Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to ...Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.展开更多
Although blockchain technology has received a significant amount of cutting-edge research on constructing a novel carbon trade market in theory,there is little research on using blockchain in carbon emission trading s...Although blockchain technology has received a significant amount of cutting-edge research on constructing a novel carbon trade market in theory,there is little research on using blockchain in carbon emission trading schemes(ETS).This study intends to address existing gaps in the literature by creating and simulating an ETS system based on blockchain technology.Using the ciphertext-policy attributed-based encryption algorithm and the Fabric network to build a platform may optimize the amount of data available while maintaining privacy security.Considering the augmentation of information interaction during the auction process brought about by blockchain,the learning behavior of bidding firms is introduced to investigate the impact of blockchain on ETS auction.In particular,implementing smart contracts can provide a swift and automatic settlement.The simulation results of the proposed system demonstrate the following:(1)fine-grained access is possible with a second delay;(2)the average annual compliance levels increase by 2%when bidders’learning behavior is considered;and(3)the blockchain network can process more than 350 reading operations or 7 writing operations in a second.Novel cooperative management of an ETS platform based on blockchain is proposed.The data access control policy based on CP-ABE is used to solve the contradiction between data privacy on the firm chain and government supervision.A learned auction strategy is proposed to suit the enhancement of information interaction caused by blockchain technology.This study provides a new method for climate change policymakers to consider the blockchain application of the carbon market.展开更多
With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to ...With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.展开更多
Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem ...Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem between MDs and ENs caused by the excessive concern on MD profit.In this paper,we propose an auction-based computation offloading algorithm,inspiring ENs to provide high-quality service by maximizing the profit of ENs.Firstly,a novel cooperation auction framework is designed to avoid overall profit damage of ENs,which is derived from the high computation delay at the overloaded ENs.Thereafter,the bidding willingness of each MD in every round of auction is determined to ensure MD rationality.Furthermore,we put forward a payment rule for the pre-selected winner to effectively guarantee auction truthfulness.Finally,the auction-based profit maximization offloading algorithm is proposed,and the MD is allowed to occupy the computation and spectrum resources of the EN for offloading if it wins the auction.Numerical results verify the performance of the proposed algorithm.Compared with the VA algorithm,the ENs profit is increased by 23.8%,and the task discard ratio is decreased by 7.5%.展开更多
The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping i...The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.展开更多
We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secu...We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secure multi-user signals. To maximize the secrecy rate of uplink communications, we propose a distributed ascending-clock auction(ACA) algorithm to allocate subcarriers and jamming power. Specifically, the impact of the self-interference of the full-duplex base station on the secrecy rate is considered. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts. Firstly, subcarriers and the jamming power are respectively priced by the base station. Secondly, users select the subcarrier and the jamming power based on the price. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed auction algorithm is mathematically proved. Simulation results show that the proposed auction algorithm is more beneficial to improve the uplink secrecy performance compared to traditional auction algorithms.展开更多
With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spe...With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spectrum allocation,and due to the complexity of the network environment,the security of spectrum auctions can not be ignored.Most existing secure spectrum auction schemes introduce a semi-honest agent to complete spectrum auction.However,the hypothetical semi-honest model does not guarantee the security of spectnim auction in the actual application scenario,which may lead to potential security threats:the agent may reveal the privacy of bidders,agent or auctioneer may collude with the bidder to manipulate the spectrum auction,and so on.In this paper,a secure spectrum auction scheme without a trusted party is proposed based on the smart contract technology,and the smart contract written into the blockchain replaces the traditional semi-honest agent to cooperate with the auctioneer server to complete the auction.In order to ensure the security of our scheme,a secure spectrum auction protocol is designed,in which the Software Guard Extensions(SGX)technology and Paillier cryptosystem are used to protect the privacy of bidders.Public verification is provided in our protocol by using extensive Pedersen commitment,which prevents the auctioneer server and the bidder from colluding with each other and verifies group bid sum values.Finally,the security analysis is given to propose several types of attacks that can be defended.Besides,theoretical analysis and simulation experiments of our protocol are also provided.展开更多
