In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’behavior,and consider the governance effect of such regulations.This examination exploits the differences between the requireme...In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’behavior,and consider the governance effect of such regulations.This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange(SHSE)and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange(SZSE).Using a difference-indifferences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017,we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE(SHIDs)has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance.This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds.Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring.The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes,and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value.In addition,SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE,and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE,which has a less constraining attendance requirement.Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.展开更多
Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governa...Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards.We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs:state involvement in ownership and market incentives.With the state involved in ownership,SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China(CPC),which results in an enhanced governance effect.Under market incentives,SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem(Type I agency problem)and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem(Type II agency problem).In terms of the governance effect of boards,directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems,and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs.Independent directors,especially those with a professional background,also play a role in improving corporate governance.However,independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor,which limits their governance effect.This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.展开更多
The modernization of state governance embodies the process of modern state construction,and the success or failure of state governance depends on the institutional logic and effectiveness of state governance.The gover...The modernization of state governance embodies the process of modern state construction,and the success or failure of state governance depends on the institutional logic and effectiveness of state governance.The governance of modern Western countries is dominated by market logic and has made outstanding achievements in protecting individual rights and increasing material wealth.However,it faces a crisis of declining governance effectiveness.Since the Opium War,China’s governance transformation has been deeply restricted by the traditional power-based logic and success has been hard.Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China,especially since the reform and opening up,there has been a gradual shift from a power-based approach to a rights-based approach in state governance,which has achieved outstanding governance results.In view of the new changes in time and space,the modernization of state governance in the new era needs to deal with the dual tests of traditional factors and international situation.Therefore,the core issues of the transformation of state governance should be analyzed from an open-system perspective,and the logic of state governance should be effectively settled on the rights-based approach.In contemporary China,the most important thing in the modernization of state governance is to uphold the Party’s leadership.From the perspective of practical issues and objective needs,the modernization of state governance must adhere to the people-centered principle,establish the foundation of governance by civil rights,build governance consensus through constitutional governance,create governance momentum through cooperative actions,and provide governance support through public virtues.This establishes and consolidates the base of the effectiveness of modern state governance and enhances its efficiency.展开更多
Politics is an important cause of economic growth and fluctuations.We present a new Political Business Cycle(PBC)Theory based on the background of recent Chinese economic transformation and government behaviors,explor...Politics is an important cause of economic growth and fluctuations.We present a new Political Business Cycle(PBC)Theory based on the background of recent Chinese economic transformation and government behaviors,explore the economic impact of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China(CPC),the National People’s Congress(NPC)and Chinese People’s Political Consultive Conference(CPPCC)and how they shape and influence the behaviors of local government officials.Based on 1994-2012 inter-provincial panel data of China and using SYS-GMM and LSDVC,we find that there are significant effects in China of PBC and government administration change.Changes in government administration influence the economic behaviors of local governments,which in turn influence local economic development through fiscal decentralization and political promotion tournament.These effects are sustained and robust.In this paper we offer an economic explanation for the Chinese proverb“a new broom sweeps clean,”and try to verify the Chinese-style Political Business Cycle(CPBC).We provide new ideas for further improving the functions of government,optimizing macroeconomic control,and preventing personnel changes in the government from overheating the economy.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China,Grant No.71972180
文摘In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’behavior,and consider the governance effect of such regulations.This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange(SHSE)and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange(SZSE).Using a difference-indifferences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017,we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE(SHIDs)has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance.This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds.Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring.The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes,and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value.In addition,SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE,and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE,which has a less constraining attendance requirement.Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.
基金the financial support from the National Social Science Fund of China Key Research Project(Project No.17ZDA086):Research on Reforms and Innovations of Monitoring System in State-Owned Enterprises
文摘Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards.We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs:state involvement in ownership and market incentives.With the state involved in ownership,SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China(CPC),which results in an enhanced governance effect.Under market incentives,SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem(Type I agency problem)and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem(Type II agency problem).In terms of the governance effect of boards,directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems,and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs.Independent directors,especially those with a professional background,also play a role in improving corporate governance.However,independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor,which limits their governance effect.This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.
文摘The modernization of state governance embodies the process of modern state construction,and the success or failure of state governance depends on the institutional logic and effectiveness of state governance.The governance of modern Western countries is dominated by market logic and has made outstanding achievements in protecting individual rights and increasing material wealth.However,it faces a crisis of declining governance effectiveness.Since the Opium War,China’s governance transformation has been deeply restricted by the traditional power-based logic and success has been hard.Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China,especially since the reform and opening up,there has been a gradual shift from a power-based approach to a rights-based approach in state governance,which has achieved outstanding governance results.In view of the new changes in time and space,the modernization of state governance in the new era needs to deal with the dual tests of traditional factors and international situation.Therefore,the core issues of the transformation of state governance should be analyzed from an open-system perspective,and the logic of state governance should be effectively settled on the rights-based approach.In contemporary China,the most important thing in the modernization of state governance is to uphold the Party’s leadership.From the perspective of practical issues and objective needs,the modernization of state governance must adhere to the people-centered principle,establish the foundation of governance by civil rights,build governance consensus through constitutional governance,create governance momentum through cooperative actions,and provide governance support through public virtues.This establishes and consolidates the base of the effectiveness of modern state governance and enhances its efficiency.
基金National Social Science Fund“The Institutional Poverty and the Poverty Reduction Model of Inclusive Growth”(11CJL033)The Philosophy and Social Science Planning Fund in Zhejing Province“Estimation of the Conversion Cost of Farmer Citizens in Zhejiang Province and the Study of Public Policy Choice”(14NDJC120YB)The commissioned project in Zhejiang province“the Impact of Political Environment on the Economic and Trade Cooperation between Zhejiang and Taiwan”(201401).
文摘Politics is an important cause of economic growth and fluctuations.We present a new Political Business Cycle(PBC)Theory based on the background of recent Chinese economic transformation and government behaviors,explore the economic impact of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China(CPC),the National People’s Congress(NPC)and Chinese People’s Political Consultive Conference(CPPCC)and how they shape and influence the behaviors of local government officials.Based on 1994-2012 inter-provincial panel data of China and using SYS-GMM and LSDVC,we find that there are significant effects in China of PBC and government administration change.Changes in government administration influence the economic behaviors of local governments,which in turn influence local economic development through fiscal decentralization and political promotion tournament.These effects are sustained and robust.In this paper we offer an economic explanation for the Chinese proverb“a new broom sweeps clean,”and try to verify the Chinese-style Political Business Cycle(CPBC).We provide new ideas for further improving the functions of government,optimizing macroeconomic control,and preventing personnel changes in the government from overheating the economy.
