This article introduces four of the latest,high-quality papers published in China’s top journals.The first article is an in-depth discussion of"government as a platform"contributing to an emerging and timel...This article introduces four of the latest,high-quality papers published in China’s top journals.The first article is an in-depth discussion of"government as a platform"contributing to an emerging and timely discussion of digital government in the public management literature.By employing the theory of"loose coupling"from organizational institutionalism,the second study introduces a new theoretical concept,that is,a"security zone for achievement"to synthesize the seemingly contradictory propositions derived from credit claiming and blame avoidance,based on a city’s trajectory in a Smart City project.The third paper proposes a theoretical alternative,prioritizing the Party committee’s assigned tasks,to supplement the existing explanations of local governance in China as applied to water treatment in provincial China.Such a mechanism is different from the campaign-style governance model because the Party committee plays a key role in providing substantial institutional incentives.The final paper conceptualizes institutional frictions in the Chinese context and explains different spending patterns across functional expenditures at the provincial level,suggesting a local leader’s tenure may influence target selections for punctuated expenditures.The paper concludes with a brief summary.展开更多
文摘This article introduces four of the latest,high-quality papers published in China’s top journals.The first article is an in-depth discussion of"government as a platform"contributing to an emerging and timely discussion of digital government in the public management literature.By employing the theory of"loose coupling"from organizational institutionalism,the second study introduces a new theoretical concept,that is,a"security zone for achievement"to synthesize the seemingly contradictory propositions derived from credit claiming and blame avoidance,based on a city’s trajectory in a Smart City project.The third paper proposes a theoretical alternative,prioritizing the Party committee’s assigned tasks,to supplement the existing explanations of local governance in China as applied to water treatment in provincial China.Such a mechanism is different from the campaign-style governance model because the Party committee plays a key role in providing substantial institutional incentives.The final paper conceptualizes institutional frictions in the Chinese context and explains different spending patterns across functional expenditures at the provincial level,suggesting a local leader’s tenure may influence target selections for punctuated expenditures.The paper concludes with a brief summary.
