The aim of this study is to examine the effects of family involvement and altruism on agency costs of equity and debt, as well on the performance of small family businesses. To achieve this objective, the authors revi...The aim of this study is to examine the effects of family involvement and altruism on agency costs of equity and debt, as well on the performance of small family businesses. To achieve this objective, the authors reviewed the literature on family business. Drawing from agency theory and stewardship theory, the authors also proposed a research model that highlights the links among the variables. In so doing, this paper makes some contributions to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it takes an integrative framework that may help to explain behaviors oriented towards maximizing potential performance within a context in which pro-organizational attitudes co-exist with self-serving motivations. Secondly, it advances the understanding of corporate governance mechanisms in small family businesses, and finally, it deepens the discussion of prior research by advancing a set of propositions based on two theoretical approaches. Thus, the authors believe that a systematic comparison of different contexts provides new insights into small family business governance. The implications and directions for future research are in the last section.展开更多
We incorporate large losses risks into the DeM arzo et al.(2012) model of dynamic agency and the q theory of investment.The large losses risks induce losses costs and losses arising from agency conflicts during the la...We incorporate large losses risks into the DeM arzo et al.(2012) model of dynamic agency and the q theory of investment.The large losses risks induce losses costs and losses arising from agency conflicts during the large losses prevention process.Both of them reduce firm’s value,distort investment policy and generate a deeper wedge between the marginal and average q.In addition,we study the implementation of the contract to enhance the practical utility of our model.The agent optimally manages the firm’s cash flow and treats the cash reservation and credit line as the firm’s financial slack,and hedges the productivity shocks and large losses shocks via futures and insurance contracts,respectively.展开更多
There are two opposing views over the necessity of privatization for SOEs. While some believe that privatization is the only solution to SOE inefficiency, others contend that privatization will lead to serious loss of...There are two opposing views over the necessity of privatization for SOEs. While some believe that privatization is the only solution to SOE inefficiency, others contend that privatization will lead to serious loss of state assets without resolving the problem. This paper examined how performance evaluation system contributed to the innovation and profitability of central SOEs after the implementation of the revised Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises in 2009. Using this revision as a natural experiment, this paper conducted a difference-indifference analysis and discovered a significant improvement in the innovation of central SOEs after the implementation of the new policy as compared with private firms not affected by this system. Moreover, the revised performance evaluation system significantly improved the marginal contribution of innovation to corporate value. The above test result indicates that SOEs may become more efficient solely by altering executive incentives without privatization. In this sense, privatization may not be the only solution to SOE inefficiency. This paper offers theoretical insights on the controversies regarding SOE privatization and helps enrich relevant literature on corporate incentives and innovation.展开更多
CEO compensation stickiness represents an important indicator to measure the effectiveness of compensation contracts.This study uses CEO career experience data and compensation stickiness data from Shanghai and Shenzh...CEO compensation stickiness represents an important indicator to measure the effectiveness of compensation contracts.This study uses CEO career experience data and compensation stickiness data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020 to investigate the compensation contracts’effectiveness of CEOs with diverse career experiences.The findings are as follows:1)Compensation stickiness is more pronounced for CEOs with diverse career experiences.According to the mechanism test,these CEOs with diverse career experiences can obtain compensation incentives by reducing corporate uncertainty perception and improving total factor productivity.This approach leads to increased compensation stickiness and the effectiveness of compensation contracts.CEOs with diverse career experiences may receive excess compensation by raising agency costs,which intensifies compensation stickiness and weakens the effectiveness of compensation contracts.2)Compensation stickiness of CEOs with diverse career experiences is more significant in companies with lower investor protection,which brings about less effective compensation contracts.In contrast,in companies with higher diversification,the compensation stickiness of CEOs with diverse career experiences is more significant,which delivers more effective compensation contracts.The conclusions deepen the research of CEO compensation contracts and provide a helpful reference for CEO compensation management practices.展开更多
