Based on the evolutionary game approach,this paper analyzes how the automaker makes rational production decisions under the influence of the government and consumers.A tripartite evolutionary game model of“government...Based on the evolutionary game approach,this paper analyzes how the automaker makes rational production decisions under the influence of the government and consumers.A tripartite evolutionary game model of“government-automaker-consumer”is established to explore the interactions under the condition of bounded rationality.The study shows that:1)The increase of credit price and credit ratio will promote the diffusion of new energy vehicles(NEVs).2)The cost premium of NEVs and the shrinking market will slow the spread of NEVs to some extent but will not prevent NEVs from becoming a trend in the automobile industry.However,the cost premium of fuel vehicles(FVs)will accelerate the development of the NEV industry.3)Government subsidies can promote the development of NEV industry to some extent,but they are not always effective.The government can simultaneously implement subsidies for automakers and consumers in the early stages,and choose to implement the subsidy only for consumers in the medium term.Additionally,there is no need to implement the subsidy policy at a later stage.展开更多
We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LII...We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LIIs),small and medium-sized institutional investors(SMIIs),and supervision department(SD).The results show that supervision behaviors of SD,and quotation behaviors of institutional investors,are subject to supervision conditions.Under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are lower a lot than minimum benefits of light supervision(light supervision condition),SD will choose light supervision and institutional investors will turn to illegal quotation in response.Finally,a steady-state equilibrium with low-price collusion will form in SIBC’s inquiry market even with a large supervision penalty for illegal quotation.On the contrary,under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are higher a lot than maximum benefits of light supervision(tough supervision condition)and with a large penalty for illegal quotation,SD and institutional investors will choose tough supervision and legal quotation.Further numerical simulations under light supervision condition show that:(1)High-price culling rule will become a booster for low-price collusion and accelerate SMIIs’evolutionary process to imitative quotation.(2)Blindly increasing penalties for illegal quotation or reducing the culling rate is not an appropriate approach to solve the problem of low-price collusion since it cannot shift supervision condition from light into tough and make SD supervise toughly.(3)Institutional investors’choices of quotation strategies are more volatile and highly susceptible to supervision behaviors of SD when facing exogenous uncertainty.Therefore,the keys to solving the problem of low-price collusion are shifting supervision condition from light into tough through increasing incremental benefits of tough supervision,and providing institutional investors with a stable and predictable supervision policy.In conclusion,the creation of a fair inquiry market doesn’t only depend on restraint and punishment to institutional investors,but also requires the establishment of supervision mechanism those are compatible with market-based inquiry.展开更多
In the era of large-scale retirement of power batteries,there are information barriers and high recovery costs in their recycling.In view of this,in this study we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of th...In the era of large-scale retirement of power batteries,there are information barriers and high recovery costs in their recycling.In view of this,in this study we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of the cooperation between power battery production and recycling enterprises and government participation.We analyzed the strategic choice of the three parties in the process of power battery recycling and simulated the influence of participants'willingness and information barriers on the strategic choices of the parties.The results showed that power battery production and recycling enterprises,and the government are affected by each other's willingness to participate at different degrees.The willingness of power battery manufacturers and recycling enterprises to cooperate with each other decreased with increases in information barriers.By analyzing the impact of information barrier on power battery recycling,some suggestions are put forward to provide decision-making reference for promoting the sustainable development of power battery industry.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71702112,72204001 and 71971049the Social Science Planning Fund of Liaoning Province under Grant No.L19CGL008The Economic and Social Development Project of Liaoning Province under Grant 2022lslybkt-027.
文摘Based on the evolutionary game approach,this paper analyzes how the automaker makes rational production decisions under the influence of the government and consumers.A tripartite evolutionary game model of“government-automaker-consumer”is established to explore the interactions under the condition of bounded rationality.The study shows that:1)The increase of credit price and credit ratio will promote the diffusion of new energy vehicles(NEVs).2)The cost premium of NEVs and the shrinking market will slow the spread of NEVs to some extent but will not prevent NEVs from becoming a trend in the automobile industry.However,the cost premium of fuel vehicles(FVs)will accelerate the development of the NEV industry.3)Government subsidies can promote the development of NEV industry to some extent,but they are not always effective.The government can simultaneously implement subsidies for automakers and consumers in the early stages,and choose to implement the subsidy only for consumers in the medium term.Additionally,there is no need to implement the subsidy policy at a later stage.
基金funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72172164)Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province(2021A1515011354).
文摘We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LIIs),small and medium-sized institutional investors(SMIIs),and supervision department(SD).The results show that supervision behaviors of SD,and quotation behaviors of institutional investors,are subject to supervision conditions.Under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are lower a lot than minimum benefits of light supervision(light supervision condition),SD will choose light supervision and institutional investors will turn to illegal quotation in response.Finally,a steady-state equilibrium with low-price collusion will form in SIBC’s inquiry market even with a large supervision penalty for illegal quotation.On the contrary,under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are higher a lot than maximum benefits of light supervision(tough supervision condition)and with a large penalty for illegal quotation,SD and institutional investors will choose tough supervision and legal quotation.Further numerical simulations under light supervision condition show that:(1)High-price culling rule will become a booster for low-price collusion and accelerate SMIIs’evolutionary process to imitative quotation.(2)Blindly increasing penalties for illegal quotation or reducing the culling rate is not an appropriate approach to solve the problem of low-price collusion since it cannot shift supervision condition from light into tough and make SD supervise toughly.(3)Institutional investors’choices of quotation strategies are more volatile and highly susceptible to supervision behaviors of SD when facing exogenous uncertainty.Therefore,the keys to solving the problem of low-price collusion are shifting supervision condition from light into tough through increasing incremental benefits of tough supervision,and providing institutional investors with a stable and predictable supervision policy.In conclusion,the creation of a fair inquiry market doesn’t only depend on restraint and punishment to institutional investors,but also requires the establishment of supervision mechanism those are compatible with market-based inquiry.
基金supported by the science and technology research project of Chongqing Education Commission“Research on the renewable effect of China's renewable resources industry in the relationship between economic growth and environmental pollution”[Grant No.KJQN202000532]the humanities and Social Sciences Planning Project of Chongqing Education Commission“Research on supporting policies of power battery producer responsibility extension system un‐der the new development pattern of double cycle”[Grant No.21SKGH039].
文摘In the era of large-scale retirement of power batteries,there are information barriers and high recovery costs in their recycling.In view of this,in this study we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of the cooperation between power battery production and recycling enterprises and government participation.We analyzed the strategic choice of the three parties in the process of power battery recycling and simulated the influence of participants'willingness and information barriers on the strategic choices of the parties.The results showed that power battery production and recycling enterprises,and the government are affected by each other's willingness to participate at different degrees.The willingness of power battery manufacturers and recycling enterprises to cooperate with each other decreased with increases in information barriers.By analyzing the impact of information barrier on power battery recycling,some suggestions are put forward to provide decision-making reference for promoting the sustainable development of power battery industry.
