This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of“unarticulated rules”and“articulated rules”.The study ...This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of“unarticulated rules”and“articulated rules”.The study finds that state-owned capital participation significantly reduces the debt financing costs of private enterprises and expands the scale of their debt financing.This conclusion remains valid after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.Further analysis of the mechanism reveals that state-owned capital participation improves the debt financing of private enterprises through multiple channels:Enhancing their social reputation,mitigating the“statistical bias”they face,optimizing their information quality,and reducing the“shareholder-creditor”agency problems.This paper conceptualizes these benefits as the“complementary advantages of heterogeneous shareholders”.This not only constructs a theoretical framework for“reverse mixed-ownership reform”but also better narrates the Chinese story of“mixed-ownership reform”by adopting a more universally applicable theory of equity structure.Additionally,the paper supplements existing research on the macro-and meso-level relationship between the government and the market by exploring the government’s positive role at the micro-level.展开更多
Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are importan...Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.展开更多
Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the comp...Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company.This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment(CEPI).We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI.Specifically,external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI.In addition,after participating in SOEs,non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.展开更多
According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with ...According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.展开更多
This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investo...This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and profit from private benefits of control. However, this agency conflict has been rarely studied, as the most commonly assumed agency conflict occurs between managers and shareholders. Using an audit fee model derived from Simunic(1980), we study the impact of the nature of controlling shareholders on audit fees in French listed firms. Our results show:(1) a negative relationship between audit fees and government shareholdings;(2) a positive relationship between audit fees and institutional shareholdings; and(3) no relationship between audit fees and family shareholdings. These results illustrate the mixed effects of the nature of ownership on audit fees.展开更多
A major risk currently facing the Chinese economy is overcapacity,which affects the efficiency of social resource allocation(Xi et al.,2017;Huang et al.,2019).When a company is in crisis,the internal capital market of...A major risk currently facing the Chinese economy is overcapacity,which affects the efficiency of social resource allocation(Xi et al.,2017;Huang et al.,2019).When a company is in crisis,the internal capital market often plays a propping role.This study approached this issue from the perspective of the controlling shareholder and examined whether controlling shareholders provide financial support to enterprises in industries with excess capacity.According to the data for China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to2019,companies in industries with excess capacity received more financial support from controlling shareholders compared with those in non-overcapacity industries.Analysis of the mechanism revealed that state-owned enterprises and companies with relatively poor financial status received more financial support from controlling shareholders.This study also examined the economic consequences of such support and found that it is conducive to enhancing enterprise value.This study enriches the literature on overcapacity and internal capital markets by demonstrating that internal capital markets play a propping role for companies facing industry-level crises.This finding has both theoretical value and practical implications related to supply-side reform and capacity reduction.展开更多
The Taiwan Residents government offers firms that invest in qualified projects in emerging high-tech industries two mutually exclusive tax incentives—a corporate 5-year tax exemption or shareholder investment tax cre...The Taiwan Residents government offers firms that invest in qualified projects in emerging high-tech industries two mutually exclusive tax incentives—a corporate 5-year tax exemption or shareholder investment tax credits. This study examines whether corporate managers take shareholder tax benefits into account in their corporate tax planning. The results show that privately held firms are more likely than listed firms to choose shareholder investment tax credits and forego corporate tax benefits. Listed firms with relatively high earnings response coefficients tend to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption, as it can enhance reported after-tax earnings. Further, in the 5-year period following their choice of a particular tax incentive, firms choosing a corporate 5-year tax exemption exhibit significantly lower earnings persistence than those choosing shareholder investment tax credits. Taken together, these results suggest that stock market pressure has a significant effect on firms' choices between corporate and shareholder tax benefits, and that the choice of tax incentives has an effect on future earnings quality.展开更多