Environmental,social,and governance(ESG)performance,along with the novelty of innovation,are significant factors in promoting sustainable development for corporations.This study employs the Heckman two-stage model to ...Environmental,social,and governance(ESG)performance,along with the novelty of innovation,are significant factors in promoting sustainable development for corporations.This study employs the Heckman two-stage model to examine the impact of ESG performance on innovation novelty using a dataset comprising A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Ex-changes from 2011 to 2020.The results indicate that enhanced ESG performance significantly fosters innovation by expanding innovation resources and mitigating agency problems.Further analysis reveals that this relationship is more pronounced under high economic policy uncer-tainty,a challenging information environment,elevated financing constraints,and in the context of digital transformation.This study not only expands the research on the economic implications of ESG performance for enterprise innovation behavior but also places a distinct emphasis on innovation quality rather than quantity.Additionally,this study enriches the existing literature on the factors influencing innovation novelty and extends research into the link between envi-ronmental protection and firm innovation,particularly from the perspective of stakeholder the-ory.Furthermore,this study holds practical significance for governments aiming to enhance ESG evaluation systems and establish guiding policies that encourage novel innovations,ultimately contributing to sustainable and high-quality development.Simultaneously,this study provides guidance to enterprises by encouraging them to embrace green development,improve social responsibility,and elevate their governance standards to promote innovation quality.展开更多
We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other l...We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms,have higher profitability,operating efficiency and productivity.They suffer from fewer agency problems,pay more cash dividends and have lower likelihoods of receiving modified audit opinions and participating in financial disclosure-related irregularities than their counterparts.In China’s unique institutional context,the reputation mechanism for independent directors applies to firms in regions with weak marketization environments,nonstate-owned enterprises and firms without political connections;it also applies when external governance is weak.Overall,reputable independent directors appear to occupy valuable advising and monitoring roles and compensate for weak institutions and governance in China.展开更多
In this paper, we investigate if dividend policy is influenced by ownership type.Within the dividend literature, dividends have a signaling role regarding agency costs, such that dividends may diminish insider conflic...In this paper, we investigate if dividend policy is influenced by ownership type.Within the dividend literature, dividends have a signaling role regarding agency costs, such that dividends may diminish insider conflicts(reduce free cash flow) or may be used to extract cash from firms(tunneling effect)- which could be predominant in emerging markets. We expect firms with foreign ownership and those that are listed in overseas markets to have different dividend policies and practices than those that are not, and firms with more state ownership and less individual ownership to be more likely to pay cash dividends and less likely to pay stock dividends. Using firms from an emerging economy(China), we examine whether these effects exist in corporate dividend policy and practice. We find that both foreign ownership and cross-listing have significant negative effects on cash dividends, consistent with the signaling effect and the notion of reduced tunneling activities for firms with the ability to raise capital from outside of China. Consistent with the tunneling effect, we find that firms with higher state ownership tend to pay higher cash dividends and lower stock dividends, while the opposite is true for public(individual) ownership.Further analysis shows that foreign ownership mediates the effect of state ownership on dividend policy. Our results have significant implications for researchers, investors, policy makers and regulators in emerging markets.展开更多
This article reviews family firm studies in the finance and accounting literature,primarily those conducted using data from the United States and China. Family owners have unique features such as concentrated ownershi...This article reviews family firm studies in the finance and accounting literature,primarily those conducted using data from the United States and China. Family owners have unique features such as concentrated ownership, long investment horizon, and reputation concerns. Given the distinguishing features of family ownership and control, family firms face unique agency conflicts. We discuss the agency problems in family firms and review the findings of recent family firm studies. We call for more research to understand the unique family effects and encourage more research on Chinese family firms.Part I of the article discusses the fundaments of family firms: the prevalence of and the agency conflicts within family firms. Part II summarizes the findings of recent U.S. family firm studies. It reviews the evidence on the family firm premium(how, which, and when family firms are associated with a valuation premium), the manifestation of the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders in family firms, earnings quality and corporate disclosure, and the determinants of family ownership and control. Part III discusses the prevalence and characteristics of Chinese family firms and reviews the findings of related studies. The article concludes with some suggestions for future research.展开更多
This paper synthesizes the major empirical findings of the burgeoning tax avoidance research in China from the accounting,finance,and economics literature over the last 13 years.It surveys the evidence in four main ar...This paper synthesizes the major empirical findings of the burgeoning tax avoidance research in China from the accounting,finance,and economics literature over the last 13 years.It surveys the evidence in four main areas:(1)the mechanisms through which Chinese firms avoid income taxes;(2)the effects of government ownership and agency problem on tax avoidance;(3)tax avoidance and political connections;and(4)the roles of book-tax conformity,tax enforcement,and corporate governance.It also discusses the appropriateness of tax avoidance measures in the Chinese setting.Finally,it proposes important directions for future research.展开更多
