With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted mor...With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control： The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.展开更多
According to the differences between operation and correlationship by both sides of the takeover in the market for corporate control, the takeover can be divided into three types--transverse takeover, longitudinal tak...According to the differences between operation and correlationship by both sides of the takeover in the market for corporate control, the takeover can be divided into three types--transverse takeover, longitudinal takeover and mixed takeover. Meanwhile, due to the activities of takeover taken by the companies in the different trade life circles adopting different takeover types, so their performances are different. Seeing about this relationship, you can effectively inspect the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Adopting298 stylebook data from the market for corporate control in China, and through empirical analyzing, it can see that because of the existing of the stock holding, the efficiency of the market for corporate control in China is not very high. The government tempts to adjust the industrial structure through merger and acquisition （M＆A）, but it urged the aim of state-owned economy forward strategic transfer difficult to come true. To solve the contradiction of ＂setting up of the stock holding＂ comes to no time to delay. ＇展开更多
The mode of arrangement and innovation of governance for corporate rights of control should be in accordance with the global resource disposition opportunities and efficiency competition. Based on rights formulated by...The mode of arrangement and innovation of governance for corporate rights of control should be in accordance with the global resource disposition opportunities and efficiency competition. Based on rights formulated by acts and regulations, this paper establishes models of arrangement for corporate rights of control, and then analyses the composite basic features derived from the models. To conclude, a main frame for the arrangement and innovation of corporate rights of control is put forward based on the real practice of listed companies in China.展开更多
This paper analyzes determinants and consequences of managerial ownership within ownership structures of the selected European and Asian transition countries. Focus of the analysis is the influence of the specific uni...This paper analyzes determinants and consequences of managerial ownership within ownership structures of the selected European and Asian transition countries. Focus of the analysis is the influence of the specific unification of ownership and control on corporate performance. Findings in the paper are based on research that produced empirical data for Croatia which is subsequently compared with evidence from other Asian and European transition countries facing the same issues. Consequently, transitional ownership structures, influenced by actual privatization process, like emergent corporate governance mechanisms, highly concentrated ownership and undeveloped markets for corporate control are also described. Research findings show that direct or indirect managerial ownership are important phenomena in transition countries, research has also shown that stable and concentrated managerial ownership have positive effects on firms＇ profitability in the observed transitional environments.展开更多
By studying the cultural background and corporate culture in China, Japan and USA, this paper analyzes the effects of cultural background and corporation culture on the transaction cost and the efficiency of control r...By studying the cultural background and corporate culture in China, Japan and USA, this paper analyzes the effects of cultural background and corporation culture on the transaction cost and the efficiency of control right, thus shows that cultural backgrounds have great impact on merger. This paper further studies the choice and application of the mode of culture combination of the transnational merger.展开更多
We study the dynamic causal effects of the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholder on tunneling behavior in China.We use control-right-transfers as the event to conduct the study.We obtain 394 control-right-tran...We study the dynamic causal effects of the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholder on tunneling behavior in China.We use control-right-transfers as the event to conduct the study.We obtain 394 control-right-transfer samples in China corporate control market from 2001 to 2008.We use related party transactions amount to capture control shareholders’tunneling activities,and make the following findings.Firstly,tunneling behavior is significantly affected by the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholder.Secondly,the relationship between tunneling and shareholding ratio of controlling shareholder takes an N shape(incline-decline-incline).There are at least two turning points in the relationship.Furthermore,firms with shareholding ratios of controlling shareholder that range from 34.46%to 39.01%(8.99–18.04%)exhibit the most(least)severe tunneling.Firm size is significantly positively related to tunneling activities.In addition,the shareholding ratios of the board and the tunneling activities are significantly negatively correlated.These findings imply the shareholding ratio decision of controlling shareholder in control transfers lead to agency problems manifested in China in a particular form of tunneling.展开更多
文摘With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control： The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.
文摘According to the differences between operation and correlationship by both sides of the takeover in the market for corporate control, the takeover can be divided into three types--transverse takeover, longitudinal takeover and mixed takeover. Meanwhile, due to the activities of takeover taken by the companies in the different trade life circles adopting different takeover types, so their performances are different. Seeing about this relationship, you can effectively inspect the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Adopting298 stylebook data from the market for corporate control in China, and through empirical analyzing, it can see that because of the existing of the stock holding, the efficiency of the market for corporate control in China is not very high. The government tempts to adjust the industrial structure through merger and acquisition （M＆A）, but it urged the aim of state-owned economy forward strategic transfer difficult to come true. To solve the contradiction of ＂setting up of the stock holding＂ comes to no time to delay. ＇
文摘The mode of arrangement and innovation of governance for corporate rights of control should be in accordance with the global resource disposition opportunities and efficiency competition. Based on rights formulated by acts and regulations, this paper establishes models of arrangement for corporate rights of control, and then analyses the composite basic features derived from the models. To conclude, a main frame for the arrangement and innovation of corporate rights of control is put forward based on the real practice of listed companies in China.
文摘This paper analyzes determinants and consequences of managerial ownership within ownership structures of the selected European and Asian transition countries. Focus of the analysis is the influence of the specific unification of ownership and control on corporate performance. Findings in the paper are based on research that produced empirical data for Croatia which is subsequently compared with evidence from other Asian and European transition countries facing the same issues. Consequently, transitional ownership structures, influenced by actual privatization process, like emergent corporate governance mechanisms, highly concentrated ownership and undeveloped markets for corporate control are also described. Research findings show that direct or indirect managerial ownership are important phenomena in transition countries, research has also shown that stable and concentrated managerial ownership have positive effects on firms＇ profitability in the observed transitional environments.
文摘By studying the cultural background and corporate culture in China, Japan and USA, this paper analyzes the effects of cultural background and corporation culture on the transaction cost and the efficiency of control right, thus shows that cultural backgrounds have great impact on merger. This paper further studies the choice and application of the mode of culture combination of the transnational merger.
基金financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC Nos. 71372149, and 71402034)the philosophy and social sciences major issue research projects of the Ministry of Education of China (Grant No. 8151027501000039)
文摘We study the dynamic causal effects of the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholder on tunneling behavior in China.We use control-right-transfers as the event to conduct the study.We obtain 394 control-right-transfer samples in China corporate control market from 2001 to 2008.We use related party transactions amount to capture control shareholders’tunneling activities,and make the following findings.Firstly,tunneling behavior is significantly affected by the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholder.Secondly,the relationship between tunneling and shareholding ratio of controlling shareholder takes an N shape(incline-decline-incline).There are at least two turning points in the relationship.Furthermore,firms with shareholding ratios of controlling shareholder that range from 34.46%to 39.01%(8.99–18.04%)exhibit the most(least)severe tunneling.Firm size is significantly positively related to tunneling activities.In addition,the shareholding ratios of the board and the tunneling activities are significantly negatively correlated.These findings imply the shareholding ratio decision of controlling shareholder in control transfers lead to agency problems manifested in China in a particular form of tunneling.