Equity crowdfunding via the Internet is a new channel of raising money for startups.It features low barriers to entry,low cost,and high speed,and thus encourages innovation.In recent years,equity crowdfunding in China...Equity crowdfunding via the Internet is a new channel of raising money for startups.It features low barriers to entry,low cost,and high speed,and thus encourages innovation.In recent years,equity crowdfunding in China has experienced some developments.However,some problems remain unsolved in practice.Blockchain is a decentralized and distributed ledger technology to ensure data security,transparency,and integrity.Because it cannot be tampered with or forged,the technology is deemed to have great potential in the finance industry.This study examines current problems in the practice of equity crowdfunding in China.Based on the analysis of the characteristics of blockchain technology,this study further explores its practical applications in equity crowdfunding.1)Blockchain technology may be a secure,efficient,low-cost solution for the registration of stocks and shares of a firm financed by crowdfunding;2)Blockchain technology simplifies the transaction and transfer of crowdfunding equities,and thus facilitates their circulation;3)Blockchain technology enables peer to peer transactions between investors and entrepreneurs,and solves the problems of regulatory compliance and security of fund management;Blockchain technology can be used to develop a voting system for crowdfunders,which enables them to be involved in corporate governance.This helps protect the rights and interests of small investors;5)Blockchain technology helps regulators know about market conditions,and supports regulatory activities such as managing investors and fighting money laundering.展开更多
Shareholders and debtholders have diverging objectives.Shareholders are residual claimants whereas debtholders are fixed claimants to firm’s assets.In leveraged firms,shareholders may increase the value of their clai...Shareholders and debtholders have diverging objectives.Shareholders are residual claimants whereas debtholders are fixed claimants to firm’s assets.In leveraged firms,shareholders may increase the value of their claims at the expense of debtholders.The presence of shareholders being debtholders is a smart interest alignment,providing a solution to shareholder-debtholder conflicts.This paper focuses on small businesses,which play an important role in the United States economy but are generally neglected by academia.Utilizing National Survey of Small Business Finance(NSSBF)data,this paper shows that firms with higher agency cost of debt are more likely to issue owner loan.The incidence of small business owner loan is positively associated with external lending difficulty,low shareholder agency cost and firm valuation difficulty.展开更多
This study examines the impact of family control on the dividend policy of firms in Pakistan,covering the period from 2009 to 2016.It also investigates whether family control moderates the impact of firm-specific fact...This study examines the impact of family control on the dividend policy of firms in Pakistan,covering the period from 2009 to 2016.It also investigates whether family control moderates the impact of firm-specific factors on the dividend policy.The GMM model for panel data estimation is used.The mean difference univariate analysis shows that family firms differ from nonfamily firms based on financial characteristics.The multivariate analysis shows that family firms pay lower dividends than nonfamily firms.Besides,firm size inversely affects the dividend policy,whereas tangibility positively affects it.Moreover,family control does not moderate the impact of all firm-specific factors on the dividend policy.Overall,family control,size,and tangibility are found to be the main determinants of the dividend policy in Pakistan.展开更多
The reform for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)during the past twenty years selected several ways which couldn't solve essential problems and improve the performance of the SOEs in China. The reason is that ...The reform for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)during the past twenty years selected several ways which couldn't solve essential problems and improve the performance of the SOEs in China. The reason is that traditional ownership instituton wasn't changed at all,the institution reach an impasse in market system which resulted in the fact that SOEs couldn't get used to keen competition. This paper analyses an ownership restructuring case in which an executive holds major capital stock in a state textile institute restructured and therefore the state ownership was withdrawn from it completely, it expounds the rationality of the model selected and points out that the model is currently a very effective way by which M & S SOEs would withdraw from competitive business field successfully.展开更多
The authors propose new Bayesian models to obtain individual-level and time-varying regression coefficients in longitudinal data involving a single observation per response unit at each time period. An application to ...The authors propose new Bayesian models to obtain individual-level and time-varying regression coefficients in longitudinal data involving a single observation per response unit at each time period. An application to explore the association between customer satisfaction and shareholder value is included in the paper. The Bayesian models allow the flexibility of incorporating industry and firm factors in the context of the application to help explain variations of the regression coefficients. Results from the analysis indicate that the effect of customer satisfaction on shareholder value is not homogeneous over time. The proposed methodology provides a powerful tool to explore the relationship between two important business concepts.展开更多
Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure...Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure and standardize their exercise of shareholder rights over state-owned listed companies. Based on this quasinatural experiment, this paper examines the BoD's effects on the agency cost of state-owned listed companies and their economic consequences. Using data of central SOE-controlled companies listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2002-2015, this paper finds that the pilot programs significantly reduced the two types of agency costs for the companies, and such effects primarily existed for listed companies with smaller central SOE shareholding ratios. Further test uncovers that, compared with central SOEs that did not carry out the pilot programs, those that did reported higher economic value-added and stock returns. Our conclusions offer a new interpretation of the BoD's governance effects from a controlling shareholder's perspective, and provide empirical evidence for the positive effects of the pilot programs for central SOE boards of directors. These findings have important policy implications for deepening SOE governance reforms.展开更多
Using modern economic theories,this paper analyzed drawbacks of Shareholding cooperative development of agricultural cooperatives in institutional design and expounded inevitable difficulties of development of agricul...Using modern economic theories,this paper analyzed drawbacks of Shareholding cooperative development of agricultural cooperatives in institutional design and expounded inevitable difficulties of development of agricultural cooperatives. Shareholding cooperative development provides a pass for many social forces entering and controlling agricultural cooperatives and making numerous non-agricultural cooperative organizations become formal cooperatives. Deep cause for Shareholding cooperative development of agricultural cooperatives involves how to recognize status and function of family producers of agricultural products in the drive of agricultural modernization and the problem of state policies choosing family producers of agricultural products or other participants in the agricultural industry chain. Shareholding cooperative development is only an expedient measure in certain period,and it should not change development laws of things and essential feature of agricultural cooperatives because of stressing national conditions.展开更多
According to the legal definitions of land transfer under shareholding cooperative systems,rural groups,collective rights of members,and this paper discloses the necessity of protecting the collective rights of member...According to the legal definitions of land transfer under shareholding cooperative systems,rural groups,collective rights of members,and this paper discloses the necessity of protecting the collective rights of members.In terms of qualification definition of members,rights of fetus,married daughters and sons in law cannot be guaranteed.In terms of rights protection,partial rights cannot be assured,power of personal stake inthe collective members is imperfect which results in inadequate,unbalanced,shaky and unpunctuated benefits.Based on objective and subjectivecauses,the democratic management rights of members in land transfer process have been weakened or even deprived,the protection of the basiclife is hard to realize.The paper proposes that it is necessary to build the social protection mechanisms of rural land shareholding cooperative sys-tems.The first is to treat those members that own land,attending the shareholding cooperation but having not taken part in the land transfer proces-sion as the protection objects.The second is in the procession of land transfer,making it clear the compensation standards of land transfer,estab-lishing the intermediate agencies of land transfer and performing the collective economic organizing functions.The third is that the account capital ofsocial protection is contributed together by personal member,the land users(shareholding cooperative companies) and government.The fourth isto pay more attention to the added value and safety management of capital operation.展开更多
Debates on shareholder structure and discretionary management of accounting results have carried forward controversial results. This study is intended to analyze within the Cameroonian context the impact of shareholde...Debates on shareholder structure and discretionary management of accounting results have carried forward controversial results. This study is intended to analyze within the Cameroonian context the impact of shareholder structure on the management of accounting results in enterprises. More specifically, its objective is to analyze the impact of shareholder structure on the adjustment of regulating discretionary accounting variables. A panel of enterprises is constituted over the periods 2013, 2014, and 2015 in Cameroon. The modeling of regulating discretionary accounting variables has been carried out according to the model of Jones (1991). The different results obtained show that the degree of concentration of the capital seems not to dissuade the management of result per long-term positions. Foreign ownership and state property stimulate management by regulating discretionary accounting variables.展开更多
The aim is to examine how the creative economy develops in shareholder,state,and stakeholder capitalism.In the shareholder capitalism,the creative economy is headed by large companies in cooperation with governments,w...The aim is to examine how the creative economy develops in shareholder,state,and stakeholder capitalism.In the shareholder capitalism,the creative economy is headed by large companies in cooperation with governments,which replicate pregiven formulas of governance with no consideration of local specificities,and reinforces the exclusion of small and medium-sized creative enterprises.The state capitalism has the government authorities as the main drivers of the creative economy’s growth,which is usually connected to their political interest in preserving authority and manipulating the population.In the stakeholder capitalism,companies should pay their fair share of taxes,show zero tolerance for corruption,uphold human rights throughout their global supply chains,and advocate for a competitive level playing field.These elements create the specific conditions for a more diversified set of actors leading the initiatives dedicated to the development of creative economy.展开更多
