Truth-conditional approaches to tense and other temporal expressions have relied on both linear-time and branching-time frameworks as needed. However, in the truth-conditional enterprise generally, it seems advisable ...Truth-conditional approaches to tense and other temporal expressions have relied on both linear-time and branching-time frameworks as needed. However, in the truth-conditional enterprise generally, it seems advisable to settle on a single depiction of time. Linear time is the simpler framework, and branching time faces difficulties for which we seem to have no immediate solutions. This paper defends the applicability of linear time. The apparent branching of time results from the use of speech acts other than factual assertion. Truth in correspondence with specific conditions is relevant when making factual assertions. However, we are in no epistemic position to advance factual assertions about the future, but only suppositions and predictions. For these, the truth-conditional content is employed differently. For suppositions and predictions, we only ＂pretend＂ to reference things, to assert facts, and to accept them as ＂true.＂ There is a wide array of alternatives about what we can suppose or predict, giving the impression of branching options. Suppositions and predictions under active consideration are often marked with present tense, whereas those that are inactive （not presently under active consideration but nonetheless relevant） are often marked with past tense.展开更多
The paper examines some doctrines of the Davidsonian Programme of truth conditional Semantics that relates truth to meaning using Tarski’s T-Convention,in relation to its efficacy in a semantic valuation of the EkeGu...The paper examines some doctrines of the Davidsonian Programme of truth conditional Semantics that relates truth to meaning using Tarski’s T-Convention,in relation to its efficacy in a semantic valuation of the EkeGusii proverb:Nda’indongi ereta morogi ereta moibi which exemplifies a kind of complex sentence that a given system of Semantics is meant to account for.The coverage of Davidsonian truth-conditional notion of T-convention and that of compositionality are considered to have only a partial reach in accounting for the meaning of the proverb by not incorporating pragmatic aspects.The failure of T-convention is not alleviated by the adoption of radical interpretation as posited by Davidson but is extended to consider aspects of pragmatic enrichment and dynamic Semantics.展开更多
文摘Truth-conditional approaches to tense and other temporal expressions have relied on both linear-time and branching-time frameworks as needed. However, in the truth-conditional enterprise generally, it seems advisable to settle on a single depiction of time. Linear time is the simpler framework, and branching time faces difficulties for which we seem to have no immediate solutions. This paper defends the applicability of linear time. The apparent branching of time results from the use of speech acts other than factual assertion. Truth in correspondence with specific conditions is relevant when making factual assertions. However, we are in no epistemic position to advance factual assertions about the future, but only suppositions and predictions. For these, the truth-conditional content is employed differently. For suppositions and predictions, we only ＂pretend＂ to reference things, to assert facts, and to accept them as ＂true.＂ There is a wide array of alternatives about what we can suppose or predict, giving the impression of branching options. Suppositions and predictions under active consideration are often marked with present tense, whereas those that are inactive （not presently under active consideration but nonetheless relevant） are often marked with past tense.
文摘The paper examines some doctrines of the Davidsonian Programme of truth conditional Semantics that relates truth to meaning using Tarski’s T-Convention,in relation to its efficacy in a semantic valuation of the EkeGusii proverb:Nda’indongi ereta morogi ereta moibi which exemplifies a kind of complex sentence that a given system of Semantics is meant to account for.The coverage of Davidsonian truth-conditional notion of T-convention and that of compositionality are considered to have only a partial reach in accounting for the meaning of the proverb by not incorporating pragmatic aspects.The failure of T-convention is not alleviated by the adoption of radical interpretation as posited by Davidson but is extended to consider aspects of pragmatic enrichment and dynamic Semantics.