In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder’s deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and...In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder’s deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and designing the mechanism of procurement combinational auctions (CAs), and it also provides the decision making support for bidders who are in commercial synergies surrounding. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the feasibility and detailed processes of calculating winning probability.展开更多
In this era of digital domination,it is fit to say that individuals are more inclined towards viewership on online platforms due to the wide variety and the scope of individual preferences it provides.In the past few ...In this era of digital domination,it is fit to say that individuals are more inclined towards viewership on online platforms due to the wide variety and the scope of individual preferences it provides.In the past few years,there has been a massive growth in the popularity of Over-The-Top platforms,with an increasing number of consumers adapting to them.The Covid-19 pandemic has also caused the proliferation of these services as people are restricted to their homes.Consumers are often in a dilemma about which subscription plan to choose,and this iswhere a recommendation systemmakes their task easy.The Subscription recommendation system allows potential users to pick the most suitable and convenient plan for their daily consumption from diverse OTT platforms.The economic equilibrium behind allocating these resources follows a unique voting and bidding system propped by us in this paper.The systemis dependent on two types of individuals,type 1 seeking the recommendation plan,and type 2 suggesting it.In our study,the system collaborates with the latterwho participate in voting and invest/bid in the available options,keeping in mind the user preferences.This architecture runs on an interface where the candidates can login to participate at their convenience.As a result,selective participants are awarded monetary gains considering the rules of the suggested mechanism,and the most voted subscription plan gets recommended to the user.展开更多
Cloud computing is a demanding business platform for services related to the field of IT.The goal of cloud customers is to access resources at a sustainable price,while the goal of cloud suppliers is to maximize their...Cloud computing is a demanding business platform for services related to the field of IT.The goal of cloud customers is to access resources at a sustainable price,while the goal of cloud suppliers is to maximize their services utilization.Previously,the customers would bid for every single resource type,which was a limitation of cloud resources allocation.To solve these issues,researchers have focused on a combinatorial auction in which the resources are offered by the providers in bundles so that the user bids for their required bundle.Still,in this allocation mechanism,some drawbacks need to be tackled,such as due to the lower average bid price the users are dropped from the auction process.To solve this problem,we proposed a“Negotiation based Combinatorial Double Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation(N-CDARA)in cloud computing”.The proposed method negotiates with dropped users.Lower average bid price users are asked by our proposed mechanism to increase their bids,as by the quoted bids they will be dropped by the auctioneer.Most of the users that are close to winning accept the proposal and increase their bid prices.The proposed mechanism is implemented in a CloudSim simulation toolkit.Results are compared with the latest model and performance study shows that in our proposed scheme more users win and get their requested services and the utilization of offered services is increased up to 18.4%than the existing schemes.展开更多
The carbon market auction mechanism is an important policy tool for carbon pricing and a key mechanism that supports carbon emission neutralization,especially for China.A few systematic studies exist on China’s carbo...The carbon market auction mechanism is an important policy tool for carbon pricing and a key mechanism that supports carbon emission neutralization,especially for China.A few systematic studies exist on China’s carbon market auction mechanism.This article focuses on the five auction mechanisms in Chinese pilot emission trading schemes(ETS),reviews the structures and bidding situation of the five-pilot auction mechanism,extracts the similarities,and analyzes their different features,such as auction mode,bidding scale,participants,pricing mode,auction frequency,and so on.This study conducts an in-depth analysis of the carbon allowance auction mechanism in the Guangdong pilot ETS of China,including its development and the evolution of the key elements,its operational effects,and related disputes.Finally,this study puts forward the trend forecast and suggestions for the Chinese allowance auction mechanism,such as the time window of launching national allowance auctions,the most likely auction mode,carbon pricing,and bidding revenue management.Carbon pricing by auction is the most powerful policy tool for addressing carbon emissions reduction and implementing the Glasgow Climate Pact.展开更多
With the emergence of ambient sensing technologies which combine mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things,large amount of people-centric data can be obtained and utilized to build people-centric services.Note that t...With the emergence of ambient sensing technologies which combine mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things,large amount of people-centric data can be obtained and utilized to build people-centric services.Note that the service quality is highly related to the privacy level of the data.In this paper,we investigate the problem of privacy-aware service subscription in people-centric sensing.An efficient resource allocation framework using a combinatorial auction(CA)model is provided.Specifically,the resource allocation problem that maximizes the social welfare in view of varying requirements of multiple users is formulated,and it is solved by a proposed computationally tractable solution algorithm.Furthermore,the prices of allocated resources that winners need to pay are figured out by a designed scheme.Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.展开更多