Financial decisions in general and dividend policy in particular are based on the relationship between the stakeholders.Also,analyzing the dividend policy in companies that are not listed on the stock market remains i...Financial decisions in general and dividend policy in particular are based on the relationship between the stakeholders.Also,analyzing the dividend policy in companies that are not listed on the stock market remains important.The object of our study is to analyze the agency relationship in the link between the ownership structure and the distribution of the dividend at the level of Cameroonian companies.We opted for a qualitative and quantitative study.The statistical tests carried out(with 67 companies)are the comparison test of means and the analysis of variance with one factor(using Statistic Package for Social Science[SPSS]software).The results of this research show that regular and irregular dividend payments lead to a low level of conflict between majority-minority shareholders and shareholder-managers.This leads to a negative relationship between the concentration,the ownership identity,and the dividend policy.展开更多
Background: Older people participating in shareholding networks are exposed to diverse situations, which may be associated with dignity. Aims: This study aimed to illuminate the meaning of lived experiences when parti...Background: Older people participating in shareholding networks are exposed to diverse situations, which may be associated with dignity. Aims: This study aimed to illuminate the meaning of lived experiences when participating in shareholding networks for the care of older people in rural areas. Methods: This qualitative study is based on individual interviews. Ten older Thai persons with at least 12 months of lived experiences participating in shareholding networks for older people in rural areas were interviewed. A phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, inspired by Ricoeur, was used to understand the meaning of the narrated text. Findings: The structural analysis resulted in four themes: 1) being satisfied with activities, 2) being valued as important, 3) being frustrated and feeling sad, and 4) being bored and feeling disinterest. The meaning of participation in a shareholding network for the elderly can be understood as a pathway to feelings of confidence and presence of others. Confidence and allowing the presence of others mean facing humanity and sensing vulnerability, because in a trusting relationship the person who gives confidence is susceptible to the other’s betrayal. Conclusion: An individual’s dignity should be a high priority in health and social care strategies. Therefore, it is important for healthcare professionals to initiate a dialogue with the shareholding participants for support and information. The narrations in this study can be used as a basis for developing cooperating care with older people in shareholding network focusing on their needs and dignity.展开更多
On 28 June 2001, CES held 2001 Shareholder Meeting ceremoniously at Qing Song Cheng Hotel.After hearing Board Secretary Luo Zhuping’s accounts on attendance number and shareholding issues, Ye Yigan, President of East...On 28 June 2001, CES held 2001 Shareholder Meeting ceremoniously at Qing Song Cheng Hotel.After hearing Board Secretary Luo Zhuping’s accounts on attendance number and shareholding issues, Ye Yigan, President of Eastern Air展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China,“State-owned Capital Participation and Financial Behavior of Private Enterprises:A Study from the Perspective of‘Balance’and‘Complementarity’of Multiple Major Shareholders”(Grant No.72202230).
文摘This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of“unarticulated rules”and“articulated rules”.The study finds that state-owned capital participation significantly reduces the debt financing costs of private enterprises and expands the scale of their debt financing.This conclusion remains valid after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.Further analysis of the mechanism reveals that state-owned capital participation improves the debt financing of private enterprises through multiple channels:Enhancing their social reputation,mitigating the“statistical bias”they face,optimizing their information quality,and reducing the“shareholder-creditor”agency problems.This paper conceptualizes these benefits as the“complementary advantages of heterogeneous shareholders”.This not only constructs a theoretical framework for“reverse mixed-ownership reform”but also better narrates the Chinese story of“mixed-ownership reform”by adopting a more universally applicable theory of equity structure.Additionally,the paper supplements existing research on the macro-and meso-level relationship between the government and the market by exploring the government’s positive role at the micro-level.
基金the financial support of the Deloitte Professorship
文摘Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.
文摘Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company.This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment(CEPI).We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI.Specifically,external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI.In addition,after participating in SOEs,non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.
基金funded by grants from the Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71772029)LiaoNing Revitalization Talents Program(No.XLYC2007052)Tax Accounting Research Center of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
文摘According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.
