider the blockchain application of the carbon market.
文摘With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under grants 61901070,61801065,61771082,61871062,U20A20157in part by the Science and Technology Research Program of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission under grants KJQN202000603,KJQN201900611+1 种基金in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Chongqing under grant cstc2020jcyjzdxmX0024part by University Innovation Research Group of Chongqing under grant CXQT20017.
文摘Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem between MDs and ENs caused by the excessive concern on MD profit.In this paper,we propose an auction-based computation offloading algorithm,inspiring ENs to provide high-quality service by maximizing the profit of ENs.Firstly,a novel cooperation auction framework is designed to avoid overall profit damage of ENs,which is derived from the high computation delay at the overloaded ENs.Thereafter,the bidding willingness of each MD in every round of auction is determined to ensure MD rationality.Furthermore,we put forward a payment rule for the pre-selected winner to effectively guarantee auction truthfulness.Finally,the auction-based profit maximization offloading algorithm is proposed,and the MD is allowed to occupy the computation and spectrum resources of the EN for offloading if it wins the auction.Numerical results verify the performance of the proposed algorithm.Compared with the VA algorithm,the ENs profit is increased by 23.8%,and the task discard ratio is decreased by 7.5%.
基金Supported by Hubei Provincial Foundation for Natural Science under Contract 99J041 and 2001ABB104
文摘It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.
文摘The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.
基金Supported by the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China("863"Program)(20060AA12A105)the Chinese Airspace Management Commission Researching Program(GKG200802006)~~
文摘The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foun-dation of China (70071012)
文摘In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions. We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies. For seller or auction house, whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function, the size of the fixed commission proportion, but also related with the value of the item auctioned. So, in the practical auctions, the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.
基金supported by the Beijing Natural Science Foundation of China (4102050)
文摘Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framework has been recognized as an effective way to achieve dynamic spectrum access.From the perspective of spectrum auction,multi-band multi-user auction provides a new challenge for spectrum management.This paper proposes an auction framework based on location information for multi-band multi-user spectrum allocation.The performance of the proposed framework is compared with that of traditional auction framework based on a binary interference model as a benchmark.Simulation results show that primary users will obtain more total system revenue by selling their idle frequency bands to secondary users and the spectrum utilization of the proposed framework is more effective and fairer.
基金Supported by the 211 Project of Anhui University under Grant No.2009QN028B
文摘I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication （QSDC） with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen （EPR） pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state measurements, it is shown that the three legitimate parties can exchange their respective secret message simultaneously. Then I modify it for an experimentally feasible and secure quantum sealed-bid auction （QSBD） protocol. Furthermore, I also analyze th^ecurity of the protocol, and the scheme is proven to be secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, the disturbancb attack and the entangled-and-measure attack.
基金supported in part by National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)under Grant No.SS2015AA011306National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)under Grant No.2014AA01A701National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants No.61379006 and 61521003
文摘We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secure multi-user signals. To maximize the secrecy rate of uplink communications, we propose a distributed ascending-clock auction(ACA) algorithm to allocate subcarriers and jamming power. Specifically, the impact of the self-interference of the full-duplex base station on the secrecy rate is considered. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts. Firstly, subcarriers and the jamming power are respectively priced by the base station. Secondly, users select the subcarrier and the jamming power based on the price. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed auction algorithm is mathematically proved. Simulation results show that the proposed auction algorithm is more beneficial to improve the uplink secrecy performance compared to traditional auction algorithms.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61741102,61471164,61601122)
文摘A joint resource allocation algorithm based on parallel auction(JRAPA)is proposed for mobile edge computing(MEC).In JRAPA,the joint allocation of wireless and cloud resources is modeled as an auction process,aiming at maximizing the utilities of service providers(SPs)and satisfying the delay requirements of mobile terminals(MTs).The auction process consists of the bidding submission,winner determination and pricing stages.At the bidding submission stage,the MTs take available resources from SPs and distance factors into account to decide the bidding priority,thereby reducing the processing delay and improving the successful trades rate.A resource constrained utility ranking(RCUR)algorithm is put forward at the winner determination stage to determine the winners and losers so as to maximize the utilities of SPs.At the pricing stage,the sealed second-price rule is adopted to ensure the independence between the price paid by the buyer and its own bid.The simulation results show that the proposed JRAPA algorithm outperforms other existing algorithms in terms of the convergence rate and the number of successful trades rate.Moreover,it can not only achieve a larger average utility of SPs but also significantly reduce the average delay of MTs.
