Larger amount of national and provincial forest eco-compensation funds in China have been distributed to farmers annually,which aims to encourage farmers input more labor and fund in daily forestry management.We selec...Larger amount of national and provincial forest eco-compensation funds in China have been distributed to farmers annually,which aims to encourage farmers input more labor and fund in daily forestry management.We selected 503 household from 50 villages of 10 counties in Jiangxi Province in the paper.Household labor and cash input responded negatively towards forest eco-compensation fund in forestry management.Forest eco-compensation subsidy(FECS)granted to the household in the rural mountain area didn't stimulate the household labor and cash input in forestry management.It implies that it is not a wise way to distribute FECS equally to the rural household,so as to promote the forestry ecological quality.The current forest eco-compensation policy(FECP)need modifying urgently.展开更多
Taking Scotland Rural Priority Scheme as an example, experiences of EU rural eco-compensation policy were discussed to enlighten China. The implementing objectives and processing program of Scottish policy were respec...Taking Scotland Rural Priority Scheme as an example, experiences of EU rural eco-compensation policy were discussed to enlighten China. The implementing objectives and processing program of Scottish policy were respectively set forth,including 6 steps of statement of Intent, proposal, assessment, contract signing, claims and inspections, breaches and penalties.Therein 3 meaningful aspects for the construction of current compensation mechanism in China were as following: keeping consistency between national and local policies to establish close connection in eco-goal and funding subsidy, setting both improved assessment procedure and scientific compensation system to promote the lasting implementation of environmental-friendly measures, making correspondent check and monitor mechanism together with breach and penalty mechanism to secure the payment execution.展开更多
To reverse the continuous deterioration of grassland ecology and to improve the well-being of herders, China has been formulating many national policies on payments for grassland ecological conservation. One of them, ...To reverse the continuous deterioration of grassland ecology and to improve the well-being of herders, China has been formulating many national policies on payments for grassland ecological conservation. One of them, the Grassland Eco-compensation Policy(GEP), is the biggest program for grassland protection in China since 1949. The GEP conserves natural grassland by paying herders cash subsidies. It also has worldwide significance because it can increase vegetative cover, improve the ecological balance, increase carbon sequestration and lessen the amount of dust reaching other countries through inhibiting soil erosion. Overall, we find that its ecological and socioeconomic effects are beneficial and further benefits may be observed in the future because while the socioeconomic effects usually appear quickly, ecological effects may take longer to manifest. 2015 is the last year for the first round of the GEP policy implementation and the extended policy for the GEP will be approved and continued by the central government. To make the policy more successful, we suggest coordinated planning, a comprehensive overview, higher compensation and collaborative study. Efficient implementation of the GEP could also provide valuable experience for other eco-compensation programs in China and numerous other regions of the world.展开更多
The Middle Route Project(MRP)of the Southto-North Water Transfer Scheme(SNWT)in China will require a very large financial expenditure to ensure the water supply and the associated water quality to northern China.An ec...The Middle Route Project(MRP)of the Southto-North Water Transfer Scheme(SNWT)in China will require a very large financial expenditure to ensure the water supply and the associated water quality to northern China.An eco-compensation mechanism between the water service source areas and its beneficiaries is essential.This paper establishes an analytic framework of ecocompensation standard for the protection of the water source area,including both the calculation of ecocompensation based on opportunity cost method(OCM)and calculation of the burden sharing of eco-compensation between the water source area and the external water reception area based on the deviation square method(DSM).Taking Shiyan City,Hubei Province in China as a case study,our results show that the eco-compensation in the first-phase of MRP for the water source area in Shiyan,Hubei Province should be 1.63×10^(10) CNY,about four times of planned eco-construction investment budget(4.33×10^(9) CNY).In addition,the burden sharing of eco-compensation varied greatly in terms of different methods.It would be better to integrate the results of different single-factor burden sharing methods by determining the corresponding weighting coefficient with DSM and form one unanimous consent result by the interested parties.展开更多
The selection of policy instruments involves policy efficiency and policy effect.Effective settlement of eco-environment problems in the process of industrialization and implementation of active eco-environment protec...The selection of policy instruments involves policy efficiency and policy effect.Effective settlement of eco-environment problems in the process of industrialization and implementation of active eco-environment protection depend on the innovation of policy instruments.In this paper,based on a descriptive analysis of the policy instruments for ecoenvironmental protection of our country,combined with the theoretical analysis and the empirical research on current marketization of eco-environmental protection,the authors indicate that eco-environmental problems originate fi'om the damage of eco-environment and the extemalities of eco-service,and that the market-based policy instruments which are helpful to balance the relationship between fight,responsibility and interest in the eco-service are effective measures to eliminate externalities and protect eco-environment.展开更多
