由Vienna University of Economics and Business(维也纳经济大学)的Gerhard Speckbacher和Markus Wabnegg共同完成的文章"Incentivizing innovation:The role of knowledge exchange and distal search behavior(激励创新:知识交...由Vienna University of Economics and Business(维也纳经济大学)的Gerhard Speckbacher和Markus Wabnegg共同完成的文章"Incentivizing innovation:The role of knowledge exchange and distal search behavior(激励创新:知识交流与远程搜索行为的作用)"刊发在Accounting,Organizations and Society(会计、组织和社会)杂志2020年7月刊上。这篇论文研究显性激励机制和隐性激励机制如何影响创新过程中的关键行为——知识交流和远程搜索,从而影响创新绩效。展开更多
Aim To study the implicit restriction mechanism for hidden action in multi stage dynamic game. Methods A reputation model for restriction on repeated principal agent relationship was established by using the theor...Aim To study the implicit restriction mechanism for hidden action in multi stage dynamic game. Methods A reputation model for restriction on repeated principal agent relationship was established by using the theory on principal agent problem in information economics and the method of game theory to study the implicit restriction mechanism for hidden action. Results and Conclusion It is proved that there exists implicit restriction mechanism for the multi stage principal agent relationship, some conditions for effective restriction are derived, the design methods of implicit restriction mechanism are presented.展开更多
文摘由Vienna University of Economics and Business(维也纳经济大学)的Gerhard Speckbacher和Markus Wabnegg共同完成的文章"Incentivizing innovation:The role of knowledge exchange and distal search behavior(激励创新:知识交流与远程搜索行为的作用)"刊发在Accounting,Organizations and Society(会计、组织和社会)杂志2020年7月刊上。这篇论文研究显性激励机制和隐性激励机制如何影响创新过程中的关键行为——知识交流和远程搜索,从而影响创新绩效。
文摘Aim To study the implicit restriction mechanism for hidden action in multi stage dynamic game. Methods A reputation model for restriction on repeated principal agent relationship was established by using the theory on principal agent problem in information economics and the method of game theory to study the implicit restriction mechanism for hidden action. Results and Conclusion It is proved that there exists implicit restriction mechanism for the multi stage principal agent relationship, some conditions for effective restriction are derived, the design methods of implicit restriction mechanism are presented.