基金the financial support of the Fondation HEC (Project F0802)the INTACCT program (European Union, Contract No. MRTN-CT-2006-035850)
文摘This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and profit from private benefits of control. However, this agency conflict has been rarely studied, as the most commonly assumed agency conflict occurs between managers and shareholders. Using an audit fee model derived from Simunic(1980), we study the impact of the nature of controlling shareholders on audit fees in French listed firms. Our results show:(1) a negative relationship between audit fees and government shareholdings;(2) a positive relationship between audit fees and institutional shareholdings; and(3) no relationship between audit fees and family shareholdings. These results illustrate the mixed effects of the nature of ownership on audit fees.
基金financial support from the Youth Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Approval No.72002234)the Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Sciences Research Project(Approval No.19YJC790072)the Young Teacher Development Fund of Central University of Finance and Economics(QJJ1801)
文摘A major risk currently facing the Chinese economy is overcapacity,which affects the efficiency of social resource allocation(Xi et al.,2017;Huang et al.,2019).When a company is in crisis,the internal capital market often plays a propping role.This study approached this issue from the perspective of the controlling shareholder and examined whether controlling shareholders provide financial support to enterprises in industries with excess capacity.According to the data for China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to2019,companies in industries with excess capacity received more financial support from controlling shareholders compared with those in non-overcapacity industries.Analysis of the mechanism revealed that state-owned enterprises and companies with relatively poor financial status received more financial support from controlling shareholders.This study also examined the economic consequences of such support and found that it is conducive to enhancing enterprise value.This study enriches the literature on overcapacity and internal capital markets by demonstrating that internal capital markets play a propping role for companies facing industry-level crises.This finding has both theoretical value and practical implications related to supply-side reform and capacity reduction.
文摘The Taiwan Residents government offers firms that invest in qualified projects in emerging high-tech industries two mutually exclusive tax incentives—a corporate 5-year tax exemption or shareholder investment tax credits. This study examines whether corporate managers take shareholder tax benefits into account in their corporate tax planning. The results show that privately held firms are more likely than listed firms to choose shareholder investment tax credits and forego corporate tax benefits. Listed firms with relatively high earnings response coefficients tend to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption, as it can enhance reported after-tax earnings. Further, in the 5-year period following their choice of a particular tax incentive, firms choosing a corporate 5-year tax exemption exhibit significantly lower earnings persistence than those choosing shareholder investment tax credits. Taken together, these results suggest that stock market pressure has a significant effect on firms' choices between corporate and shareholder tax benefits, and that the choice of tax incentives has an effect on future earnings quality.
基金China’s National Science Foundation 71371121China’s National Science Foundation 71421002China's National Science Foundation 71531010.
文摘Equity crowdfunding via the Internet is a new channel of raising money for startups.It features low barriers to entry,low cost,and high speed,and thus encourages innovation.In recent years,equity crowdfunding in China has experienced some developments.However,some problems remain unsolved in practice.Blockchain is a decentralized and distributed ledger technology to ensure data security,transparency,and integrity.Because it cannot be tampered with or forged,the technology is deemed to have great potential in the finance industry.This study examines current problems in the practice of equity crowdfunding in China.Based on the analysis of the characteristics of blockchain technology,this study further explores its practical applications in equity crowdfunding.1)Blockchain technology may be a secure,efficient,low-cost solution for the registration of stocks and shares of a firm financed by crowdfunding;2)Blockchain technology simplifies the transaction and transfer of crowdfunding equities,and thus facilitates their circulation;3)Blockchain technology enables peer to peer transactions between investors and entrepreneurs,and solves the problems of regulatory compliance and security of fund management;Blockchain technology can be used to develop a voting system for crowdfunders,which enables them to be involved in corporate governance.This helps protect the rights and interests of small investors;5)Blockchain technology helps regulators know about market conditions,and supports regulatory activities such as managing investors and fighting money laundering.
文摘Shareholders and debtholders have diverging objectives.Shareholders are residual claimants whereas debtholders are fixed claimants to firm’s assets.In leveraged firms,shareholders may increase the value of their claims at the expense of debtholders.The presence of shareholders being debtholders is a smart interest alignment,providing a solution to shareholder-debtholder conflicts.This paper focuses on small businesses,which play an important role in the United States economy but are generally neglected by academia.Utilizing National Survey of Small Business Finance(NSSBF)data,this paper shows that firms with higher agency cost of debt are more likely to issue owner loan.The incidence of small business owner loan is positively associated with external lending difficulty,low shareholder agency cost and firm valuation difficulty.