The calculation of ecological compensation and boundary identification of stakeholders represent the key challenges for Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region in its implementation of the trans-regional ecological compensation ...The calculation of ecological compensation and boundary identification of stakeholders represent the key challenges for Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region in its implementation of the trans-regional ecological compensation mechanism.Breaking administrative boundaries and spatially coordinating ecological resources helps to restructure an ecological compensation mechanism of the region based on the coordinated development of Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei.According to the estimated ecological assets in the counties of the region in 2000,2005,2010 and 2015,a quantitative model for total ecological compensation was built based on ecological assets and county-level economic development.Then,the spatiotemporal distribution characteristics of the total ecological compensation in the region were defined,and the boundaries of ecological surplus and deficit areas were identified.Results indicate:(1)The region’s annual average ecological assets amounted to￥1379.47 billion;in terms of annual total ecological assets,Hebei ranked first(￥1123.80 billion),followed by Beijing(￥157.46 billion)and Tianjin(￥98.21 billion);and in terms of ecological assets per unit area,Beijing ranked first,Tianjin second and Hebei last.(2)Among ecosystem services,hydrological regulation and climate regulation had the highest annual average value and contributed most to the increase in ecological assets.In 2015,the contribution of water and soil conservation to the total ecological assets decreased to-15.66%,showing the degradation of the function played by different ecosystems.(3)The ecological surplus of the region in four periods of 2000,2005,2010 and 2015 were￥398.98 billion,￥870.37 billion,￥1254.93 billion and￥2693.94 billion respectively,basically offsetting the ecological deficit of each corresponding period,but the urgency for ecological compensation was increased.(4)The ecological surplus and deficit areas showed a great fluctuation in different time periods.Larger time span means more noticeable convergence of deficit areas towards central and eastern areas.Public resources such as education,transportation and medical care in central urban areas should be decentralized to encourage population dispersal,weaken the agglomeration effect of deficit areas and finally achieve the ecological synergy of the region.展开更多
China's policy on ecological compensation(eco-compensation)in watershed ecosystems is of economic,social and environmental significance for China's ecological governance and protection of natural areas.It invo...China's policy on ecological compensation(eco-compensation)in watershed ecosystems is of economic,social and environmental significance for China's ecological governance and protection of natural areas.It involves balancing the interests of regional stakeholders,coordinating the development of regional environments and establishing effective cooperation models,making it a classic topic for geographical research.This study introduces the concept of institutional"stickiness"to the theory of politics of scale to analyze the features and mechanisms of the game behavior of government entities in the process of implementing watershed eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin.Our results show the following:government entities at various levels,including the central,provincial and municipal governments,experienced the three stages of game strategy of competition,cooperation and"coopetition";building a government community of shared interests can promote watershed eco-compensation,and"appropriate intervention"by the central government is key to achieving inter-provincial watershed eco-compensation;there was clear institutional stickiness during the transition from a"vertical"model of watershed eco-compensation to a"vertical-horizontal"model,with government entities using policy innovations and social participation to limit and reduce stickiness so as to reshape the watershed eco-compensation system;scalar jumping is the core mechanism that promoted eco-compensation in the study basin,and government entities shaped the discourse on watershed eco-compensation by redistributing powers and capital and creating informal constraints,which promoted the transformation of eco-compensation from a"strong state–weak society"structural model,to a"strong state–strong society"model in the Xin'an River Basin.These results can provide theoretical support for the construction of inter-regional watershed eco-compensation mechanisms,provide a scientific basis for the rational evaluation and guidance of watershed eco-compensation practices,and promote the coordinated and sustainable socioeconomic development of watersheds.展开更多
Collective forest tenure reform is now carried out throughout China with the aim to clarify the property,increase forest farmers' income and motivate the development of forestry.But the collective forest tenure re...Collective forest tenure reform is now carried out throughout China with the aim to clarify the property,increase forest farmers' income and motivate the development of forestry.But the collective forest tenure reform in nature reserves comes to a dilemma.The current implemented laws and regulations provide that forests and trees in nature reserves shall be under strict protection,while the forest farmers hope to improve their livelihood in the reform.The paper discussed the problems encountered in the c...展开更多
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71663027,41701622 and 71840013)Soft Science Program of Jiangxi Province,China(No.20161BBA10008)Humanities and Social Sciences Program of Jiangxi Province,China(No.JD16086)。
文摘Larger amount of national and provincial forest eco-compensation funds in China have been distributed to farmers annually,which aims to encourage farmers input more labor and fund in daily forestry management.We selected 503 household from 50 villages of 10 counties in Jiangxi Province in the paper.Household labor and cash input responded negatively towards forest eco-compensation fund in forestry management.Forest eco-compensation subsidy(FECS)granted to the household in the rural mountain area didn't stimulate the household labor and cash input in forestry management.It implies that it is not a wise way to distribute FECS equally to the rural household,so as to promote the forestry ecological quality.The current forest eco-compensation policy(FECP)need modifying urgently.