This study solves the dispute between the free cash flow and tunneling hypotheses in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Investors valu...This study solves the dispute between the free cash flow and tunneling hypotheses in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Investors value more the cash dividends and the cash holdings of firms with lower ownership control than those of firms with higher ownership control. This is more consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. However, when investment opportunities are considered, the free cash flow hypothesis better explains firms' dividend policy. Investors value more the cash dividends of firms with fewer investment opportunities and higher probability of expropriation. This study indicates that investors are concerned with the potential asset expropriation through cash payouts, unless firms possess high growth opportunities.展开更多
A principal-agent relationship exists among creditors,shareholders and management,and information asymmetry among them leads to asymmetric loss functions,which induces conservative accounting.This paper investigates t...A principal-agent relationship exists among creditors,shareholders and management,and information asymmetry among them leads to asymmetric loss functions,which induces conservative accounting.This paper investigates the determinants of accounting conservatism using accrual-based measures and data from 2001 to 2006 in China.We find that a higher degree of leverage,lower level of control of ultimate shareholders and lower level of management ownership lead to more conservative financial reporting.We also find that political concerns and pressures among state-owned enterprises are greater than those among non-state owned enterprises,which leads to more conservative financial reporting among the former.However,a decrease in such concerns leads to a decrease in accounting conservatism.Overall,we find that among the determinants of conservatism in China,debt is the most important,followed by ownership,and that board has little influence.展开更多
Using creditor litigation data from China,we investigate whether creditors can participate in corporate governance when agency conflict between shareholders and creditors is severe.By comparing firms that have experie...Using creditor litigation data from China,we investigate whether creditors can participate in corporate governance when agency conflict between shareholders and creditors is severe.By comparing firms that have experienced creditor lawsuits(litigation firms)with those that have not(non-litigation firms),we find that litigation firms have lower pay-performance sensitivity before lawsuits,suggesting that these firms have weaker corporate governance.This result is consistent with our expectation that creditors participate in corporate governance by introducing external monitoring when internal monitoring,dominated by shareholders,is insufficient.We also find that the association is stronger for firms with more severe shareholder-creditor agency conflict.Moreover,creditor litigation is strongly related to low pay-performance sensitivity when the external legal environment is strong.Our results remain robust to different model specifications and after addressing endogeneity problems.展开更多
文摘The aim of this study is to examine the effects of family involvement and altruism on agency costs of equity and debt, as well on the performance of small family businesses. To achieve this objective, the authors reviewed the literature on family business. Drawing from agency theory and stewardship theory, the authors also proposed a research model that highlights the links among the variables. In so doing, this paper makes some contributions to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it takes an integrative framework that may help to explain behaviors oriented towards maximizing potential performance within a context in which pro-organizational attitudes co-exist with self-serving motivations. Secondly, it advances the understanding of corporate governance mechanisms in small family businesses, and finally, it deepens the discussion of prior research by advancing a set of propositions based on two theoretical approaches. Thus, the authors believe that a systematic comparison of different contexts provides new insights into small family business governance. The implications and directions for future research are in the last section.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(11571310 and 71371168)
文摘We incorporate large losses risks into the DeM arzo et al.(2012) model of dynamic agency and the q theory of investment.The large losses risks induce losses costs and losses arising from agency conflicts during the large losses prevention process.Both of them reduce firm’s value,distort investment policy and generate a deeper wedge between the marginal and average q.In addition,we study the implementation of the contract to enhance the practical utility of our model.The agent optimally manages the firm’s cash flow and treats the cash reservation and credit line as the firm’s financial slack,and hedges the productivity shocks and large losses shocks via futures and insurance contracts,respectively.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.:71172205,71372126,71502161,71572133 and 71672134)the Humanities and Social Science Project of the Ministry of Education(Grant No.:15YJA630057)
文摘There are two opposing views over the necessity of privatization for SOEs. While some believe that privatization is the only solution to SOE inefficiency, others contend that privatization will lead to serious loss of state assets without resolving the problem. This paper examined how performance evaluation system contributed to the innovation and profitability of central SOEs after the implementation of the revised Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises in 2009. Using this revision as a natural experiment, this paper conducted a difference-indifference analysis and discovered a significant improvement in the innovation of central SOEs after the implementation of the new policy as compared with private firms not affected by this system. Moreover, the revised performance evaluation system significantly improved the marginal contribution of innovation to corporate value. The above test result indicates that SOEs may become more efficient solely by altering executive incentives without privatization. In this sense, privatization may not be the only solution to SOE inefficiency. This paper offers theoretical insights on the controversies regarding SOE privatization and helps enrich relevant literature on corporate incentives and innovation.
