Objective To explore the current situation of human resource management outsourcing in China’s pharmaceutical enterprises,and to put forward some suggestions for enterprises and the government.Methods The current sit...Objective To explore the current situation of human resource management outsourcing in China’s pharmaceutical enterprises,and to put forward some suggestions for enterprises and the government.Methods The current situation of human resource management outsourcing in China’s pharmaceutical enterprises was analyzed through the method of literature research.Results and Conclusion At present,the status of human resource management outsourcing in China’s pharmaceutical companies is that the level of human resource outsourcing companies is not high,and there are no relevant industry norms and laws.The information asymmetry between pharmaceutical enterprises and outsourcing companies results in adverse selection and moral hazard.Besides,the different culture of pharmaceutical enterprises and outsourcing companies leads to inefficient communication between enterprises and employee.To solve these problems,the government should promote and improve industry norms and laws to regulate the market.In addition,enterprises should clarify the motivation for outsourcing and make good decision on the outsourcing content.Meanwhile,enterprises should strengthen communication with employees to eliminate employees’concerns.展开更多
The trend of economic globalisation and advances in i nformation technology has led to the emergence of dispersed manufacturing system s as a form of the virtual organisation. New manufacturing strategy pays more at t...The trend of economic globalisation and advances in i nformation technology has led to the emergence of dispersed manufacturing system s as a form of the virtual organisation. New manufacturing strategy pays more at tention to the management of the total value chain and therefore puts emphasis o n outsourcing. In fact, outsourcing is an efficient way of utilizing available r esources and has become one key aspect of the manufacturing strategy. Improved d ecision and organization on outsourcing will result in cost production and short er lead-times. However, most concepts and practice of traditional outsourcing do not adapt to t he changing environment and meet increasing performance requirements. On the oth er hand, virtual organisations might display instability between pure outsourcin g and establishing alliance. Balance and trade-off between independent agents a nd creating alliance are thus required. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to develop a model to support decision-making, management and control on outsou rcing in a dispersed network manufacturing system and to discuss several key iss ues that are relevant to the relationship between the agents of the network. Dev elopment of the model will deploy Applied System Theory and will be built on fou ndations of earlier research on industrial management such the theories of Outso urcing, Order Entry Points, Design of Organisations and Logistic Control. The is sues that will be addressed in this paper are: · The selection of suppliers and co-makers; · Communication between suppliers and clients; · The mechanisms for profit-sharing between agents; · The product data management to integrate the knowledge of the different agent s into product design. Industrial companies will benefit from this research by the practical methods an d implementation extending their business models beyond concepts for outsourcing and alliances. Additionally, the exploration will lead to proactive contributio n of manufacturing during engineering, which would improve management and contro l of dispersed manufacturing systems.展开更多
We study a project management problem where the prime contractor needs to outsource tasks to subcontractors with the required resources.Successful execution of the project requires proper coordination among the subcon...We study a project management problem where the prime contractor needs to outsource tasks to subcontractors with the required resources.Successful execution of the project requires proper coordination among the subcontractors,as well as contract design by the prime contractor to incentivize the subcontractors.By modeling the subcontractors’coordination problem as a cooperative game,we develop a profit sharing scheme to facilitate the subcontractors’cooperation.We consider two contract designs for the prime contractor:a uniform contract across all subcontractors,and a nonuniform one that customizes incentives for each subcontractor.We propose efficient algorithms to solve the implicit optimization problems for optimal contract parameters.Computational experiments show that the pooling effect of subcontractors’cooperation mitigates the negative impact of poor estimates about the crashing cost and resource availability.We observe three unexpected results through the randomized computation experiments:(i)the subcontractors’profits may decrease if they provide false information;(ii)it is safer for the prime contractor to overestimate subcontractors’crashing costs than underestimate them;and(iii)uniform contracts deliver more project profit for the subcontractors in the coalitions.展开更多
基金Graduate Education and Teaching Reform Project of Shenyang Pharmaceutical University(2020)(No.YJSJG200301).
文摘Objective To explore the current situation of human resource management outsourcing in China’s pharmaceutical enterprises,and to put forward some suggestions for enterprises and the government.Methods The current situation of human resource management outsourcing in China’s pharmaceutical enterprises was analyzed through the method of literature research.Results and Conclusion At present,the status of human resource management outsourcing in China’s pharmaceutical companies is that the level of human resource outsourcing companies is not high,and there are no relevant industry norms and laws.The information asymmetry between pharmaceutical enterprises and outsourcing companies results in adverse selection and moral hazard.Besides,the different culture of pharmaceutical enterprises and outsourcing companies leads to inefficient communication between enterprises and employee.To solve these problems,the government should promote and improve industry norms and laws to regulate the market.In addition,enterprises should clarify the motivation for outsourcing and make good decision on the outsourcing content.Meanwhile,enterprises should strengthen communication with employees to eliminate employees’concerns.
文摘The trend of economic globalisation and advances in i nformation technology has led to the emergence of dispersed manufacturing system s as a form of the virtual organisation. New manufacturing strategy pays more at tention to the management of the total value chain and therefore puts emphasis o n outsourcing. In fact, outsourcing is an efficient way of utilizing available r esources and has become one key aspect of the manufacturing strategy. Improved d ecision and organization on outsourcing will result in cost production and short er lead-times. However, most concepts and practice of traditional outsourcing do not adapt to t he changing environment and meet increasing performance requirements. On the oth er hand, virtual organisations might display instability between pure outsourcin g and establishing alliance. Balance and trade-off between independent agents a nd creating alliance are thus required. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to develop a model to support decision-making, management and control on outsou rcing in a dispersed network manufacturing system and to discuss several key iss ues that are relevant to the relationship between the agents of the network. Dev elopment of the model will deploy Applied System Theory and will be built on fou ndations of earlier research on industrial management such the theories of Outso urcing, Order Entry Points, Design of Organisations and Logistic Control. The is sues that will be addressed in this paper are: · The selection of suppliers and co-makers; · Communication between suppliers and clients; · The mechanisms for profit-sharing between agents; · The product data management to integrate the knowledge of the different agent s into product design. Industrial companies will benefit from this research by the practical methods an d implementation extending their business models beyond concepts for outsourcing and alliances. Additionally, the exploration will lead to proactive contributio n of manufacturing during engineering, which would improve management and contro l of dispersed manufacturing systems.
基金supported by Leading Talent Program of Guangdong Province(Project No.2016LJ06D703)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project No.72192805),and the Shenzhen Science and Technology Innovation Commission(Project No.JCYJ20210324115604012)+1 种基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Key Research Grant 71732003)the Summer Fellowship Program of the Fisher College of Business,The Ohio State University.
文摘We study a project management problem where the prime contractor needs to outsource tasks to subcontractors with the required resources.Successful execution of the project requires proper coordination among the subcontractors,as well as contract design by the prime contractor to incentivize the subcontractors.By modeling the subcontractors’coordination problem as a cooperative game,we develop a profit sharing scheme to facilitate the subcontractors’cooperation.We consider two contract designs for the prime contractor:a uniform contract across all subcontractors,and a nonuniform one that customizes incentives for each subcontractor.We propose efficient algorithms to solve the implicit optimization problems for optimal contract parameters.Computational experiments show that the pooling effect of subcontractors’cooperation mitigates the negative impact of poor estimates about the crashing cost and resource availability.We observe three unexpected results through the randomized computation experiments:(i)the subcontractors’profits may decrease if they provide false information;(ii)it is safer for the prime contractor to overestimate subcontractors’crashing costs than underestimate them;and(iii)uniform contracts deliver more project profit for the subcontractors in the coalitions.
