The outbreak of COVID-19 has significantly affected the development of enterprises.In the post-pandemic era,blockchain technology has become one of the important technologies to help enterprises quickly gain market co...The outbreak of COVID-19 has significantly affected the development of enterprises.In the post-pandemic era,blockchain technology has become one of the important technologies to help enterprises quickly gain market competitiveness.The heavy investment required of supply chain stakeholders to employ blockchain technology has hindered its adoption and application.To tackle this issue,this study aims to facilitate the adoption of blockchain technology in a supply chain consisting of a core enterprise and a small/medium-sized enterprise through an effective supply chain contract.We analyze the performance of a cost-sharing(CS)contract and a revenue-sharing(RS)contract and propose a new hybrid CS-RS contract for better performance.We conduct comparative analyses of the three contracts and find that the hybrid CS-RS contract can more effectively incentivize both parties to reach the highest level of blockchain technology adoption and achieve supply chain coordination.展开更多
Sales promotion is getting more and more prosperous in Chinese cross-border e-commerce platforms where the demand is uncertain.However,most existing literature on promotion strategies is focusing on deterministic dema...Sales promotion is getting more and more prosperous in Chinese cross-border e-commerce platforms where the demand is uncertain.However,most existing literature on promotion strategies is focusing on deterministic demand.In this paper,we propose a game-theoretical model under multiplicative stochastic demand to investigate the pricing,inventory quantity and sales promotion strategies for a supply chain which is consisted of one cross-border distributor and one capital-constrained retailer under a consignment contract.We obtain the equilibrium outcomes under stochastic demand,and find that the optimal price and promotion investment depend on demand uncertainty under endogenous inventory decisions.With exogenous unlimited inventory,the retailer prefers owing promotion right when the elasticity of price and promotion is small enough and its capital is sufficient,while the distributor always prefers to control sales promotion.With endogenous inventory quantity,the sensitivity of demand to price is influence by the demand uncertainty.The retailer prefers to decide the promotion when the price-elasticity is small,while the distributor prefers to decide the promotion under large promotion-elasticity.And the intensity of optimal sales promotion made by retailers may be stronger than that when the distributor owns the promotion right,which depends on the elasticity of price and promotion.More importantly,it is always better for consumers when the distributor reserves the promotion right as a lower optimal retailing price is offered.展开更多
基金funded by the Major Program of the National Social Science Foundation of China(Grant No.18ZDA060)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71672121)Tianjin Science and Technology Planning Project(Grant No.22ZLGCGX00060).
文摘The outbreak of COVID-19 has significantly affected the development of enterprises.In the post-pandemic era,blockchain technology has become one of the important technologies to help enterprises quickly gain market competitiveness.The heavy investment required of supply chain stakeholders to employ blockchain technology has hindered its adoption and application.To tackle this issue,this study aims to facilitate the adoption of blockchain technology in a supply chain consisting of a core enterprise and a small/medium-sized enterprise through an effective supply chain contract.We analyze the performance of a cost-sharing(CS)contract and a revenue-sharing(RS)contract and propose a new hybrid CS-RS contract for better performance.We conduct comparative analyses of the three contracts and find that the hybrid CS-RS contract can more effectively incentivize both parties to reach the highest level of blockchain technology adoption and achieve supply chain coordination.
基金the Key Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.71831007the General Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.72071085,No.71671133 and No.72711178Huazhong University of Science and Technology Double First-Class Funds for Humanities and Social Sciences under Grant No.2021WKFZZX008.
文摘Sales promotion is getting more and more prosperous in Chinese cross-border e-commerce platforms where the demand is uncertain.However,most existing literature on promotion strategies is focusing on deterministic demand.In this paper,we propose a game-theoretical model under multiplicative stochastic demand to investigate the pricing,inventory quantity and sales promotion strategies for a supply chain which is consisted of one cross-border distributor and one capital-constrained retailer under a consignment contract.We obtain the equilibrium outcomes under stochastic demand,and find that the optimal price and promotion investment depend on demand uncertainty under endogenous inventory decisions.With exogenous unlimited inventory,the retailer prefers owing promotion right when the elasticity of price and promotion is small enough and its capital is sufficient,while the distributor always prefers to control sales promotion.With endogenous inventory quantity,the sensitivity of demand to price is influence by the demand uncertainty.The retailer prefers to decide the promotion when the price-elasticity is small,while the distributor prefers to decide the promotion under large promotion-elasticity.And the intensity of optimal sales promotion made by retailers may be stronger than that when the distributor owns the promotion right,which depends on the elasticity of price and promotion.More importantly,it is always better for consumers when the distributor reserves the promotion right as a lower optimal retailing price is offered.