文摘This study examines the impact of family control on the dividend policy of firms in Pakistan,covering the period from 2009 to 2016.It also investigates whether family control moderates the impact of firm-specific factors on the dividend policy.The GMM model for panel data estimation is used.The mean difference univariate analysis shows that family firms differ from nonfamily firms based on financial characteristics.The multivariate analysis shows that family firms pay lower dividends than nonfamily firms.Besides,firm size inversely affects the dividend policy,whereas tangibility positively affects it.Moreover,family control does not moderate the impact of all firm-specific factors on the dividend policy.Overall,family control,size,and tangibility are found to be the main determinants of the dividend policy in Pakistan.
基金The National Natural Science Fund Aid Project(No.79925004,79870022)
文摘The reform for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)during the past twenty years selected several ways which couldn't solve essential problems and improve the performance of the SOEs in China. The reason is that traditional ownership instituton wasn't changed at all,the institution reach an impasse in market system which resulted in the fact that SOEs couldn't get used to keen competition. This paper analyses an ownership restructuring case in which an executive holds major capital stock in a state textile institute restructured and therefore the state ownership was withdrawn from it completely, it expounds the rationality of the model selected and points out that the model is currently a very effective way by which M & S SOEs would withdraw from competitive business field successfully.
文摘The authors propose new Bayesian models to obtain individual-level and time-varying regression coefficients in longitudinal data involving a single observation per response unit at each time period. An application to explore the association between customer satisfaction and shareholder value is included in the paper. The Bayesian models allow the flexibility of incorporating industry and firm factors in the context of the application to help explain variations of the regression coefficients. Results from the analysis indicate that the effect of customer satisfaction on shareholder value is not homogeneous over time. The proposed methodology provides a powerful tool to explore the relationship between two important business concepts.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) programs (71502161 and 71672134)Key Programs of Philosophical and Social Science Planning of Zhejiang Province (17NDJC025Z)+1 种基金Natural Science Foundation Program of Zhejiang Province (LQ14G020011)"Zhi Jiang Young Social Science Scholar" Program of Zhejiang Province (G267)
文摘Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure and standardize their exercise of shareholder rights over state-owned listed companies. Based on this quasinatural experiment, this paper examines the BoD's effects on the agency cost of state-owned listed companies and their economic consequences. Using data of central SOE-controlled companies listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2002-2015, this paper finds that the pilot programs significantly reduced the two types of agency costs for the companies, and such effects primarily existed for listed companies with smaller central SOE shareholding ratios. Further test uncovers that, compared with central SOEs that did not carry out the pilot programs, those that did reported higher economic value-added and stock returns. Our conclusions offer a new interpretation of the BoD's governance effects from a controlling shareholder's perspective, and provide empirical evidence for the positive effects of the pilot programs for central SOE boards of directors. These findings have important policy implications for deepening SOE governance reforms.
文摘Using modern economic theories,this paper analyzed drawbacks of Shareholding cooperative development of agricultural cooperatives in institutional design and expounded inevitable difficulties of development of agricultural cooperatives. Shareholding cooperative development provides a pass for many social forces entering and controlling agricultural cooperatives and making numerous non-agricultural cooperative organizations become formal cooperatives. Deep cause for Shareholding cooperative development of agricultural cooperatives involves how to recognize status and function of family producers of agricultural products in the drive of agricultural modernization and the problem of state policies choosing family producers of agricultural products or other participants in the agricultural industry chain. Shareholding cooperative development is only an expedient measure in certain period,and it should not change development laws of things and essential feature of agricultural cooperatives because of stressing national conditions.
