This article analyzes the importance of non use values in the management of natural resources with a model of imperfect competition.By constucting a framework of duopolistic exploiters,the incorporation of non use v...This article analyzes the importance of non use values in the management of natural resources with a model of imperfect competition.By constucting a framework of duopolistic exploiters,the incorporation of non use values based on self interest and altruistic motives appears to be significant for determining the degree of inefficiency caused by the problem of common property at the non cooperative Nash equilibrium.It is found that when the non use value placed by the altruist exploiter is bounded by that placed by the pure self interest exploiter,the effect of market power is dominated by the effect of common exploitation.In this case,the exploiters' harvesting strategy will response in the same direction to the change of each other's harvesting at the non cooperative Nash equilibrium.In contrast,when the non use value placed by the altruist is substantially larger or smaller than that placed by the self interest exploiter,one exploiter's increase in harvesting will lead to a decrease in harvesting of the other exploiter at the non cooperative Nash equilibrium.展开更多
This article presents a mathematical model for the medium-term scheduling of the operating states of electric power systems.The scheduling period is divided into several time intervals.The model can be used to determi...This article presents a mathematical model for the medium-term scheduling of the operating states of electric power systems.The scheduling period is divided into several time intervals.The model can be used to determine the equilibrium state in which each supplier earns maximum profit from supplying electricity to the wholesale market.We estimated the maximum value of public welfare,which indicates the total financial gains of suppliers and consumers,to determine the prices at the nodes of the power system.This was done by considering the balance constraints at the nodes of the power system and constraints on the allowable values of generation,power flows,and volumes of energy resources consumed over several time intervals.This problem belongs to the class of bi-level Stackelberg game-theoretic models with several leaders.The market equilibrium is modeled simultaneously in several intervals,given the multiplicity and duration of interactions.We considered two approaches for solving the multi-interval equilibrium state problem.The first approach involved directly solving a system of joint optimality conditions for electricity suppliers and consumers.The second approach involved iterative searches until the equilibrium state was reached.This article presents the results of medium-term scheduling using a case study of a simplified real-world power system.展开更多
The paper analyses the coordinated hydro-wind power generation considering joint bidding in the electricity market.The impact of mutual bidding strategies on market prices,traded volumes,and revenues has been quantifi...The paper analyses the coordinated hydro-wind power generation considering joint bidding in the electricity market.The impact of mutual bidding strategies on market prices,traded volumes,and revenues has been quantified.The coordination assumes that hydro power generation is scheduled mainly to compensate the differences between actual and planned wind power outputs.The potential of this coordination in achieving and utilizing of market power is explored.The market equilibrium of asymmetric generation companies is analyzed using a game theory approach.The assumed market situation is imperfect competition and non-cooperative game.A nu-merical approximation of the asymmetric supply function equilibrium is used to model this game.An introduced novelty is the application of an asymmetric supply function equilibrium approximation for coordinated hydro-wind power generation.The model is tested using real input data from the Croatian power system.展开更多
In this paper,we set up a mixed duopoly competition model between state-owned and private firms in order to compare specific and ad valorem taxes.Assuming that the total output under specific and ad valorem taxation r...In this paper,we set up a mixed duopoly competition model between state-owned and private firms in order to compare specific and ad valorem taxes.Assuming that the total output under specific and ad valorem taxation remains unchanged,we find that if the public firm is completely privatised,the output of the private firm under the two tax schemes will be the same.If the public firm is not completely privatised,the output of the the private firm under specific taxation will be greater than that under ad valorem taxation.If the private firm is a pure local one,the social benefits will be the same under the two tax schemes.However,if the private firm is a joint venture that involves domestic and foreign entities,social welfare under ad valorem taxation will be greater than that under specific taxation.展开更多
文摘This article analyzes the importance of non use values in the management of natural resources with a model of imperfect competition.By constucting a framework of duopolistic exploiters,the incorporation of non use values based on self interest and altruistic motives appears to be significant for determining the degree of inefficiency caused by the problem of common property at the non cooperative Nash equilibrium.It is found that when the non use value placed by the altruist exploiter is bounded by that placed by the pure self interest exploiter,the effect of market power is dominated by the effect of common exploitation.In this case,the exploiters' harvesting strategy will response in the same direction to the change of each other's harvesting at the non cooperative Nash equilibrium.In contrast,when the non use value placed by the altruist is substantially larger or smaller than that placed by the self interest exploiter,one exploiter's increase in harvesting will lead to a decrease in harvesting of the other exploiter at the non cooperative Nash equilibrium.
基金the State Assignment Project (No. FWEU-754 2021-0001) of the Basic Research Program of the Russian Federation 2021-2030
文摘This article presents a mathematical model for the medium-term scheduling of the operating states of electric power systems.The scheduling period is divided into several time intervals.The model can be used to determine the equilibrium state in which each supplier earns maximum profit from supplying electricity to the wholesale market.We estimated the maximum value of public welfare,which indicates the total financial gains of suppliers and consumers,to determine the prices at the nodes of the power system.This was done by considering the balance constraints at the nodes of the power system and constraints on the allowable values of generation,power flows,and volumes of energy resources consumed over several time intervals.This problem belongs to the class of bi-level Stackelberg game-theoretic models with several leaders.The market equilibrium is modeled simultaneously in several intervals,given the multiplicity and duration of interactions.We considered two approaches for solving the multi-interval equilibrium state problem.The first approach involved directly solving a system of joint optimality conditions for electricity suppliers and consumers.The second approach involved iterative searches until the equilibrium state was reached.This article presents the results of medium-term scheduling using a case study of a simplified real-world power system.
基金the H2020 project CROSSBOW-CROSS Border management of variable renewable energies and storage units enabling a transnational wholesale market(No.773430)this work was supported in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under the project IMPACT-Implementation of Peer-to-Pecr Advanced Concept for Electricity Trading(No.UIP-2017-05-4068).
文摘The paper analyses the coordinated hydro-wind power generation considering joint bidding in the electricity market.The impact of mutual bidding strategies on market prices,traded volumes,and revenues has been quantified.The coordination assumes that hydro power generation is scheduled mainly to compensate the differences between actual and planned wind power outputs.The potential of this coordination in achieving and utilizing of market power is explored.The market equilibrium of asymmetric generation companies is analyzed using a game theory approach.The assumed market situation is imperfect competition and non-cooperative game.A nu-merical approximation of the asymmetric supply function equilibrium is used to model this game.An introduced novelty is the application of an asymmetric supply function equilibrium approximation for coordinated hydro-wind power generation.The model is tested using real input data from the Croatian power system.
基金supported by the Social Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province of China[Grant No.2019D037]the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China[Grant No.310823153013].
文摘In this paper,we set up a mixed duopoly competition model between state-owned and private firms in order to compare specific and ad valorem taxes.Assuming that the total output under specific and ad valorem taxation remains unchanged,we find that if the public firm is completely privatised,the output of the private firm under the two tax schemes will be the same.If the public firm is not completely privatised,the output of the the private firm under specific taxation will be greater than that under ad valorem taxation.If the private firm is a pure local one,the social benefits will be the same under the two tax schemes.However,if the private firm is a joint venture that involves domestic and foreign entities,social welfare under ad valorem taxation will be greater than that under specific taxation.