基金the National Social Science Fund of China,under grant No.21BGL017.
文摘CEO compensation stickiness represents an important indicator to measure the effectiveness of compensation contracts.This study uses CEO career experience data and compensation stickiness data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020 to investigate the compensation contracts’effectiveness of CEOs with diverse career experiences.The findings are as follows:1)Compensation stickiness is more pronounced for CEOs with diverse career experiences.According to the mechanism test,these CEOs with diverse career experiences can obtain compensation incentives by reducing corporate uncertainty perception and improving total factor productivity.This approach leads to increased compensation stickiness and the effectiveness of compensation contracts.CEOs with diverse career experiences may receive excess compensation by raising agency costs,which intensifies compensation stickiness and weakens the effectiveness of compensation contracts.2)Compensation stickiness of CEOs with diverse career experiences is more significant in companies with lower investor protection,which brings about less effective compensation contracts.In contrast,in companies with higher diversification,the compensation stickiness of CEOs with diverse career experiences is more significant,which delivers more effective compensation contracts.The conclusions deepen the research of CEO compensation contracts and provide a helpful reference for CEO compensation management practices.
基金support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project No.72102139)Kang He acknowledges financial support from Shantou University Research Start-up Fund Project(Project No.STF22007)Guangdong Province Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project(GD23XYJ77).
文摘Environmental,social,and governance(ESG)performance,along with the novelty of innovation,are significant factors in promoting sustainable development for corporations.This study employs the Heckman two-stage model to examine the impact of ESG performance on innovation novelty using a dataset comprising A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Ex-changes from 2011 to 2020.The results indicate that enhanced ESG performance significantly fosters innovation by expanding innovation resources and mitigating agency problems.Further analysis reveals that this relationship is more pronounced under high economic policy uncer-tainty,a challenging information environment,elevated financing constraints,and in the context of digital transformation.This study not only expands the research on the economic implications of ESG performance for enterprise innovation behavior but also places a distinct emphasis on innovation quality rather than quantity.Additionally,this study enriches the existing literature on the factors influencing innovation novelty and extends research into the link between envi-ronmental protection and firm innovation,particularly from the perspective of stakeholder the-ory.Furthermore,this study holds practical significance for governments aiming to enhance ESG evaluation systems and establish guiding policies that encourage novel innovations,ultimately contributing to sustainable and high-quality development.Simultaneously,this study provides guidance to enterprises by encouraging them to embrace green development,improve social responsibility,and elevate their governance standards to promote innovation quality.
基金financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71572160)
文摘We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms,have higher profitability,operating efficiency and productivity.They suffer from fewer agency problems,pay more cash dividends and have lower likelihoods of receiving modified audit opinions and participating in financial disclosure-related irregularities than their counterparts.In China’s unique institutional context,the reputation mechanism for independent directors applies to firms in regions with weak marketization environments,nonstate-owned enterprises and firms without political connections;it also applies when external governance is weak.Overall,reputable independent directors appear to occupy valuable advising and monitoring roles and compensate for weak institutions and governance in China.