基金Supported by the Project of Intelligence import and demonstration in 2018(2018-yzzx-zr)the Project for the International Exchange and Cooperation in Agriculture in 2018(2018-gjhz-zkq)
文摘Taking Scotland Rural Priority Scheme as an example, experiences of EU rural eco-compensation policy were discussed to enlighten China. The implementing objectives and processing program of Scottish policy were respectively set forth,including 6 steps of statement of Intent, proposal, assessment, contract signing, claims and inspections, breaches and penalties.Therein 3 meaningful aspects for the construction of current compensation mechanism in China were as following: keeping consistency between national and local policies to establish close connection in eco-goal and funding subsidy, setting both improved assessment procedure and scientific compensation system to promote the lasting implementation of environmental-friendly measures, making correspondent check and monitor mechanism together with breach and penalty mechanism to secure the payment execution.
基金supported by the MOE (Ministry of Education in China) Project of Humanities and Social Sciences (Grant No. 15XJC790004)Social Science Fund of Shaanxi Province (Grant No. 13SC023)2013 Ph.D Scientific Research Starting Fund of Shaanxi Province (Grant No. Z111021504)
文摘To reverse the continuous deterioration of grassland ecology and to improve the well-being of herders, China has been formulating many national policies on payments for grassland ecological conservation. One of them, the Grassland Eco-compensation Policy(GEP), is the biggest program for grassland protection in China since 1949. The GEP conserves natural grassland by paying herders cash subsidies. It also has worldwide significance because it can increase vegetative cover, improve the ecological balance, increase carbon sequestration and lessen the amount of dust reaching other countries through inhibiting soil erosion. Overall, we find that its ecological and socioeconomic effects are beneficial and further benefits may be observed in the future because while the socioeconomic effects usually appear quickly, ecological effects may take longer to manifest. 2015 is the last year for the first round of the GEP policy implementation and the extended policy for the GEP will be approved and continued by the central government. To make the policy more successful, we suggest coordinated planning, a comprehensive overview, higher compensation and collaborative study. Efficient implementation of the GEP could also provide valuable experience for other eco-compensation programs in China and numerous other regions of the world.
基金This research was supported by the National Water Pollution Control Technology Major Projects(No.2008ZX07033-03).
文摘The Middle Route Project(MRP)of the Southto-North Water Transfer Scheme(SNWT)in China will require a very large financial expenditure to ensure the water supply and the associated water quality to northern China.An eco-compensation mechanism between the water service source areas and its beneficiaries is essential.This paper establishes an analytic framework of ecocompensation standard for the protection of the water source area,including both the calculation of ecocompensation based on opportunity cost method(OCM)and calculation of the burden sharing of eco-compensation between the water source area and the external water reception area based on the deviation square method(DSM).Taking Shiyan City,Hubei Province in China as a case study,our results show that the eco-compensation in the first-phase of MRP for the water source area in Shiyan,Hubei Province should be 1.63×10^(10) CNY,about four times of planned eco-construction investment budget(4.33×10^(9) CNY).In addition,the burden sharing of eco-compensation varied greatly in terms of different methods.It would be better to integrate the results of different single-factor burden sharing methods by determining the corresponding weighting coefficient with DSM and form one unanimous consent result by the interested parties.