This paper aims to assess the Initial Investment Valuation Methodology of the local regulator, facing the results of auctions, due to the high occurrence of low clearing prices observed from 2003 to 2008 and the high ...This paper aims to assess the Initial Investment Valuation Methodology of the local regulator, facing the results of auctions, due to the high occurrence of low clearing prices observed from 2003 to 2008 and the high percentage of auctions without any bidder recently. The regulator investment forecasted defines the maximum value of Yearly Allowed Revenue and the bidder that offers the lowest YAR value wins the auction. The first type of analysis considers project cost, location, execution deadline, transmission line extension and type of all actions from 1999 to 2015, totalling about 3.361 billion USD. It was not found any correlation of those variables and the result of the actions. The second analysis compared the equipment and the additional costs breakdown of the regulator investment forecast with the real investment in projects from 2009 to 2013 and it rarely surpasses 5%. Suggestions are proposed based on the analysis.展开更多
According to 2013 Chinese Art Auction Market Sur-vey Report by Art Market Mon itor of A r t ron,in the second half of 2013,western art market stayed firm,with consumer demand keep rising,private procure-ment business ...According to 2013 Chinese Art Auction Market Sur-vey Report by Art Market Mon itor of A r t ron,in the second half of 2013,western art market stayed firm,with consumer demand keep rising,private procure-ment business of auction companies get more strengths,and buying forces move east ward,all bringing展开更多
Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivate...Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivated us to propose an improvement of a genetic algorithm based method, we have previously proposed, to address two important issues in the context of combinatorial reverse auctions: determining the winner(s) in a reasonable processing time, and reducing the procurement cost. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed method in practice, we conduct several experiments on combinatorial reverse auctions instances. The results we report in this paper clearly demonstrate the efficiency of our new method in terms of processing time and procurement cost.展开更多
Chinese"red"art,which refer to artworks depicting revolutionary subjects,have seen excellent performance in the auction market since the beginning of this year.In particular,the celebration of the60th annive...Chinese"red"art,which refer to artworks depicting revolutionary subjects,have seen excellent performance in the auction market since the beginning of this year.In particular,the celebration of the60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China gave a new push to its price rise.展开更多
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(62173066)Open Project of Sichuan Provincial Key Laboratory of Intelligent Terminal Co-built by Province and City(SCITLAB-1014)。
文摘Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.72104075,71850012,72274056)the National Social Science Fund of China(No.19AZD014,21&ZD125)+2 种基金the Major Special Projects of the Department of Science and Technology of Hunan province(No.2018GK1020)the Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province(No.2022JJ40106)the China Association for Science and Technology(No.20220615ZZ07110402),and Hunan University Youth Talent Program.
文摘Although blockchain technology has received a significant amount of cutting-edge research on constructing a novel carbon trade market in theory,there is little research on using blockchain in carbon emission trading schemes(ETS).This study intends to address existing gaps in the literature by creating and simulating an ETS system based on blockchain technology.Using the ciphertext-policy attributed-based encryption algorithm and the Fabric network to build a platform may optimize the amount of data available while maintaining privacy security.Considering the augmentation of information interaction during the auction process brought about by blockchain,the learning behavior of bidding firms is introduced to investigate the impact of blockchain on ETS auction.In particular,implementing smart contracts can provide a swift and automatic settlement.The simulation results of the proposed system demonstrate the following:(1)fine-grained access is possible with a second delay;(2)the average annual compliance levels increase by 2%when bidders’learning behavior is considered;and(3)the blockchain network can process more than 350 reading operations or 7 writing operations in a second.Novel cooperative management of an ETS platform based on blockchain is proposed.The data access control policy based on CP-ABE is used to solve the contradiction between data privacy on the firm chain and government supervision.A learned auction strategy is proposed to suit the enhancement of information interaction caused by blockchain technology.This study provides a new method for climate change policymakers to consider the blockchain application of the carbon market.
文摘With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under grants 61901070,61801065,61771082,61871062,U20A20157in part by the Science and Technology Research Program of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission under grants KJQN202000603,KJQN201900611+1 种基金in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Chongqing under grant cstc2020jcyjzdxmX0024part by University Innovation Research Group of Chongqing under grant CXQT20017.