基金Supported by the Collective Impact Survey of Rural Collective Members' Rights on the Land Transfer of National College Innovative Pilot Projects of 2009 (081035716)
文摘According to the legal definitions of land transfer under shareholding cooperative systems,rural groups,collective rights of members,and this paper discloses the necessity of protecting the collective rights of members.In terms of qualification definition of members,rights of fetus,married daughters and sons in law cannot be guaranteed.In terms of rights protection,partial rights cannot be assured,power of personal stake inthe collective members is imperfect which results in inadequate,unbalanced,shaky and unpunctuated benefits.Based on objective and subjectivecauses,the democratic management rights of members in land transfer process have been weakened or even deprived,the protection of the basiclife is hard to realize.The paper proposes that it is necessary to build the social protection mechanisms of rural land shareholding cooperative sys-tems.The first is to treat those members that own land,attending the shareholding cooperation but having not taken part in the land transfer proces-sion as the protection objects.The second is in the procession of land transfer,making it clear the compensation standards of land transfer,estab-lishing the intermediate agencies of land transfer and performing the collective economic organizing functions.The third is that the account capital ofsocial protection is contributed together by personal member,the land users(shareholding cooperative companies) and government.The fourth isto pay more attention to the added value and safety management of capital operation.
文摘Debates on shareholder structure and discretionary management of accounting results have carried forward controversial results. This study is intended to analyze within the Cameroonian context the impact of shareholder structure on the management of accounting results in enterprises. More specifically, its objective is to analyze the impact of shareholder structure on the adjustment of regulating discretionary accounting variables. A panel of enterprises is constituted over the periods 2013, 2014, and 2015 in Cameroon. The modeling of regulating discretionary accounting variables has been carried out according to the model of Jones (1991). The different results obtained show that the degree of concentration of the capital seems not to dissuade the management of result per long-term positions. Foreign ownership and state property stimulate management by regulating discretionary accounting variables.
文摘The aim is to examine how the creative economy develops in shareholder,state,and stakeholder capitalism.In the shareholder capitalism,the creative economy is headed by large companies in cooperation with governments,which replicate pregiven formulas of governance with no consideration of local specificities,and reinforces the exclusion of small and medium-sized creative enterprises.The state capitalism has the government authorities as the main drivers of the creative economy’s growth,which is usually connected to their political interest in preserving authority and manipulating the population.In the stakeholder capitalism,companies should pay their fair share of taxes,show zero tolerance for corruption,uphold human rights throughout their global supply chains,and advocate for a competitive level playing field.These elements create the specific conditions for a more diversified set of actors leading the initiatives dedicated to the development of creative economy.
文摘Financial decisions in general and dividend policy in particular are based on the relationship between the stakeholders.Also,analyzing the dividend policy in companies that are not listed on the stock market remains important.The object of our study is to analyze the agency relationship in the link between the ownership structure and the distribution of the dividend at the level of Cameroonian companies.We opted for a qualitative and quantitative study.The statistical tests carried out(with 67 companies)are the comparison test of means and the analysis of variance with one factor(using Statistic Package for Social Science[SPSS]software).The results of this research show that regular and irregular dividend payments lead to a low level of conflict between majority-minority shareholders and shareholder-managers.This leads to a negative relationship between the concentration,the ownership identity,and the dividend policy.
文摘Background: Older people participating in shareholding networks are exposed to diverse situations, which may be associated with dignity. Aims: This study aimed to illuminate the meaning of lived experiences when participating in shareholding networks for the care of older people in rural areas. Methods: This qualitative study is based on individual interviews. Ten older Thai persons with at least 12 months of lived experiences participating in shareholding networks for older people in rural areas were interviewed. A phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, inspired by Ricoeur, was used to understand the meaning of the narrated text. Findings: The structural analysis resulted in four themes: 1) being satisfied with activities, 2) being valued as important, 3) being frustrated and feeling sad, and 4) being bored and feeling disinterest. The meaning of participation in a shareholding network for the elderly can be understood as a pathway to feelings of confidence and presence of others. Confidence and allowing the presence of others mean facing humanity and sensing vulnerability, because in a trusting relationship the person who gives confidence is susceptible to the other’s betrayal. Conclusion: An individual’s dignity should be a high priority in health and social care strategies. Therefore, it is important for healthcare professionals to initiate a dialogue with the shareholding participants for support and information. The narrations in this study can be used as a basis for developing cooperating care with older people in shareholding network focusing on their needs and dignity.
文摘On 28 June 2001, CES held 2001 Shareholder Meeting ceremoniously at Qing Song Cheng Hotel.After hearing Board Secretary Luo Zhuping’s accounts on attendance number and shareholding issues, Ye Yigan, President of Eastern Air
