Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satis...Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are conducted.The results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.展开更多
The realty(real estate)management of ownership of buildings includes the owner(homeowner)entrust-management and the owner self-management,the former through the way of realty service contracts,the latter through the r...The realty(real estate)management of ownership of buildings includes the owner(homeowner)entrust-management and the owner self-management,the former through the way of realty service contracts,the latter through the resolution of the owners’assembly and the owners’committee.The legal disputes of realty service contracts involve balancing interests among the realty service enterprise,individual owner,and all the owners.We should use dynamic balancing of the interests of the three parties to implement the interests of the win-win cooperation rather than the interests of the trade-off of“all or nothing.”The realty service contract is similar to the entrustment contract,both of which are based on the owners’entrustment.The duty to provide realty service is not simply equivalent to fiduciary duty.The realty service contract has the essence of both behavior debt and result debt.For the former,the general provisions of the entrustment contract can be referred to,and for the latter,the general provisions of the contract for work can be referred to.In view of the group characteristics of the realty service contract,owners have no right to terminate the realty service contract at any time but should obey the principle of due process and take the majority mechanism to make a dismissal resolution resolution.The resolutions and management stipulations worked out by the owners’assembly in a majority mechanism,both of which belong to resolution behavior and are legal tools of the owners’autonomy,shall be binding on all the owners.The relationship between the owner,the owner’s assembly,and the owner’s committee is similar to the fiduciary relationship.If the decision made by the owners’assembly or the owners’committee and the management stipulation infringes upon the legal rights and interests of the owners,the injured owner has the right to revocation litigation.At present,residential commodity owners have a relatively low degree of autonomy in China,and legal disputes over realty services are frequent.In the future,we need to perfect the legal incentive and constraint measures,and stimulate the vitality of owner autonomy to promote better implementation of the owner self-management and owner entrust-management.展开更多
This paper considers a dual channel supply chain,where a manufacturer sells a single product through his/her online channel and a traditional retailer,who provides consumers with pre-sale services.The manufacturer'...This paper considers a dual channel supply chain,where a manufacturer sells a single product through his/her online channel and a traditional retailer,who provides consumers with pre-sale services.The manufacturer's online channel may free-ride the retailer's pre-sale service,which reduces the retailer's desired effort level,and hence may hurt the manufacturer's and the overall supply chain performance.Under both Manufacturer-and Retailer-Stackelberg settings,we study how the manufacturer designs a service-cost-sharing(SCS for brevity)contract to enhance the retailer's service effort level,and how free riding influences two members'optimal decisions.We design an algorithm for determining the two members’optimal decisions under each setting.The three main findings are found:(i)In the Manufacturer-Stackelberg setting,the SCS contract can enhance the retailer's service effort level and eliminate the negative impact incurred by free riding,but can't in the Retailer-Stackelberg setting,(ii)Under the SCS contract,the smaller the fraction of service cost the retailer is requested to share,the more detrimental to the retailer it will be under certain conditions.That is,the phenomenon called"counter-profit cost-sharing"appears,(iii)Both players like to act as a leader if the price competition between the two channels is not relatively very fierce,otherwise they both like to act as a follower.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71671035)。
文摘Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are conducted.The results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.
文摘The realty(real estate)management of ownership of buildings includes the owner(homeowner)entrust-management and the owner self-management,the former through the way of realty service contracts,the latter through the resolution of the owners’assembly and the owners’committee.The legal disputes of realty service contracts involve balancing interests among the realty service enterprise,individual owner,and all the owners.We should use dynamic balancing of the interests of the three parties to implement the interests of the win-win cooperation rather than the interests of the trade-off of“all or nothing.”The realty service contract is similar to the entrustment contract,both of which are based on the owners’entrustment.The duty to provide realty service is not simply equivalent to fiduciary duty.The realty service contract has the essence of both behavior debt and result debt.For the former,the general provisions of the entrustment contract can be referred to,and for the latter,the general provisions of the contract for work can be referred to.In view of the group characteristics of the realty service contract,owners have no right to terminate the realty service contract at any time but should obey the principle of due process and take the majority mechanism to make a dismissal resolution resolution.The resolutions and management stipulations worked out by the owners’assembly in a majority mechanism,both of which belong to resolution behavior and are legal tools of the owners’autonomy,shall be binding on all the owners.The relationship between the owner,the owner’s assembly,and the owner’s committee is similar to the fiduciary relationship.If the decision made by the owners’assembly or the owners’committee and the management stipulation infringes upon the legal rights and interests of the owners,the injured owner has the right to revocation litigation.At present,residential commodity owners have a relatively low degree of autonomy in China,and legal disputes over realty services are frequent.In the future,we need to perfect the legal incentive and constraint measures,and stimulate the vitality of owner autonomy to promote better implementation of the owner self-management and owner entrust-management.
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC)under Grant No.71902055+2 种基金the philosophy and social science planning project of Guangdong province under Grant No.GD21CGL12STU scientific research initiation under Grant No.STF21005Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province under Grant No.2022A1515010573.
文摘This paper considers a dual channel supply chain,where a manufacturer sells a single product through his/her online channel and a traditional retailer,who provides consumers with pre-sale services.The manufacturer's online channel may free-ride the retailer's pre-sale service,which reduces the retailer's desired effort level,and hence may hurt the manufacturer's and the overall supply chain performance.Under both Manufacturer-and Retailer-Stackelberg settings,we study how the manufacturer designs a service-cost-sharing(SCS for brevity)contract to enhance the retailer's service effort level,and how free riding influences two members'optimal decisions.We design an algorithm for determining the two members’optimal decisions under each setting.The three main findings are found:(i)In the Manufacturer-Stackelberg setting,the SCS contract can enhance the retailer's service effort level and eliminate the negative impact incurred by free riding,but can't in the Retailer-Stackelberg setting,(ii)Under the SCS contract,the smaller the fraction of service cost the retailer is requested to share,the more detrimental to the retailer it will be under certain conditions.That is,the phenomenon called"counter-profit cost-sharing"appears,(iii)Both players like to act as a leader if the price competition between the two channels is not relatively very fierce,otherwise they both like to act as a follower.
