Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore ...Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.展开更多
Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this ...Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this travel method,despite its numerous benefits.Here,this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game theory(EGT)model to verify the evolutionary stability of choosing the PUDO strategy of drivers and passengers and offering subsidies strategy of carpooling platforms in carpooling system.The model presented in this paper serves as a valuable tool for assessing the dissemination and implementation of PUDO strategy and offering subsidies strategy in carpooling applications.Subsequently,an empirical analysis is conducted to examine and compare the sensitivity of the parameters across various scenarios.The findings suggest that:firstly,providing subsidies to passengers and drivers,along with deductions for drivers through carpooling platforms,is an effective way to promote wider adoption of the PUDO strategy.Then,the decision-making process is divided into three stages:initial stage,middle stage,and mature stage.PUDO strategy progresses from initial rejection to widespread acceptance among drivers in the middle stage and,in the mature stage,both passengers and drivers tend to adopt it under carpooling platform subsidies;the factors influencing the costs of waiting and walking times,as well as the subsidies granted to passengers,are essential determinants that require careful consideration by passengers,drivers,and carpooling platforms when choosing the PUDO strategy.Our work provides valuable insight into the PUDO strategy’s applicability and the declared results provide implications for traffic managers and carpooling platforms to offer a suitable incentive.展开更多
Based on the evolutionary game approach,this paper analyzes how the automaker makes rational production decisions under the influence of the government and consumers.A tripartite evolutionary game model of“government...Based on the evolutionary game approach,this paper analyzes how the automaker makes rational production decisions under the influence of the government and consumers.A tripartite evolutionary game model of“government-automaker-consumer”is established to explore the interactions under the condition of bounded rationality.The study shows that:1)The increase of credit price and credit ratio will promote the diffusion of new energy vehicles(NEVs).2)The cost premium of NEVs and the shrinking market will slow the spread of NEVs to some extent but will not prevent NEVs from becoming a trend in the automobile industry.However,the cost premium of fuel vehicles(FVs)will accelerate the development of the NEV industry.3)Government subsidies can promote the development of NEV industry to some extent,but they are not always effective.The government can simultaneously implement subsidies for automakers and consumers in the early stages,and choose to implement the subsidy only for consumers in the medium term.Additionally,there is no need to implement the subsidy policy at a later stage.展开更多
We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LII...We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LIIs),small and medium-sized institutional investors(SMIIs),and supervision department(SD).The results show that supervision behaviors of SD,and quotation behaviors of institutional investors,are subject to supervision conditions.Under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are lower a lot than minimum benefits of light supervision(light supervision condition),SD will choose light supervision and institutional investors will turn to illegal quotation in response.Finally,a steady-state equilibrium with low-price collusion will form in SIBC’s inquiry market even with a large supervision penalty for illegal quotation.On the contrary,under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are higher a lot than maximum benefits of light supervision(tough supervision condition)and with a large penalty for illegal quotation,SD and institutional investors will choose tough supervision and legal quotation.Further numerical simulations under light supervision condition show that:(1)High-price culling rule will become a booster for low-price collusion and accelerate SMIIs’evolutionary process to imitative quotation.(2)Blindly increasing penalties for illegal quotation or reducing the culling rate is not an appropriate approach to solve the problem of low-price collusion since it cannot shift supervision condition from light into tough and make SD supervise toughly.(3)Institutional investors’choices of quotation strategies are more volatile and highly susceptible to supervision behaviors of SD when facing exogenous uncertainty.Therefore,the keys to solving the problem of low-price collusion are shifting supervision condition from light into tough through increasing incremental benefits of tough supervision,and providing institutional investors with a stable and predictable supervision policy.In conclusion,the creation of a fair inquiry market doesn’t only depend on restraint and punishment to institutional investors,but also requires the establishment of supervision mechanism those are compatible with market-based inquiry.展开更多
In the era of large-scale retirement of power batteries,there are information barriers and high recovery costs in their recycling.In view of this,in this study we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of th...In the era of large-scale retirement of power batteries,there are information barriers and high recovery costs in their recycling.In view of this,in this study we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of the cooperation between power battery production and recycling enterprises and government participation.We analyzed the strategic choice of the three parties in the process of power battery recycling and simulated the influence of participants'willingness and information barriers on the strategic choices of the parties.The results showed that power battery production and recycling enterprises,and the government are affected by each other's willingness to participate at different degrees.The willingness of power battery manufacturers and recycling enterprises to cooperate with each other decreased with increases in information barriers.By analyzing the impact of information barrier on power battery recycling,some suggestions are put forward to provide decision-making reference for promoting the sustainable development of power battery industry.展开更多
基金the financial support from the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of China(2022M720131)Spring Sunshine Collaborative Research Project of the Ministry of Education(202201660)+3 种基金Youth Project of Gansu Natural Science Foundation(22JR5RA542)General Project of Gansu Philosophy and Social Science Foundation(2022YB014)National Natural Science Foundation of China(72034003,72243006,and 71874074)Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2023lzdxjbkyzx008,lzujbky-2021-sp72)。
文摘Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72171172 and 62088101the Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology,China Major Project under Grant No.2021SHZDZX0100the Shanghai Municipal Commission of Science and Technology,China Project under Grant No.19511132101.