文摘Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem between MDs and ENs caused by the excessive concern on MD profit.In this paper,we propose an auction-based computation offloading algorithm,inspiring ENs to provide high-quality service by maximizing the profit of ENs.Firstly,a novel cooperation auction framework is designed to avoid overall profit damage of ENs,which is derived from the high computation delay at the overloaded ENs.Thereafter,the bidding willingness of each MD in every round of auction is determined to ensure MD rationality.Furthermore,we put forward a payment rule for the pre-selected winner to effectively guarantee auction truthfulness.Finally,the auction-based profit maximization offloading algorithm is proposed,and the MD is allowed to occupy the computation and spectrum resources of the EN for offloading if it wins the auction.Numerical results verify the performance of the proposed algorithm.Compared with the VA algorithm,the ENs profit is increased by 23.8%,and the task discard ratio is decreased by 7.5%.
文摘The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.
基金supported in part by National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)under Grant No.SS2015AA011306National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)under Grant No.2014AA01A701National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants No.61379006 and 61521003
文摘We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secure multi-user signals. To maximize the secrecy rate of uplink communications, we propose a distributed ascending-clock auction(ACA) algorithm to allocate subcarriers and jamming power. Specifically, the impact of the self-interference of the full-duplex base station on the secrecy rate is considered. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts. Firstly, subcarriers and the jamming power are respectively priced by the base station. Secondly, users select the subcarrier and the jamming power based on the price. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed auction algorithm is mathematically proved. Simulation results show that the proposed auction algorithm is more beneficial to improve the uplink secrecy performance compared to traditional auction algorithms.
基金This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.61601107,U1708262 and 61872449)China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(No.2019M653568)The Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.Nl 72304023).
文摘With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spectrum allocation,and due to the complexity of the network environment,the security of spectrum auctions can not be ignored.Most existing secure spectrum auction schemes introduce a semi-honest agent to complete spectrum auction.However,the hypothetical semi-honest model does not guarantee the security of spectnim auction in the actual application scenario,which may lead to potential security threats:the agent may reveal the privacy of bidders,agent or auctioneer may collude with the bidder to manipulate the spectrum auction,and so on.In this paper,a secure spectrum auction scheme without a trusted party is proposed based on the smart contract technology,and the smart contract written into the blockchain replaces the traditional semi-honest agent to cooperate with the auctioneer server to complete the auction.In order to ensure the security of our scheme,a secure spectrum auction protocol is designed,in which the Software Guard Extensions(SGX)technology and Paillier cryptosystem are used to protect the privacy of bidders.Public verification is provided in our protocol by using extensive Pedersen commitment,which prevents the auctioneer server and the bidder from colluding with each other and verifies group bid sum values.Finally,the security analysis is given to propose several types of attacks that can be defended.Besides,theoretical analysis and simulation experiments of our protocol are also provided.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.70231010 and No.70321001)
文摘In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder’s deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and designing the mechanism of procurement combinational auctions (CAs), and it also provides the decision making support for bidders who are in commercial synergies surrounding. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the feasibility and detailed processes of calculating winning probability.
文摘In this era of digital domination,it is fit to say that individuals are more inclined towards viewership on online platforms due to the wide variety and the scope of individual preferences it provides.In the past few years,there has been a massive growth in the popularity of Over-The-Top platforms,with an increasing number of consumers adapting to them.The Covid-19 pandemic has also caused the proliferation of these services as people are restricted to their homes.Consumers are often in a dilemma about which subscription plan to choose,and this iswhere a recommendation systemmakes their task easy.The Subscription recommendation system allows potential users to pick the most suitable and convenient plan for their daily consumption from diverse OTT platforms.The economic equilibrium behind allocating these resources follows a unique voting and bidding system propped by us in this paper.The systemis dependent on two types of individuals,type 1 seeking the recommendation plan,and type 2 suggesting it.In our study,the system collaborates with the latterwho participate in voting and invest/bid in the available options,keeping in mind the user preferences.This architecture runs on an interface where the candidates can login to participate at their convenience.As a result,selective participants are awarded monetary gains considering the rules of the suggested mechanism,and the most voted subscription plan gets recommended to the user.
基金This publication was supported by the Deanship of Scientific Research at Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz University,Alkharj,Saudi Arabia.
