采用演化博弈模型分析海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准的采纳问题,构建了标准监管部门和海水养殖主体之间的标准采纳演化博弈模型,分析双方对于标准采纳与监管的动态演化过程。并以天津市《海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准》的发布为例,研究了...采用演化博弈模型分析海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准的采纳问题,构建了标准监管部门和海水养殖主体之间的标准采纳演化博弈模型,分析双方对于标准采纳与监管的动态演化过程。并以天津市《海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准》的发布为例,研究了标准发布后海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准的采纳,受到标准监管部门的标准监督成本、标准处罚力度、养殖主体不采纳标准发生的损失以及概率的影响。The evolutionary game model is used to analyze the adoption of the discharge standards of mariculture tail water pollutants, and the standard adoption evolutionary game model between standard regulatory departments and mariculture subjects is constructed, and the dynamic evolution process of standard adoption and supervision of both sides is analyzed. Taking the release of Discharge Standards for Mariculture Tail Water Pollutants in Tianjin as an example, the adoption of the discharge standards after the release of the standards was studied, which was affected by the standard supervision cost of the standard supervision department, the severity of the standard punishment, the loss of the standard and the probability.展开更多
文摘采用演化博弈模型分析海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准的采纳问题,构建了标准监管部门和海水养殖主体之间的标准采纳演化博弈模型,分析双方对于标准采纳与监管的动态演化过程。并以天津市《海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准》的发布为例,研究了标准发布后海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准的采纳,受到标准监管部门的标准监督成本、标准处罚力度、养殖主体不采纳标准发生的损失以及概率的影响。The evolutionary game model is used to analyze the adoption of the discharge standards of mariculture tail water pollutants, and the standard adoption evolutionary game model between standard regulatory departments and mariculture subjects is constructed, and the dynamic evolution process of standard adoption and supervision of both sides is analyzed. Taking the release of Discharge Standards for Mariculture Tail Water Pollutants in Tianjin as an example, the adoption of the discharge standards after the release of the standards was studied, which was affected by the standard supervision cost of the standard supervision department, the severity of the standard punishment, the loss of the standard and the probability.
