Background: The department of defense's field manual(FM) 3-11 is among the military's field manuals for preparing for, reacting to and recovering from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. Si...Background: The department of defense's field manual(FM) 3-11 is among the military's field manuals for preparing for, reacting to and recovering from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. Since post 9-11, U.S. military service members have been deployed in the global war on terrorism. This study attempted to determine the effectiveness of the FM 3-11 in detecting, deterring or preventing a human-borne with bioagent(HBBA) terrorist breach at an entry control point(ECP).Methods: This time-specific, cross-sectional study disseminated a validated survey tool with Cronbach's α>0.82 to respondents who have had antiterrorism training and combat ECP experience. The return rate was greater than 75.0%; however, many of the respondents failed to meet the inclusion criteria. Consequently, only 26 questionnaires were included in the sample.Results: The results revealed that while over 60.0% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that biointelligence, the deployment of biodetectors and the use of biowarning systems could be effective in preventing an ECP breach by a terrorist with a bioagent, the use of protective equipment and immunization to decontaminate service members or other tactics, techniques and procedures(TTPs) would never prevent a breach. A large percentage of respondents claimed that soldiers at the ECP lacked the devices or the knowledge to detect an HBBA at an ECP, and 72.0% suggested modifying current ECP TTPs to include education, training and equipment for security personnel at military base ECPs.Conclusion: If obtained from appropriate sources and communicated to the personnel at the ECP in an effective or timely manner, the possible effectiveness of certain TTPs in the FM 3-11, specifically FM 3-11.86(intelligence), might increase.展开更多
Background:The global war on terrorism has prompted an increase in the deployment of security personnel from multi-national forces on foreign lands,especially in places where known terrorist groups are based.The aim o...Background:The global war on terrorism has prompted an increase in the deployment of security personnel from multi-national forces on foreign lands,especially in places where known terrorist groups are based.The aim of this study was to obtain U.S.military and security personnel's perceptions of the possibility of encountering a humanborne with bioagent(HBBA) terrorist at an entry control point(ECP).Methods:This study was a mixed-method,cross-sectional,survey-based,time-limited study.A validated,five-option Likert scale questionnaire with Cronbach's alphas of 0.82 and 0.894 for Constructs 1 and 2 was distributed to over 113 respondents with combat experience.Results:The results indicated that 92.3% of the respondents thought it was possible for a terrorist to employ a biological agent to cause terror; 61.5% claimed it was either possible or very possible,and 26.9% claimed it was somewhat possible for a terrorist carrying a biological agent to successfully breach a combat Forward Operating Bases(FOB) ECP undetected.26.9% of the respondents agreed that "ECP soldiers are knowledgeable about bioagents(BA)",only 15.4% responded that ECP soldiers have effective devices for detecting a BA on a terrorist at an ECP.Conclusion:Despite some limitations,this pre-study tends to indicate that while many U.S.military or security personnel acknowledge the possibility of an HBBA terrorist breach and the vulnerability of U.S.combat post ECPs to a BA breach,the soldiers at the ECPs lack adequate knowledge or devices to effectively detect a BA on a terrorist at an ECP.展开更多
文摘Background: The department of defense's field manual(FM) 3-11 is among the military's field manuals for preparing for, reacting to and recovering from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. Since post 9-11, U.S. military service members have been deployed in the global war on terrorism. This study attempted to determine the effectiveness of the FM 3-11 in detecting, deterring or preventing a human-borne with bioagent(HBBA) terrorist breach at an entry control point(ECP).Methods: This time-specific, cross-sectional study disseminated a validated survey tool with Cronbach's α>0.82 to respondents who have had antiterrorism training and combat ECP experience. The return rate was greater than 75.0%; however, many of the respondents failed to meet the inclusion criteria. Consequently, only 26 questionnaires were included in the sample.Results: The results revealed that while over 60.0% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that biointelligence, the deployment of biodetectors and the use of biowarning systems could be effective in preventing an ECP breach by a terrorist with a bioagent, the use of protective equipment and immunization to decontaminate service members or other tactics, techniques and procedures(TTPs) would never prevent a breach. A large percentage of respondents claimed that soldiers at the ECP lacked the devices or the knowledge to detect an HBBA at an ECP, and 72.0% suggested modifying current ECP TTPs to include education, training and equipment for security personnel at military base ECPs.Conclusion: If obtained from appropriate sources and communicated to the personnel at the ECP in an effective or timely manner, the possible effectiveness of certain TTPs in the FM 3-11, specifically FM 3-11.86(intelligence), might increase.
文摘Background:The global war on terrorism has prompted an increase in the deployment of security personnel from multi-national forces on foreign lands,especially in places where known terrorist groups are based.The aim of this study was to obtain U.S.military and security personnel's perceptions of the possibility of encountering a humanborne with bioagent(HBBA) terrorist at an entry control point(ECP).Methods:This study was a mixed-method,cross-sectional,survey-based,time-limited study.A validated,five-option Likert scale questionnaire with Cronbach's alphas of 0.82 and 0.894 for Constructs 1 and 2 was distributed to over 113 respondents with combat experience.Results:The results indicated that 92.3% of the respondents thought it was possible for a terrorist to employ a biological agent to cause terror; 61.5% claimed it was either possible or very possible,and 26.9% claimed it was somewhat possible for a terrorist carrying a biological agent to successfully breach a combat Forward Operating Bases(FOB) ECP undetected.26.9% of the respondents agreed that "ECP soldiers are knowledgeable about bioagents(BA)",only 15.4% responded that ECP soldiers have effective devices for detecting a BA on a terrorist at an ECP.Conclusion:Despite some limitations,this pre-study tends to indicate that while many U.S.military or security personnel acknowledge the possibility of an HBBA terrorist breach and the vulnerability of U.S.combat post ECPs to a BA breach,the soldiers at the ECPs lack adequate knowledge or devices to effectively detect a BA on a terrorist at an ECP.
