This essay explores the aims of working-class education in China.The word'working-class5 is seldom used nowadays but social stratification still exists.Different groups of people in working-class changes with soci...This essay explores the aims of working-class education in China.The word'working-class5 is seldom used nowadays but social stratification still exists.Different groups of people in working-class changes with social changes so who are the working-class in China now will be identified firstly.The current aims of working-class education in China will be critiqued through four ideologies in education that are highlighted by Schiro(2013).The Social Efficiency Ideology,the Social Recontribution Ideology,the Scholar Academic Ideology in China will be discussed at the same time.Relative theories like aim-based education to achieve flourishing lives(Reiss&White,2014)and knowledge-based curriculum reported by Young(2013)are relevant in leading education policies and provoking for future schools and education system.Finally,I will conclude the aims of working-class education and give the implications.展开更多
The emergence of a novel strain during a pandemic,like the current COVID-19,is a major concern to the healthcare system.The most effective strategy to control this type of pandemic is vaccination.Many previous studies...The emergence of a novel strain during a pandemic,like the current COVID-19,is a major concern to the healthcare system.The most effective strategy to control this type of pandemic is vaccination.Many previous studies suggest that the existing vaccine may not be fully effective against the new strain.Additionally,the new strain's late arrival has a significant impact on the disease dynamics and vaccine coverage.Focusing on these issues,this study presents a two-strain epidemic model in which the new strain appears with a time delay.We considered two vaccination provisions,namely preinfection and post-infection vaccinations,which are governed by human behavioral dynamics.In such a framework,individuals have the option to commit vaccination before being infected with the first strain.Additionally,people who forgo vaccination and become infected with the first train have the chance to be vaccinated(after recovery)in an attempt to avoid infection from the second strain.However,a second strain can infect vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals.People may have additional opportunities to be vaccinated and to protect themselves from the second strain due to the time delay.Considering the cost of the vaccine,the severity of the new strain,and the vaccine's effectiveness,our results indicated that delaying the second strain decreases the peak size of the infected individuals.Finally,by estimating the social efficiency deficit,we discovered that the social dilemma for receiving immunization decreases with the delay in the arrival of the second strain.展开更多
In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-the-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources. However, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is a...In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-the-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources. However, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is always trustworthy in the sealed-bid auctions, which is not always true in a more realistic scenario. Besides the privacy-preserving issue, the performance guarantee of social efficiency maximization is also crucial for auction mechanism design. In this paper, we study the auction mechanisms that consider the above two aspects. We discuss two multi-unit auction models： the identical multiple-items auction and the distinct multiple-items auction.Since the problem of determining a multi-unit auction mechanism that can maximize its social efficiency is NPhard, we design a series of nearly optimal multi-unit auction mechanisms for the proposed models. We prove that the proposed auction mechanisms are strategyproof. Moreover, we also prove that the privacy of bid value from each bidder can be preserved in the auction mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on the strategyproof multi-unit auction mechanisms that simultaneously consider privacy preservation and social efficiency maximization. The extensive simulations show that the proposed mechanisms have low computation and communication overheads.展开更多
文摘This essay explores the aims of working-class education in China.The word'working-class5 is seldom used nowadays but social stratification still exists.Different groups of people in working-class changes with social changes so who are the working-class in China now will be identified firstly.The current aims of working-class education in China will be critiqued through four ideologies in education that are highlighted by Schiro(2013).The Social Efficiency Ideology,the Social Recontribution Ideology,the Scholar Academic Ideology in China will be discussed at the same time.Relative theories like aim-based education to achieve flourishing lives(Reiss&White,2014)and knowledge-based curriculum reported by Young(2013)are relevant in leading education policies and provoking for future schools and education system.Finally,I will conclude the aims of working-class education and give the implications.
基金supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from JSPS,Japan,KAKENHI(Grant No.JP 19KK0262,JP 20H02314,JP 20K21062)a warded to Professor Tanimoto.
文摘The emergence of a novel strain during a pandemic,like the current COVID-19,is a major concern to the healthcare system.The most effective strategy to control this type of pandemic is vaccination.Many previous studies suggest that the existing vaccine may not be fully effective against the new strain.Additionally,the new strain's late arrival has a significant impact on the disease dynamics and vaccine coverage.Focusing on these issues,this study presents a two-strain epidemic model in which the new strain appears with a time delay.We considered two vaccination provisions,namely preinfection and post-infection vaccinations,which are governed by human behavioral dynamics.In such a framework,individuals have the option to commit vaccination before being infected with the first strain.Additionally,people who forgo vaccination and become infected with the first train have the chance to be vaccinated(after recovery)in an attempt to avoid infection from the second strain.However,a second strain can infect vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals.People may have additional opportunities to be vaccinated and to protect themselves from the second strain due to the time delay.Considering the cost of the vaccine,the severity of the new strain,and the vaccine's effectiveness,our results indicated that delaying the second strain decreases the peak size of the infected individuals.Finally,by estimating the social efficiency deficit,we discovered that the social dilemma for receiving immunization decreases with the delay in the arrival of the second strain.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61572342 and 61672369)the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (Nos. BK20151240 and BK20161258)China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Nos. 2015M580470 and 2016M591920)
文摘In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-the-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources. However, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is always trustworthy in the sealed-bid auctions, which is not always true in a more realistic scenario. Besides the privacy-preserving issue, the performance guarantee of social efficiency maximization is also crucial for auction mechanism design. In this paper, we study the auction mechanisms that consider the above two aspects. We discuss two multi-unit auction models： the identical multiple-items auction and the distinct multiple-items auction.Since the problem of determining a multi-unit auction mechanism that can maximize its social efficiency is NPhard, we design a series of nearly optimal multi-unit auction mechanisms for the proposed models. We prove that the proposed auction mechanisms are strategyproof. Moreover, we also prove that the privacy of bid value from each bidder can be preserved in the auction mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on the strategyproof multi-unit auction mechanisms that simultaneously consider privacy preservation and social efficiency maximization. The extensive simulations show that the proposed mechanisms have low computation and communication overheads.