基金Gradual Achievement of the Planning Project funded by the Ministry of Education "Research on Market-based Policy Instruments for Ecological Compensation"(Grant No.11YJA630110)
文摘The selection of policy instruments involves policy efficiency and policy effect.Effective settlement of eco-environment problems in the process of industrialization and implementation of active eco-environment protection depend on the innovation of policy instruments.In this paper,based on a descriptive analysis of the policy instruments for ecoenvironmental protection of our country,combined with the theoretical analysis and the empirical research on current marketization of eco-environmental protection,the authors indicate that eco-environmental problems originate fi'om the damage of eco-environment and the extemalities of eco-service,and that the market-based policy instruments which are helpful to balance the relationship between fight,responsibility and interest in the eco-service are effective measures to eliminate externalities and protect eco-environment.
基金National Social Science Foundation of China,No.18BGL173,No.16CJY044Beijing Social Science Fund Project,China,No.16LJC009
文摘The calculation of ecological compensation and boundary identification of stakeholders represent the key challenges for Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region in its implementation of the trans-regional ecological compensation mechanism.Breaking administrative boundaries and spatially coordinating ecological resources helps to restructure an ecological compensation mechanism of the region based on the coordinated development of Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei.According to the estimated ecological assets in the counties of the region in 2000,2005,2010 and 2015,a quantitative model for total ecological compensation was built based on ecological assets and county-level economic development.Then,the spatiotemporal distribution characteristics of the total ecological compensation in the region were defined,and the boundaries of ecological surplus and deficit areas were identified.Results indicate:(1)The region’s annual average ecological assets amounted to￥1379.47 billion;in terms of annual total ecological assets,Hebei ranked first(￥1123.80 billion),followed by Beijing(￥157.46 billion)and Tianjin(￥98.21 billion);and in terms of ecological assets per unit area,Beijing ranked first,Tianjin second and Hebei last.(2)Among ecosystem services,hydrological regulation and climate regulation had the highest annual average value and contributed most to the increase in ecological assets.In 2015,the contribution of water and soil conservation to the total ecological assets decreased to-15.66%,showing the degradation of the function played by different ecosystems.(3)The ecological surplus of the region in four periods of 2000,2005,2010 and 2015 were￥398.98 billion,￥870.37 billion,￥1254.93 billion and￥2693.94 billion respectively,basically offsetting the ecological deficit of each corresponding period,but the urgency for ecological compensation was increased.(4)The ecological surplus and deficit areas showed a great fluctuation in different time periods.Larger time span means more noticeable convergence of deficit areas towards central and eastern areas.Public resources such as education,transportation and medical care in central urban areas should be decentralized to encourage population dispersal,weaken the agglomeration effect of deficit areas and finally achieve the ecological synergy of the region.
基金Key Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China,No.41930644。
文摘China's policy on ecological compensation(eco-compensation)in watershed ecosystems is of economic,social and environmental significance for China's ecological governance and protection of natural areas.It involves balancing the interests of regional stakeholders,coordinating the development of regional environments and establishing effective cooperation models,making it a classic topic for geographical research.This study introduces the concept of institutional"stickiness"to the theory of politics of scale to analyze the features and mechanisms of the game behavior of government entities in the process of implementing watershed eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin.Our results show the following:government entities at various levels,including the central,provincial and municipal governments,experienced the three stages of game strategy of competition,cooperation and"coopetition";building a government community of shared interests can promote watershed eco-compensation,and"appropriate intervention"by the central government is key to achieving inter-provincial watershed eco-compensation;there was clear institutional stickiness during the transition from a"vertical"model of watershed eco-compensation to a"vertical-horizontal"model,with government entities using policy innovations and social participation to limit and reduce stickiness so as to reshape the watershed eco-compensation system;scalar jumping is the core mechanism that promoted eco-compensation in the study basin,and government entities shaped the discourse on watershed eco-compensation by redistributing powers and capital and creating informal constraints,which promoted the transformation of eco-compensation from a"strong state–weak society"structural model,to a"strong state–strong society"model in the Xin'an River Basin.These results can provide theoretical support for the construction of inter-regional watershed eco-compensation mechanisms,provide a scientific basis for the rational evaluation and guidance of watershed eco-compensation practices,and promote the coordinated and sustainable socioeconomic development of watersheds.
文摘Collective forest tenure reform is now carried out throughout China with the aim to clarify the property,increase forest farmers' income and motivate the development of forestry.But the collective forest tenure reform in nature reserves comes to a dilemma.The current implemented laws and regulations provide that forests and trees in nature reserves shall be under strict protection,while the forest farmers hope to improve their livelihood in the reform.The paper discussed the problems encountered in the c...