文摘Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this travel method,despite its numerous benefits.Here,this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game theory(EGT)model to verify the evolutionary stability of choosing the PUDO strategy of drivers and passengers and offering subsidies strategy of carpooling platforms in carpooling system.The model presented in this paper serves as a valuable tool for assessing the dissemination and implementation of PUDO strategy and offering subsidies strategy in carpooling applications.Subsequently,an empirical analysis is conducted to examine and compare the sensitivity of the parameters across various scenarios.The findings suggest that:firstly,providing subsidies to passengers and drivers,along with deductions for drivers through carpooling platforms,is an effective way to promote wider adoption of the PUDO strategy.Then,the decision-making process is divided into three stages:initial stage,middle stage,and mature stage.PUDO strategy progresses from initial rejection to widespread acceptance among drivers in the middle stage and,in the mature stage,both passengers and drivers tend to adopt it under carpooling platform subsidies;the factors influencing the costs of waiting and walking times,as well as the subsidies granted to passengers,are essential determinants that require careful consideration by passengers,drivers,and carpooling platforms when choosing the PUDO strategy.Our work provides valuable insight into the PUDO strategy’s applicability and the declared results provide implications for traffic managers and carpooling platforms to offer a suitable incentive.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71702112,72204001 and 71971049the Social Science Planning Fund of Liaoning Province under Grant No.L19CGL008The Economic and Social Development Project of Liaoning Province under Grant 2022lslybkt-027.
文摘Based on the evolutionary game approach,this paper analyzes how the automaker makes rational production decisions under the influence of the government and consumers.A tripartite evolutionary game model of“government-automaker-consumer”is established to explore the interactions under the condition of bounded rationality.The study shows that:1)The increase of credit price and credit ratio will promote the diffusion of new energy vehicles(NEVs).2)The cost premium of NEVs and the shrinking market will slow the spread of NEVs to some extent but will not prevent NEVs from becoming a trend in the automobile industry.However,the cost premium of fuel vehicles(FVs)will accelerate the development of the NEV industry.3)Government subsidies can promote the development of NEV industry to some extent,but they are not always effective.The government can simultaneously implement subsidies for automakers and consumers in the early stages,and choose to implement the subsidy only for consumers in the medium term.Additionally,there is no need to implement the subsidy policy at a later stage.
基金funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72172164)Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province(2021A1515011354).
文摘We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LIIs),small and medium-sized institutional investors(SMIIs),and supervision department(SD).The results show that supervision behaviors of SD,and quotation behaviors of institutional investors,are subject to supervision conditions.Under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are lower a lot than minimum benefits of light supervision(light supervision condition),SD will choose light supervision and institutional investors will turn to illegal quotation in response.Finally,a steady-state equilibrium with low-price collusion will form in SIBC’s inquiry market even with a large supervision penalty for illegal quotation.On the contrary,under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are higher a lot than maximum benefits of light supervision(tough supervision condition)and with a large penalty for illegal quotation,SD and institutional investors will choose tough supervision and legal quotation.Further numerical simulations under light supervision condition show that:(1)High-price culling rule will become a booster for low-price collusion and accelerate SMIIs’evolutionary process to imitative quotation.(2)Blindly increasing penalties for illegal quotation or reducing the culling rate is not an appropriate approach to solve the problem of low-price collusion since it cannot shift supervision condition from light into tough and make SD supervise toughly.(3)Institutional investors’choices of quotation strategies are more volatile and highly susceptible to supervision behaviors of SD when facing exogenous uncertainty.Therefore,the keys to solving the problem of low-price collusion are shifting supervision condition from light into tough through increasing incremental benefits of tough supervision,and providing institutional investors with a stable and predictable supervision policy.In conclusion,the creation of a fair inquiry market doesn’t only depend on restraint and punishment to institutional investors,but also requires the establishment of supervision mechanism those are compatible with market-based inquiry.
基金supported by the science and technology research project of Chongqing Education Commission“Research on the renewable effect of China's renewable resources industry in the relationship between economic growth and environmental pollution”[Grant No.KJQN202000532]the humanities and Social Sciences Planning Project of Chongqing Education Commission“Research on supporting policies of power battery producer responsibility extension system un‐der the new development pattern of double cycle”[Grant No.21SKGH039].
文摘In the era of large-scale retirement of power batteries,there are information barriers and high recovery costs in their recycling.In view of this,in this study we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of the cooperation between power battery production and recycling enterprises and government participation.We analyzed the strategic choice of the three parties in the process of power battery recycling and simulated the influence of participants'willingness and information barriers on the strategic choices of the parties.The results showed that power battery production and recycling enterprises,and the government are affected by each other's willingness to participate at different degrees.The willingness of power battery manufacturers and recycling enterprises to cooperate with each other decreased with increases in information barriers.By analyzing the impact of information barrier on power battery recycling,some suggestions are put forward to provide decision-making reference for promoting the sustainable development of power battery industry.