文摘Cloud computing is a demanding business platform for services related to the field of IT.The goal of cloud customers is to access resources at a sustainable price,while the goal of cloud suppliers is to maximize their services utilization.Previously,the customers would bid for every single resource type,which was a limitation of cloud resources allocation.To solve these issues,researchers have focused on a combinatorial auction in which the resources are offered by the providers in bundles so that the user bids for their required bundle.Still,in this allocation mechanism,some drawbacks need to be tackled,such as due to the lower average bid price the users are dropped from the auction process.To solve this problem,we proposed a“Negotiation based Combinatorial Double Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation(N-CDARA)in cloud computing”.The proposed method negotiates with dropped users.Lower average bid price users are asked by our proposed mechanism to increase their bids,as by the quoted bids they will be dropped by the auctioneer.Most of the users that are close to winning accept the proposal and increase their bid prices.The proposed mechanism is implemented in a CloudSim simulation toolkit.Results are compared with the latest model and performance study shows that in our proposed scheme more users win and get their requested services and the utilization of offered services is increased up to 18.4%than the existing schemes.
基金supported by Shenzhen Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning in 2021[Grant No.SZ2021A006]the Basic Theoretical Research in the 13th Five Year Plan of Guangdong Philosophy and Social Sciences in 2020[Grant No.GD20 YDXZGL09]and the Characteristic Innovation Projects of Guangdong Universities in China[Grant No.2021WTSCX035].
文摘The carbon market auction mechanism is an important policy tool for carbon pricing and a key mechanism that supports carbon emission neutralization,especially for China.A few systematic studies exist on China’s carbon market auction mechanism.This article focuses on the five auction mechanisms in Chinese pilot emission trading schemes(ETS),reviews the structures and bidding situation of the five-pilot auction mechanism,extracts the similarities,and analyzes their different features,such as auction mode,bidding scale,participants,pricing mode,auction frequency,and so on.This study conducts an in-depth analysis of the carbon allowance auction mechanism in the Guangdong pilot ETS of China,including its development and the evolution of the key elements,its operational effects,and related disputes.Finally,this study puts forward the trend forecast and suggestions for the Chinese allowance auction mechanism,such as the time window of launching national allowance auctions,the most likely auction mode,carbon pricing,and bidding revenue management.Carbon pricing by auction is the most powerful policy tool for addressing carbon emissions reduction and implementing the Glasgow Climate Pact.
基金This work was partially supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.61801167Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province of China under Grant No.BK20160874.
文摘With the emergence of ambient sensing technologies which combine mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things,large amount of people-centric data can be obtained and utilized to build people-centric services.Note that the service quality is highly related to the privacy level of the data.In this paper,we investigate the problem of privacy-aware service subscription in people-centric sensing.An efficient resource allocation framework using a combinatorial auction(CA)model is provided.Specifically,the resource allocation problem that maximizes the social welfare in view of varying requirements of multiple users is formulated,and it is solved by a proposed computationally tractable solution algorithm.Furthermore,the prices of allocated resources that winners need to pay are figured out by a designed scheme.Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
文摘This paper aims to assess the Initial Investment Valuation Methodology of the local regulator, facing the results of auctions, due to the high occurrence of low clearing prices observed from 2003 to 2008 and the high percentage of auctions without any bidder recently. The regulator investment forecasted defines the maximum value of Yearly Allowed Revenue and the bidder that offers the lowest YAR value wins the auction. The first type of analysis considers project cost, location, execution deadline, transmission line extension and type of all actions from 1999 to 2015, totalling about 3.361 billion USD. It was not found any correlation of those variables and the result of the actions. The second analysis compared the equipment and the additional costs breakdown of the regulator investment forecast with the real investment in projects from 2009 to 2013 and it rarely surpasses 5%. Suggestions are proposed based on the analysis.
文摘According to 2013 Chinese Art Auction Market Sur-vey Report by Art Market Mon itor of A r t ron,in the second half of 2013,western art market stayed firm,with consumer demand keep rising,private procure-ment business of auction companies get more strengths,and buying forces move east ward,all bringing
文摘Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivated us to propose an improvement of a genetic algorithm based method, we have previously proposed, to address two important issues in the context of combinatorial reverse auctions: determining the winner(s) in a reasonable processing time, and reducing the procurement cost. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed method in practice, we conduct several experiments on combinatorial reverse auctions instances. The results we report in this paper clearly demonstrate the efficiency of our new method in terms of processing time and procurement cost.
文摘Chinese"red"art,which refer to artworks depicting revolutionary subjects,have seen excellent performance in the auction market since the beginning of this year.In particular,the celebration of the60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China gave a new push to its price rise.
