我国《民法典》第196条第2项完整地保留了《民法总则》对于所有物返还请求权诉讼时效的规定,明确的将不动产物权以及登记的动产物权的所有物返还请求权排除在诉讼时效的适用范围之外。有些学者认为《民法典》第196条是对不适用诉讼时效...我国《民法典》第196条第2项完整地保留了《民法总则》对于所有物返还请求权诉讼时效的规定,明确的将不动产物权以及登记的动产物权的所有物返还请求权排除在诉讼时效的适用范围之外。有些学者认为《民法典》第196条是对不适用诉讼时效的请求权的完全列举,因此可以对该项规定进行反面解释,进而得出未登记的动产所有物返还请求权的应适用诉讼时效的规定。但对未登记动产的所有物返还请求权直接规定3年的诉讼时效,显然对于物的权利人过于严苛。并且在我国未承认取得时效的现状下,未登记动产权利人的所有物返还请求权因时效届满而导致的失能与权利人仍可以永久地保留所有权的状态发生了冲突,致使物的现实支配与物的法律支配发生了不可调和的矛盾。因此,反面解释对于《民法典》第196条第2项应是被禁止的。The “Civil Code” of our country retains in its entirety the provisions concerning the prescription period for claims of return of property as stipulated in the “General Principles of the Civil Law”, specifically excluding in Article 196(2) the application of prescription to claims for the return of real property and registered movable property. Some scholars argue that Article 196 of the “Civil Code” provides an exhaustive list of claims not subject to prescription, thus allowing for an interpretative inference that claims for the return of unregistered movable property should be subject to the prescription period. However, directly applying a three-year prescription period to claims for the return of unregistered movable property is overly stringent for the rights holder. Furthermore, given that our legal system does not recognize the doctrine of acquisition through prescription, the incapacity of the rights holder of unregistered movable property to enforce their claim due to the expiration of the prescription period conflicts with the perpetual retention of ownership by the rights holder. This results in an irreconcilable contradiction between de facto and legal control over the property. Therefore, interpretative inference should be prohibited regarding Article 196(2) of the “Civil Code”.展开更多
文摘我国《民法典》第196条第2项完整地保留了《民法总则》对于所有物返还请求权诉讼时效的规定,明确的将不动产物权以及登记的动产物权的所有物返还请求权排除在诉讼时效的适用范围之外。有些学者认为《民法典》第196条是对不适用诉讼时效的请求权的完全列举,因此可以对该项规定进行反面解释,进而得出未登记的动产所有物返还请求权的应适用诉讼时效的规定。但对未登记动产的所有物返还请求权直接规定3年的诉讼时效,显然对于物的权利人过于严苛。并且在我国未承认取得时效的现状下,未登记动产权利人的所有物返还请求权因时效届满而导致的失能与权利人仍可以永久地保留所有权的状态发生了冲突,致使物的现实支配与物的法律支配发生了不可调和的矛盾。因此,反面解释对于《民法典》第196条第2项应是被禁止的。The “Civil Code” of our country retains in its entirety the provisions concerning the prescription period for claims of return of property as stipulated in the “General Principles of the Civil Law”, specifically excluding in Article 196(2) the application of prescription to claims for the return of real property and registered movable property. Some scholars argue that Article 196 of the “Civil Code” provides an exhaustive list of claims not subject to prescription, thus allowing for an interpretative inference that claims for the return of unregistered movable property should be subject to the prescription period. However, directly applying a three-year prescription period to claims for the return of unregistered movable property is overly stringent for the rights holder. Furthermore, given that our legal system does not recognize the doctrine of acquisition through prescription, the incapacity of the rights holder of unregistered movable property to enforce their claim due to the expiration of the prescription period conflicts with the perpetual retention of ownership by the rights holder. This results in an irreconcilable contradiction between de facto and legal control over the property. Therefore, interpretative inference should be prohibited regarding Article 196(2) of the “Civil Code”.