基金This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.61601107,U1708262 and 61872449)China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(No.2019M653568)The Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.Nl 72304023).
文摘With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spectrum allocation,and due to the complexity of the network environment,the security of spectrum auctions can not be ignored.Most existing secure spectrum auction schemes introduce a semi-honest agent to complete spectrum auction.However,the hypothetical semi-honest model does not guarantee the security of spectnim auction in the actual application scenario,which may lead to potential security threats:the agent may reveal the privacy of bidders,agent or auctioneer may collude with the bidder to manipulate the spectrum auction,and so on.In this paper,a secure spectrum auction scheme without a trusted party is proposed based on the smart contract technology,and the smart contract written into the blockchain replaces the traditional semi-honest agent to cooperate with the auctioneer server to complete the auction.In order to ensure the security of our scheme,a secure spectrum auction protocol is designed,in which the Software Guard Extensions(SGX)technology and Paillier cryptosystem are used to protect the privacy of bidders.Public verification is provided in our protocol by using extensive Pedersen commitment,which prevents the auctioneer server and the bidder from colluding with each other and verifies group bid sum values.Finally,the security analysis is given to propose several types of attacks that can be defended.Besides,theoretical analysis and simulation experiments of our protocol are also provided.
基金Sponsored by Excellent Young Scholars Research Fund of Beijing Institute of Technology(00Y03-13)
文摘An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auction method to multi-robot task allocation. The genetic algorithm based combinatorial auction （GACA） method which combines the basic-genetic algorithm with a new concept of ringed chromosome is used to solve the winner determination problem （WDP） of combinatorial auction. The simulation experiments are conducted in OpenSim, a multi-robot simulator. The results show that GACA can get a satisfying solution in a reasonable shot time, and compared with SIA or parthenogenesis algorithm combinatorial auction （PGACA） method, it is the simplest and has higher search efficiency, also, GACA can get a global better/optimal solution and satisfy the high real-time requirement of multi-robot task allocation.
基金This publication was supported by the Deanship of Scientific Research at Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz University,Alkharj,Saudi Arabia.
文摘Cloud computing is a demanding business platform for services related to the field of IT.The goal of cloud customers is to access resources at a sustainable price,while the goal of cloud suppliers is to maximize their services utilization.Previously,the customers would bid for every single resource type,which was a limitation of cloud resources allocation.To solve these issues,researchers have focused on a combinatorial auction in which the resources are offered by the providers in bundles so that the user bids for their required bundle.Still,in this allocation mechanism,some drawbacks need to be tackled,such as due to the lower average bid price the users are dropped from the auction process.To solve this problem,we proposed a“Negotiation based Combinatorial Double Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation(N-CDARA)in cloud computing”.The proposed method negotiates with dropped users.Lower average bid price users are asked by our proposed mechanism to increase their bids,as by the quoted bids they will be dropped by the auctioneer.Most of the users that are close to winning accept the proposal and increase their bid prices.The proposed mechanism is implemented in a CloudSim simulation toolkit.Results are compared with the latest model and performance study shows that in our proposed scheme more users win and get their requested services and the utilization of offered services is increased up to 18.4%than the existing schemes.
基金supported by Shenzhen Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning in 2021[Grant No.SZ2021A006]the Basic Theoretical Research in the 13th Five Year Plan of Guangdong Philosophy and Social Sciences in 2020[Grant No.GD20 YDXZGL09]and the Characteristic Innovation Projects of Guangdong Universities in China[Grant No.2021WTSCX035].
文摘The carbon market auction mechanism is an important policy tool for carbon pricing and a key mechanism that supports carbon emission neutralization,especially for China.A few systematic studies exist on China’s carbon market auction mechanism.This article focuses on the five auction mechanisms in Chinese pilot emission trading schemes(ETS),reviews the structures and bidding situation of the five-pilot auction mechanism,extracts the similarities,and analyzes their different features,such as auction mode,bidding scale,participants,pricing mode,auction frequency,and so on.This study conducts an in-depth analysis of the carbon allowance auction mechanism in the Guangdong pilot ETS of China,including its development and the evolution of the key elements,its operational effects,and related disputes.Finally,this study puts forward the trend forecast and suggestions for the Chinese allowance auction mechanism,such as the time window of launching national allowance auctions,the most likely auction mode,carbon pricing,and bidding revenue management.Carbon pricing by auction is the most powerful policy tool for addressing carbon emissions reduction and implementing the Glasgow Climate Pact.