文摘In this paper, we investigate if dividend policy is influenced by ownership type.Within the dividend literature, dividends have a signaling role regarding agency costs, such that dividends may diminish insider conflicts(reduce free cash flow) or may be used to extract cash from firms(tunneling effect)- which could be predominant in emerging markets. We expect firms with foreign ownership and those that are listed in overseas markets to have different dividend policies and practices than those that are not, and firms with more state ownership and less individual ownership to be more likely to pay cash dividends and less likely to pay stock dividends. Using firms from an emerging economy(China), we examine whether these effects exist in corporate dividend policy and practice. We find that both foreign ownership and cross-listing have significant negative effects on cash dividends, consistent with the signaling effect and the notion of reduced tunneling activities for firms with the ability to raise capital from outside of China. Consistent with the tunneling effect, we find that firms with higher state ownership tend to pay higher cash dividends and lower stock dividends, while the opposite is true for public(individual) ownership.Further analysis shows that foreign ownership mediates the effect of state ownership on dividend policy. Our results have significant implications for researchers, investors, policy makers and regulators in emerging markets.
文摘This article reviews family firm studies in the finance and accounting literature,primarily those conducted using data from the United States and China. Family owners have unique features such as concentrated ownership, long investment horizon, and reputation concerns. Given the distinguishing features of family ownership and control, family firms face unique agency conflicts. We discuss the agency problems in family firms and review the findings of recent family firm studies. We call for more research to understand the unique family effects and encourage more research on Chinese family firms.Part I of the article discusses the fundaments of family firms: the prevalence of and the agency conflicts within family firms. Part II summarizes the findings of recent U.S. family firm studies. It reviews the evidence on the family firm premium(how, which, and when family firms are associated with a valuation premium), the manifestation of the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders in family firms, earnings quality and corporate disclosure, and the determinants of family ownership and control. Part III discusses the prevalence and characteristics of Chinese family firms and reviews the findings of related studies. The article concludes with some suggestions for future research.
文摘This paper synthesizes the major empirical findings of the burgeoning tax avoidance research in China from the accounting,finance,and economics literature over the last 13 years.It surveys the evidence in four main areas:(1)the mechanisms through which Chinese firms avoid income taxes;(2)the effects of government ownership and agency problem on tax avoidance;(3)tax avoidance and political connections;and(4)the roles of book-tax conformity,tax enforcement,and corporate governance.It also discusses the appropriateness of tax avoidance measures in the Chinese setting.Finally,it proposes important directions for future research.
文摘This study solves the dispute between the free cash flow and tunneling hypotheses in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Investors value more the cash dividends and the cash holdings of firms with lower ownership control than those of firms with higher ownership control. This is more consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. However, when investment opportunities are considered, the free cash flow hypothesis better explains firms' dividend policy. Investors value more the cash dividends of firms with fewer investment opportunities and higher probability of expropriation. This study indicates that investors are concerned with the potential asset expropriation through cash payouts, unless firms possess high growth opportunities.
基金sponsored by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(grant number 70772017)
文摘A principal-agent relationship exists among creditors,shareholders and management,and information asymmetry among them leads to asymmetric loss functions,which induces conservative accounting.This paper investigates the determinants of accounting conservatism using accrual-based measures and data from 2001 to 2006 in China.We find that a higher degree of leverage,lower level of control of ultimate shareholders and lower level of management ownership lead to more conservative financial reporting.We also find that political concerns and pressures among state-owned enterprises are greater than those among non-state owned enterprises,which leads to more conservative financial reporting among the former.However,a decrease in such concerns leads to a decrease in accounting conservatism.Overall,we find that among the determinants of conservatism in China,debt is the most important,followed by ownership,and that board has little influence.
基金support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(#71572210,#71802205)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(#SWU1909771)
文摘Using creditor litigation data from China,we investigate whether creditors can participate in corporate governance when agency conflict between shareholders and creditors is severe.By comparing firms that have experienced creditor lawsuits(litigation firms)with those that have not(non-litigation firms),we find that litigation firms have lower pay-performance sensitivity before lawsuits,suggesting that these firms have weaker corporate governance.This result is consistent with our expectation that creditors participate in corporate governance by introducing external monitoring when internal monitoring,dominated by shareholders,is insufficient.We also find that the association is stronger for firms with more severe shareholder-creditor agency conflict.Moreover,creditor litigation is strongly related to low pay-performance sensitivity when the external legal environment is strong.Our results remain robust to different model specifications and after addressing endogeneity problems.
